[PATCH 4.9 05/71] phonet: af_phonet: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman
Date: Mon Jan 07 2019 - 08:06:03 EST

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.


From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

[ Upstream commit d686026b1e6ed4ea27d630d8f54f9a694db088b2 ]

protocol is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

net/phonet/af_phonet.c:48 phonet_proto_get() warn: potential spectre issue 'proto_tab' [w] (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing protocol before using it to index proto_tab.

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2

Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
net/phonet/af_phonet.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

--- a/net/phonet/af_phonet.c
+++ b/net/phonet/af_phonet.c
@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@
#include <net/phonet/phonet.h>
#include <net/phonet/pn_dev.h>

+#include <linux/nospec.h>
/* Transport protocol registration */
static struct phonet_protocol *proto_tab[PHONET_NPROTO] __read_mostly;

@@ -43,6 +45,7 @@ static struct phonet_protocol *phonet_pr

if (protocol >= PHONET_NPROTO)
return NULL;
+ protocol = array_index_nospec(protocol, PHONET_NPROTO);

pp = rcu_dereference(proto_tab[protocol]);