Re: [RFC PATCH v1 0/5] Add support for O_MAYEXEC

From: MickaÃl SalaÃn
Date: Wed Dec 12 2018 - 12:01:02 EST

Le 12/12/2018 Ã 17:29, Jordan Glover a ÃcritÂ:
> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 9:17 AM, MickaÃl SalaÃn <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> Hi,
>> The goal of this patch series is to control script interpretation. A
>> new O_MAYEXEC flag used by sys_open() is added to enable userland script
>> interpreter to delegate to the kernel (and thus the system security
>> policy) the permission to interpret scripts or other files containing
>> what can be seen as commands.
>> The security policy is the responsibility of an LSM. A basic
>> system-wide policy is implemented with Yama and configurable through a
>> sysctl.
>> The initial idea come from CLIP OS and the original implementation has
>> been used for more than 10 years:
>> An introduction to O_MAYEXEC was given at the Linux Security Summit
>> Europe 2018 - Linux Kernel Security Contributions by ANSSI:
>> The "write xor execute" principle was explained at Kernel Recipes 2018 -
>> CLIP OS: a defense-in-depth OS:
>> This patch series can be applied on top of v4.20-rc6. This can be
>> tested with CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA. I would really appreciate
>> constructive comments on this RFC.
>> Regards,
> Are various interpreters upstreams interested in adding support
> for O_MAYEXEC if it land in kernel? Did you contacted them about this?

I think the first step is to be OK on the kernel side. We will then be
able to help upstream interpreters implement this feature. It should be
OK because the behavior doesn't change by default, i.e. if the sysadmin
doesn't configure (and test) the whole system. Some examples of modified
interpreters can be found at