Re: [PATCH v4 07/12] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for meltdown

[Jeremy Linton]

Hi,

On 01/31/2019 11:54 AM, Andre Przywara wrote:
> On Fri, 25 Jan 2019 12:07:06 -0600
> Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@xxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> Hi,
>
> > Display the mitigation status if active, otherwise
> > assume the cpu is safe unless it doesn't have CSV3
> > and isn't in our whitelist.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@xxxxxxx>
> > ---
> >   arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
> >   1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
> > b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
> > index a9e18b9cdc1e..624dfe0b5cdd 100644
> > --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
> > +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
> > @@ -944,6 +944,8 @@ has_useable_cnp(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope)
> > 	return has_cpuid_feature(entry, scope);
> > }
> >   
> > +/* default value is invalid until unmap_kernel_at_el0() runs */
>
> Shall we somehow enforce this? For instance by making __meltdown_safe
> an enum, initialised to UNKNOWN?

Hehe, well I think people complained about my "UNKNOWN" enum. But, in 
the end this version is trying to make it clear we shouldn't have any 
unknown states remaining.

> Then bail out with a BUG_ON or WARN_ON in the sysfs code?

AFAIK, it shouldn't be possible to actually run the sysfs code before 
this gets initialized. So, the comment is just making it clear/forcing 
the understanding of that.


> I just want to avoid to accidentally report "safe" when we actually
> aren't.
>
> > +static bool __meltdown_safe = true;
> >   static int __kpti_forced; /* 0: not forced, >0: forced on, <0: forced off */
> >   static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
> > @@ -962,6 +964,16 @@ static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
> > 		{ /* sentinel */ }
> >   	};
> >   	char const *str = "command line option";
> > +	bool meltdown_safe;
> > +
> > +	meltdown_safe = is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), kpti_safe_list);
> > +
> > +	/* Defer to CPU feature registers */
> > +	if (has_cpuid_feature(entry, scope))
> > +		meltdown_safe = true;
> > +
> > +	if (!meltdown_safe)
> > +		__meltdown_safe = false;
> >   
> >   	/*
> >   	 * For reasons that aren't entirely clear, enabling KPTI on Cavium
> > @@ -984,12 +996,7 @@ static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
> > 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE))
> > 		return kaslr_offset() > 0;
> >   
> > -	/* Don't force KPTI for CPUs that are not vulnerable */
> > -	if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), kpti_safe_list))
> > -		return false;
> > -
> > -	/* Defer to CPU feature registers */
> > -	return !has_cpuid_feature(entry, scope);
> > +	return !meltdown_safe;
> >   }
> >   
> >   static void
> > @@ -2055,3 +2062,17 @@ static int __init enable_mrs_emulation(void)
> >   }
> >   
> >   core_initcall(enable_mrs_emulation);
> > +
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES
> > +ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
> > +		char *buf)
>
> w/s issue.
>
> Cheers,
> Andre.
>
> > +{
> > +	if (arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0())
> > +		return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: KPTI\n");
> > +
> > +	if (__meltdown_safe)
> > +		return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
> > +
> > +	return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
> > +}
> > +#endif