[PATCH 24/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down
From: Matthew Garrett
Date: Thu Feb 28 2019 - 18:13:38 EST
From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
There are some bpf functions can be used to read kernel memory:
bpf_probe_read, bpf_probe_write_user and bpf_trace_printk. These allow
private keys in kernel memory (e.g. the hibernation image signing key) to
be read by an eBPF program and kernel memory to be altered without
restriction.
Completely prohibit the use of BPF when the kernel is locked down.
Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@xxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
cc: netdev@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
cc: Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
cc: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@xxxxxxxxx>
---
kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
index 8577bb7f8be6..e78dbe5473c9 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
@@ -2593,6 +2593,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(bpf, int, cmd, union bpf_attr __user *, uattr, unsigned int, siz
if (sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down("BPF"))
+ return -EPERM;
+
err = bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(uattr, sizeof(attr), size);
if (err)
return err;
--
2.21.0.352.gf09ad66450-goog