Re: [PATCH 1/2 v2] kprobe: Do not use uaccess functions to access kernel memory that can fault

[Andy Lutomirski]

On Sat, Feb 23, 2019 at 12:30 AM Nadav Amit <namit@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> > On Feb 22, 2019, at 3:59 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >
> > On Fri, Feb 22, 2019 at 3:02 PM Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >> On Fri, Feb 22, 2019 at 11:39 PM Nadav Amit <namit@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >>>> On Feb 22, 2019, at 2:21 PM, Nadav Amit <namit@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>> On Feb 22, 2019, at 2:17 PM, Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >>>>>
> >>>>> On Fri, Feb 22, 2019 at 11:08 PM Nadav Amit <namit@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >>>>>>> On Feb 22, 2019, at 1:43 PM, Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> (adding some people from the text_poke series to the thread, removing stable@)
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> On Fri, Feb 22, 2019 at 8:55 PM Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>> On Feb 22, 2019, at 11:34 AM, Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Feb 22, 2019 at 02:30:26PM -0500, Steven Rostedt wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>> On Fri, 22 Feb 2019 11:27:05 -0800
> >>>>>>>>>> Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Feb 22, 2019 at 09:43:14AM -0800, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Then we should still probably fix up "__probe_kernel_read()" to not
> >>>>>>>>>>>> allow user accesses. The easiest way to do that is actually likely to
> >>>>>>>>>>>> use the "unsafe_get_user()" functions *without* doing a
> >>>>>>>>>>>> uaccess_begin(), which will mean that modern CPU's will simply fault
> >>>>>>>>>>>> on a kernel access to user space.
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> On bpf side the bpf_probe_read() helper just calls probe_kernel_read()
> >>>>>>>>>>> and users pass both user and kernel addresses into it and expect
> >>>>>>>>>>> that the helper will actually try to read from that address.
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> If __probe_kernel_read will suddenly start failing on all user addresses
> >>>>>>>>>>> it will break the expectations.
> >>>>>>>>>>> How do we solve it in bpf_probe_read?
> >>>>>>>>>>> Call probe_kernel_read and if that fails call unsafe_get_user byte-by-byte
> >>>>>>>>>>> in the loop?
> >>>>>>>>>>> That's doable, but people already complain that bpf_probe_read() is slow
> >>>>>>>>>>> and shows up in their perf report.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> We're changing kprobes to add a specific flag to say that we want to
> >>>>>>>>>> differentiate between kernel or user reads. Can this be done with
> >>>>>>>>>> bpf_probe_read()? If it's showing up in perf report, I doubt a single
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> so you're saying you will break existing kprobe scripts?
> >>>>>>>>> I don't think it's a good idea.
> >>>>>>>>> It's not acceptable to break bpf_probe_read uapi.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> If so, the uapi is wrong: a long-sized number does not reliably identify an address if you donât separately know whether itâs a user or kernel address. s390x and 4G:4G x86_32 are the notable exceptions. I have lobbied for RISC-V and future x86_64 to join the crowd.  I donât know whether Iâll win this fight, but the uapi will probably have to change for at least s390x.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> What to do about existing scripts is a different question.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> This lack of logical separation between user and kernel addresses
> >>>>>>> might interact interestingly with the text_poke series, specifically
> >>>>>>> "[PATCH v3 05/20] x86/alternative: Initialize temporary mm for
> >>>>>>> patching" (https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flore.kernel.org%2Flkml%2F20190221234451.17632-6-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com%2F&amp;data=02%7C01%7Cnamit%40vmware.com%7Cbab53e52cc5c4ac4419008d69921d1f1%7Cb39138ca3cee4b4aa4d6cd83d9dd62f0%7C0%7C0%7C636864767879731941&amp;sdata=2tqD7udTCfNbcNLcj5SFpZt8WwK5NwtgaWMKm1Ye1EE%3D&amp;reserved=0)
> >>>>>>> and "[PATCH v3 06/20] x86/alternative: Use temporary mm for text
> >>>>>>> poking" (https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flore.kernel.org%2Flkml%2F20190221234451.17632-7-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com%2F&amp;data=02%7C01%7Cnamit%40vmware.com%7Cbab53e52cc5c4ac4419008d69921d1f1%7Cb39138ca3cee4b4aa4d6cd83d9dd62f0%7C0%7C0%7C636864767879731941&amp;sdata=7%2BLShgLKnra6xzSkxdJrCclCacfdE5IdczwScW83nuE%3D&amp;reserved=0),
> >>>>>>> right? If someone manages to get a tracing BPF program to trigger in a
> >>>>>>> task that has switched to the patching mm, could they use
> >>>>>>> bpf_probe_write_user() - which uses probe_kernel_write() after
> >>>>>>> checking that KERNEL_DS isn't active and that access_ok() passes - to
> >>>>>>> overwrite kernel text that is mapped writable in the patching mm?
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Yes, this is a good point. I guess text_poke() should be defined with
> >>>>>> â__kprobesâ and open-code memcpy.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Does it sound reasonable?
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Doesn't __text_poke() as implemented in the proposed patch use a
> >>>>> couple other kernel functions, too? Like switch_mm_irqs_off() and
> >>>>> pte_clear() (which can be a call into a separate function on paravirt
> >>>>> kernels)?
> >>>>
> >>>> I will move the pte_clear() to be done after the poking mm was unloaded.
> >>>> Give me a few minutes to send a sketch of what I think should be done.
> >>>
> >>> Err.. You are right, I donât see an easy way of preventing a kprobe from
> >>> being set on switch_mm_irqs_off(), and open-coding this monster is too ugly.
> >>>
> >>> The reasonable solution seems to me as taking all the relevant pieces of
> >>> code (and data) that might be used during text-poking and encapsulating them, so they
> >>> will be set in a memory area which cannot be kprobe'd. This can also be
> >>> useful to write-protect data structures of code that calls text_poke(),
> >>> e.g., static-keys. It can also protect data on that stack that is used
> >>> during text_poke() from being overwritten from another core.
> >>>
> >>> This solution is somewhat similar to Igor Stoppaâs idea of using âenclavesâ
> >>> when doing write-rarely operations.
> >>>
> >>> Right now, I think that text_poke() will keep being susceptible to such
> >>> an attack, unless you have a better suggestion.
> >>
> >> A relatively simple approach might be to teach BPF not to run kprobe
> >> programs and such in contexts where current->mm isn't the active mm?
> >> Maybe using nmi_uaccess_okay(), or something like that? It looks like
> >> perf_callchain_user() also already uses that. Except that a lot of
> >> this code is x86-specific...
> >
> > This sounds like exactly the right solution.  If you're running from
> > some unknown context (like NMI or tracing), then you should check
> > nmi_uaccess_okay().  I think we should just promote that to be a
> > non-arch-specific function (that returns true by default) and check it
> > the relevant bpf_probe_xyz() functions.
>
> I can do that, but notice that switch_mm_irqs_off() writes to
> cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm before it actually writes to CR3. So there are still
> a couple of instructions (and the load_new_mm_cr3()) in between that a
> kprobe can be set on, no?

But you can't mark then as no-nmi :)  See the comment in
nmi_uaccess_ok() -- the code is intended to work correctly during this
window.