On Thu, Jan 10, 2019 at 12:57:57PM -0500, Steven Rostedt wrote:
On Thu, 10 Jan 2019 09:42:57 -0800
Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Thu, Jan 10, 2019 at 12:32:43PM -0500, Steven Rostedt wrote:
On Thu, 10 Jan 2019 11:20:04 -0600
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
While I can't find a reason for hypervisors to emulate this instruction,
smarter people might find ways to turn it into a security exploit.
Interesting point... but I wonder if it's a realistic concern. BTW,
text_poke_bp() also relies on undocumented behavior.
But we did get an official OK from Intel that it will work. Took a bit
of arm twisting to get them to do so, but they did. And it really is
pretty robust.
Did we (they?) list any caveats for this behavior? E.g. I'm fairly
certain atomicity guarantees go out the window if WC memtype is used.
Note, the text_poke_bp() process was this: (nothing to do with atomic
guarantees)
add breakpoint (one byte) to instruction.
Sync all cores (send an IPI to each one).
change the back half of the instruction (the rest of the instruction
after the breakpoint).
Sync all cores
Remove the breakpoint with the new byte of the new instruction.
What atomicity guarantee does the above require?
I was asking in the context of static calls. My understanding is that
the write to change the imm32 of the CALL needs to be atomic from a
code fetch perspective so that we don't jump to a junk address.