Re: [PATCH v13 08/12] KVM: x86: Add Intel PT context switch for each vcpu
From: Paolo Bonzini
Date: Wed Oct 31 2018 - 10:44:14 EST
On 31/10/2018 15:21, Alexander Shishkin wrote:
> Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx> writes:
>
>> On 31/10/2018 12:38, Alexander Shishkin wrote:
>>>> There is no standard way to tell the guest that the host overrode its
>>>> choice to use PT. However, the host will get a PGD/PGE packet around
>>>> vmentry and vmexit, so there _will_ be an indication that the guest
>>>> owned the MSRs for that period of time.
>>>
>>> Not if they are not tracing the kernel.
>>
>> If they are not tracing the kernel why should they be tracing the guest
>> at all?
>
> To trace the guest userspace, perhaps?
Tracing the guest userspace and not the kernel is pretty much useless.
I'd also be surprised if it worked at all, and/or would consider it a
bug if it worked.
IMO tracing the kernel in system-wide mode should trace either all or
none of the guest, but certainly not just the guest kernel. Tracing
userspace should trace none of the guest.
>>>> If PT context switching is enabled with the module parameter, we could
>>>> also reject creation of events with the attribute set. However that
>>>> won't help if the event is created before KVM is even loaded.
>>>
>>> In that case, modprobe kvm should fail.
>>
>> Does that mean that an unprivileged user can effectively DoS
>> virtualization for everyone on the machine? (Honest question).
>
> Would the leave-PT-to-the-host still be allowed? Would ignoring the
> module parameter in that case and falling back to this mode still be
> fine?
That would still prevent the feature from being accessed, until someone
with root access can rmmod kvm-intel.
> I'm not really the one to brainstorm solutions here. There are
> possibilities of solving this, and the current patchset does not even
> begin to acknowledge the existence of the problem, which is what my ACK
> depends on.
Well, one way it does acknowledge the existence of the problem is by not
turning the option on by default.
BTW, Intel (not you) also doesn't acknowledge the existence of the
problem, by not suggesting a solution in the SDM. The SDM includes
examples of host-only, guest-only and combined tracing, but not separate
host and guest tracing.
Paolo