Re: [PATCH -next] x86/xen: Fix read buffer overflow
From: YueHaibing
Date: Tue Dec 18 2018 - 05:42:26 EST
On 2018/12/18 16:31, Juergen Gross wrote:
> On 18/12/2018 09:19, YueHaibing wrote:
>> Fix smatch warning:
>>
>> arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c:649 get_trap_addr() error:
>> buffer overflow 'early_idt_handler_array' 32 <= 32
>>
>> Fixes: 42b3a4cb5609 ("x86/xen: Support early interrupts in xen pv guests")
>> Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@xxxxxxxxxx>
>> ---
>> arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c | 2 +-
>> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
>> index 2f6787f..81f200d 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
>> @@ -646,7 +646,7 @@ static bool __ref get_trap_addr(void **addr, unsigned int ist)
>>
>> if (nr == ARRAY_SIZE(trap_array) &&
>> *addr >= (void *)early_idt_handler_array[0] &&
>> - *addr < (void *)early_idt_handler_array[NUM_EXCEPTION_VECTORS]) {
>> + *addr < (void *)early_idt_handler_array[NUM_EXCEPTION_VECTORS - 1]) {
>> nr = (*addr - (void *)early_idt_handler_array[0]) /
>> EARLY_IDT_HANDLER_SIZE;
>> *addr = (void *)xen_early_idt_handler_array[nr];
>>
>
> No, this patch is wrong.
>
> early_idt_handler_array is a 2-dimensional array:
>
> const char
> early_idt_handler_array[NUM_EXCEPTION_VECTORS][EARLY_IDT_HANDLER_SIZE];
>
> So above code doesn't do an out of bounds array access, but checks for
> *addr being in the array or outside of it (note the "<" used for the
> test).
Thank you for your explanation.
>
>
> Juergen
>
> .
>