[PATCH] scsi: ses: fix some risks of out of bound access
From: Jianchao Wang
Date: Mon Mar 25 2019 - 03:48:18 EST
We have some places with risk of accessing out of bound of the
buffer allocated from slab, even it could corrupt the memory.
Signed-off-by: Jianchao Wang <jianchao.w.wang@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
drivers/scsi/ses.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/ses.c b/drivers/scsi/ses.c
index 0fc3922..42e6a1f 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/ses.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/ses.c
@@ -520,6 +520,7 @@ static void ses_enclosure_data_process(struct enclosure_device *edev,
struct ses_device *ses_dev = edev->scratch;
int types = ses_dev->page1_num_types;
unsigned char *hdr_buf = kzalloc(INIT_ALLOC_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ unsigned char *page1_end = ses_dev->page1 + ses_dev->page1_len;
if (!hdr_buf)
goto simple_populate;
@@ -556,6 +557,11 @@ static void ses_enclosure_data_process(struct enclosure_device *edev,
type_ptr = ses_dev->page1_types;
components = 0;
for (i = 0; i < types; i++, type_ptr += 4) {
+ if (type_ptr > page1_end - 2) {
+ sdev_printk(KERN_ERR, sdev, "Access out of bound of page1"
+ "%p page1_end %p\n", page1_end, type_ptr);
+ break;
+ }
for (j = 0; j < type_ptr[1]; j++) {
char *name = NULL;
struct enclosure_component *ecomp;
@@ -566,10 +572,15 @@ static void ses_enclosure_data_process(struct enclosure_device *edev,
} else {
len = (desc_ptr[2] << 8) + desc_ptr[3];
desc_ptr += 4;
- /* Add trailing zero - pushes into
- * reserved space */
- desc_ptr[len] = '\0';
- name = desc_ptr;
+ if (desc_ptr + len >= buf + page7_len) {
+ desc_ptr = NULL;
+ } else {
+
+ /* Add trailing zero - pushes into
+ * reserved space */
+ desc_ptr[len] = '\0';
+ name = desc_ptr;
+ }
}
}
if (type_ptr[0] == ENCLOSURE_COMPONENT_DEVICE ||
@@ -693,7 +704,13 @@ static int ses_intf_add(struct device *cdev,
/* begin at the enclosure descriptor */
type_ptr = buf + 8;
/* skip all the enclosure descriptors */
- for (i = 0; i < num_enclosures && type_ptr < buf + len; i++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < num_enclosures; i++) {
+ if (type_ptr >= buf + len) {
+ sdev_printk(KERN_ERR, sdev, "Overflow the buf len = %d\n", len);
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto err_free;
+ }
+
types += type_ptr[2];
type_ptr += type_ptr[3] + 4;
}
--
2.7.4