Re: futex_cmpxchg_enabled breakage
From: Rich Felker
Date: Sat Sep 15 2018 - 12:16:10 EST
On Sat, Sep 15, 2018 at 05:34:24PM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> On Thu, 30 Aug 2018, Rich Felker wrote:
> > On Thu, Aug 30, 2018 at 11:19:58AM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> > > On Wed, 29 Aug 2018, Rich Felker wrote:
> > >
> > > > I just spent a number of hours helping someone track down a bug that
> > > > looks like it's some kind of futex_cmpxchg_enabled detection error on
> > > > powerpc64 (still not sure of the root cause; set_robust_list producing
> > > > -ENOSYS), and a while back I hit the same problem on sh2 due to lack
> > > > of EFAULT on nommu, leading to commit 72cc564f16ca. I think the test
> > > > (introduced way back in commit a0c1e9073ef7) is fundamentally buggy;
> > > > if anything, it should be checking for !=-ENOSYS, not ==-EFAULT.
> > >
> > > Errm? This does a futex_cmpxchg() on NULL which has to return EFAULT if
> > > it's available. There is nothing fundamentally buggy about it at all.
> > I'll let you know when if/when we finish figuring out how this
> > happened on powerpc64, but it's an arch that most certainly has a
> > working cmpxchg where these syscalls ended up returning -ENOSYS. This
> > is an error condition that should not be able to happen. At the very
> > very least all the archs that actually have a working cmpxchg
> > unconditionally should be updated with:
> > select HAVE_FUTEX_CMPXCHG if FUTEX
> > so that whatever caused this for powerpc64 doesn't happen again.
> By doing that you paper over a non functional fixup which could cause other
> really hard to decode runtime failures. If that fails there is a bug
> somewhere else and that runtime check is not to blame at all for it.
The bug, if it's a bug (lack of memory protection on a system that
explicitly does not have memory protection is not a bug), is unrelated
to futexes, so having futex functionality break is not a very
intuitive way of leading people to find the bug. If kernel developers
really want to consider 0-address-is-mapped a bug (conditional on
CONFIG_MMU) there should be some test separate from futex that does
BUG_ON(attempt to access *0 != EFAULT).
> > > > Presumably it could also fail to produce -EFAULT if mmap_min_addr is 0
> > > > and page 0 is mapped (a bad idea, but maybe someone does it...). And
> > > > of course other nommu archs are possibly still broken.
> > >
> > > If NULL is mapped in the kernel then a lot of other things are broken. The
> > > futex thing is then the least of your worries.
> > For nommu NULL is always "mapped".
> Cool, so you can have a NULL pointer dereference without noticing it.
Yes, you can also clobber arbitrary kernel memory from userspace. Fun, eh?
> > > The availibility of the interfaces which depend on futex_cmpxchg_enabled
> > > has been runtime detectable forever and it's documented that way. I have no
> > > idea why you think it's non-optional. If you made it unconditional in your
> > > lib, then it's hardly the kernels problem.
> > Modern glibc also defines:
> > #define __ASSUME_SET_ROBUST_LIST 1
> > It's then #undef'd for some archs (mips, m68k, sparc, arm), but not
> > all archs that lack HAVE_FUTEX_CMPXCHG, so glibc seems to be assuming
> > set_robust_list actually works on some where the kernel is treating
> > failure as a possibility.
> That's hardly a kernel issue, right?
It's an issue of mismatched assumptions about the contract of these
> > > > If there are no archs that support SMP but don't provide their own
> > > > asm/futex.h (as opposed to the asm-generic one that does -ENOSYS on
> > > > SMP), the detection code should just be removed, and the SMP case in
> > > > asm-generic/futex.h should be made into #error.
> > >
> > > And why so? Just because?
> > To prevent inadvertent introduction of this issue on new archs (if the
> > porters don't realize asm-generic/futex.h doesn't actually work for
> > SMP).
> > > > If there are archs that support SMP but don't provide their own
> > > > working asm/futex.h, then asm-generic/futex.h's SMP case should be
> > > > enhanced to perform a stop-the-world IPI and then do the same thing as
> > > > the non-SMP case (disable preemption[/interrupts?], perform the
> > > > cmpxchg non-atomically).
> > > >
> > > > Thoughts? Would a patch to do this be acceptable?
> > >
> > > No. There is nothing at all in the world which requires that PI futexes and
> > > robust list are provided and even if you implement that hack in the kernel
> > > then the user space side still does not work because the user space part of
> > > those interfaces has a hard dependency on working cmpxchg as well.
> > Of course there's a working cmpxchg; this is a hard requirement for
> > userspace. You cannot implement pthread primitives without one. On
> > archs/ISA-levels that lack an insn it's already provided as a syscall,
> > a vdso/khelper, or trap-and-emulate. The problem I'm complaining about
> > here is that, despite already needing and having working ways to
> > achieve this, the kernel is not using them, and breaking functionality
> > that should work.
> I kinda agree for the nommu case, but for power64 you are barking up the
> wrong tree. If that check fails something very fundamentaly is broken and
> that breakage is _NOT_ in the futex code. This has to work independent of
> the futex code, really.
I agree, but it would have been nice for that to be caught by BUG_ON,
not subtle failures in robust mutex functionality that would go
completely unnoticed in production until something broke horribly if
not for the affected user having been running conformance tests.
For musl I will probably add code to pthread_mutexattr_setrobust that
probes whether SYS_get_robust_list fails, and errors out on attempts
to produce an attribute object with the robust flag set if the kernel
cannot support it, since there is no way to safely make forward
progress if the SYS_set_robust_list call fails later. But I was not
aware of the possibility of failure here, and apparently the glibc
folks were not either.
In any case, morally it "should not" be able to fail -- some sort of
working cmpxchg is needed all over the place, at least in userspace
and likely also in kernelspace, and if the cpu lacks a direct way of
implementing it, whatever form of emulation is used elsewhere should
be used here.