Quoting Stephen Smalley (2018-09-21 07:40:58)
If we set the inode sid to the superblock def_sid on an invalid
context, then we lose the association to the original context value.
The support for deferred mapping of contexts requires allocating a new
SID for the invalid context and storing that SID in the inode, so that
if the context later becomes valid upon a policy update/reload, the
inode SID will refer to the now valid context.
To combine the two, we would need security_context_to_sid_core() to
save the def_sid in the context structure for invalid contexts, and
change sidtab_search_core() to use that value instead of
SECINITSID_UNLABELED for invalid SIDs. Then the inode would be
treated as having the defcontext for access control and getxattr() w/o
CAP_MAC_ADMIN purposes, but a subsequent policy update/reload that
makes the context valid would automatically cause subsequent accesses
to the inode to start using the original context value for access
control and getxattr() purposes. I think that's the behavior you
want.
While implementing the change I've realized that storing default context
for sidtab_search_core() in the context structure is not enough to
achieve the desired behavior. The same invalid context may exist in two
mounts with different 'defcontext', so default context can't be a
property of a context structure.
One way to address it is to propagate default context to sidtab_search() all
the way from inode hooks. But that will be a bit intrusive. Something like
avc_has_perm_default() will need to be added.
Other way is to check for context validity in inode hooks and provide a default
context to avc_has_perm() if the inode's sid is invalid. But this may have
performance implication since validity check will be done each time in fast
path.
Do you see any other options?