Re: [Patch v3 04/13] x86/speculation: Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is in use

[Tim Chen]

On 10/26/2018 10:00 AM, Waiman Long wrote:
> On 10/17/2018 01:59 PM, Tim Chen wrote:
>> With enhanced IBRS in use, the application running on sibling CPU will not
>> be able to launch Spectre v2 attack to the application on current CPU.
>> There is no need to use STIBP for this case.  Disable the STIBP code
>> when enhanced IBRS is used.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>> ---
>>  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 12 +++++++++++-
>>  1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
>> index 2fc7b4e..6ed82ea 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
>> @@ -327,6 +327,14 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
>>  
>>  static bool stibp_needed(void)
>>  {
>> +	/*
>> +	 * Determine if we want to leave STIBP always on.
>> +	 * Using enhanced IBRS makes using STIBP unnecessary.
>> +	 */
>> +
>> +	if (static_branch_unlikely(&spectre_v2_enhanced_ibrs))
>> +		return false;
>> +
>>  	if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_NONE)
>>  		return false;
>>  
>> @@ -881,7 +889,9 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr
>>  				   ", IBPB" : "",
>>  			boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ?
>>  				   ", IBRS_FW" : "",
>> -			(x86_spec_ctrl_base & SPEC_CTRL_STIBP) ?
>> +			spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED ?
>> +				   ", Enhanced IBRS" :
>> +			    (x86_spec_ctrl_base & SPEC_CTRL_STIBP) ?
>>  				   ", STIBP" : "",
>>  			boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW) ?
>>  				   ", RSB filling" : "",
> 
> The "Enhanced IBRS" is one of the states of spectre_v2_enabled. So you
> don't need to print that out one more time.
> 

This is for the query to to 
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2

Currently Enhanced IBRS usage is not shown and should be listed.

Tim