[PATCH 4.19 103/106] ipmi: msghandler: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerabilities
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman
Date: Thu Jan 24 2019 - 14:38:49 EST
4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
commit a7102c7461794a5bb31af24b08e9e0f50038897a upstream.
channel and addr->channel are indirectly controlled by user-space,
hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1
vulnerability.
These issues were detected with the help of Smatch:
drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c:1381 ipmi_set_my_address() warn: potential spectre issue 'user->intf->addrinfo' [w] (local cap)
drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c:1401 ipmi_get_my_address() warn: potential spectre issue 'user->intf->addrinfo' [r] (local cap)
drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c:1421 ipmi_set_my_LUN() warn: potential spectre issue 'user->intf->addrinfo' [w] (local cap)
drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c:1441 ipmi_get_my_LUN() warn: potential spectre issue 'user->intf->addrinfo' [r] (local cap)
drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c:2260 check_addr() warn: potential spectre issue 'intf->addrinfo' [r] (local cap)
Fix this by sanitizing channel and addr->channel before using them to
index user->intf->addrinfo and intf->addrinfo, correspondingly.
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180423164740.GY17484@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx/
Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c
+++ b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
#include <linux/workqueue.h>
#include <linux/uuid.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
#define PFX "IPMI message handler: "
@@ -1297,10 +1298,12 @@ int ipmi_set_my_address(struct ipmi_user
if (!user)
return -ENODEV;
- if (channel >= IPMI_MAX_CHANNELS)
+ if (channel >= IPMI_MAX_CHANNELS) {
rv = -EINVAL;
- else
+ } else {
+ channel = array_index_nospec(channel, IPMI_MAX_CHANNELS);
user->intf->addrinfo[channel].address = address;
+ }
release_ipmi_user(user, index);
return rv;
@@ -1317,10 +1320,12 @@ int ipmi_get_my_address(struct ipmi_user
if (!user)
return -ENODEV;
- if (channel >= IPMI_MAX_CHANNELS)
+ if (channel >= IPMI_MAX_CHANNELS) {
rv = -EINVAL;
- else
+ } else {
+ channel = array_index_nospec(channel, IPMI_MAX_CHANNELS);
*address = user->intf->addrinfo[channel].address;
+ }
release_ipmi_user(user, index);
return rv;
@@ -1337,10 +1342,12 @@ int ipmi_set_my_LUN(struct ipmi_user *us
if (!user)
return -ENODEV;
- if (channel >= IPMI_MAX_CHANNELS)
+ if (channel >= IPMI_MAX_CHANNELS) {
rv = -EINVAL;
- else
+ } else {
+ channel = array_index_nospec(channel, IPMI_MAX_CHANNELS);
user->intf->addrinfo[channel].lun = LUN & 0x3;
+ }
release_ipmi_user(user, index);
return 0;
@@ -1357,10 +1364,12 @@ int ipmi_get_my_LUN(struct ipmi_user *us
if (!user)
return -ENODEV;
- if (channel >= IPMI_MAX_CHANNELS)
+ if (channel >= IPMI_MAX_CHANNELS) {
rv = -EINVAL;
- else
+ } else {
+ channel = array_index_nospec(channel, IPMI_MAX_CHANNELS);
*address = user->intf->addrinfo[channel].lun;
+ }
release_ipmi_user(user, index);
return rv;
@@ -2184,6 +2193,7 @@ static int check_addr(struct ipmi_smi *
{
if (addr->channel >= IPMI_MAX_CHANNELS)
return -EINVAL;
+ addr->channel = array_index_nospec(addr->channel, IPMI_MAX_CHANNELS);
*lun = intf->addrinfo[addr->channel].lun;
*saddr = intf->addrinfo[addr->channel].address;
return 0;