[PATCH] arm64/vdso: don't leak kernel addresses

From: Matteo Croce
Date: Sat Mar 30 2019 - 14:46:43 EST


Since commit ad67b74d2469d9b8 ("printk: hash addresses printed with %p"),
two obfuscated kernel pointer are printed at every boot:

vdso: 2 pages (1 code @ (____ptrval____), 1 data @ (____ptrval____))

Remove the addresses from the print, which turns into a more discrete:

vdso: 2 pages (1 code, 1 data)

Fixes: ad67b74d2469d9b8 ("printk: hash addresses printed with %p")
Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
arch/arm64/kernel/vdso.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/vdso.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/vdso.c
index 2d419006ad43..fdfee0ef5bc5 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/vdso.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/vdso.c
@@ -146,8 +146,8 @@ static int __init vdso_init(void)
}

vdso_pages = (vdso_end - vdso_start) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
- pr_info("vdso: %ld pages (%ld code @ %p, %ld data @ %p)\n",
- vdso_pages + 1, vdso_pages, vdso_start, 1L, vdso_data);
+ pr_info("vdso: %ld pages (%ld code, %ld data)\n",
+ vdso_pages + 1, vdso_pages, 1L);

/* Allocate the vDSO pagelist, plus a page for the data. */
vdso_pagelist = kcalloc(vdso_pages + 1, sizeof(struct page *),
--
2.19.1