Re: [RFC PATCH] virtio_ring: Use DMA API if guest memory is encrypted

[Thiago Jung Bauermann]

Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@xxxxxxxxxx> writes:

> On Wed, Apr 17, 2019 at 06:42:00PM -0300, Thiago Jung Bauermann wrote:
>>
>> Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@xxxxxxxxxx> writes:
>>
>> > On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 09:05:04PM -0300, Thiago Jung Bauermann wrote:
>> >>
>> >> Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@xxxxxxxxxx> writes:
>> >>
>> >> > On Wed, Mar 20, 2019 at 01:13:41PM -0300, Thiago Jung Bauermann wrote:
>> >> >> >From what I understand of the ACCESS_PLATFORM definition, the host will
>> >> >> only ever try to access memory addresses that are supplied to it by the
>> >> >> guest, so all of the secure guest memory that the host cares about is
>> >> >> accessible:
>> >> >>
>> >> >>     If this feature bit is set to 0, then the device has same access to
>> >> >>     memory addresses supplied to it as the driver has. In particular,
>> >> >>     the device will always use physical addresses matching addresses
>> >> >>     used by the driver (typically meaning physical addresses used by the
>> >> >>     CPU) and not translated further, and can access any address supplied
>> >> >>     to it by the driver. When clear, this overrides any
>> >> >>     platform-specific description of whether device access is limited or
>> >> >>     translated in any way, e.g. whether an IOMMU may be present.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> All of the above is true for POWER guests, whether they are secure
>> >> >> guests or not.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Or are you saying that a virtio device may want to access memory
>> >> >> addresses that weren't supplied to it by the driver?
>> >> >
>> >> > Your logic would apply to IOMMUs as well.  For your mode, there are
>> >> > specific encrypted memory regions that driver has access to but device
>> >> > does not. that seems to violate the constraint.
>> >>
>> >> Right, if there's a pre-configured 1:1 mapping in the IOMMU such that
>> >> the device can ignore the IOMMU for all practical purposes I would
>> >> indeed say that the logic would apply to IOMMUs as well. :-)
>> >>
>> >> I guess I'm still struggling with the purpose of signalling to the
>> >> driver that the host may not have access to memory addresses that it
>> >> will never try to access.
>> >
>> > For example, one of the benefits is to signal to host that driver does
>> > not expect ability to access all memory. If it does, host can
>> > fail initialization gracefully.
>>
>> But why would the ability to access all memory be necessary or even
>> useful? When would the host access memory that the driver didn't tell it
>> to access?
>
> When I say all memory I mean even memory not allowed by the IOMMU.

Yes, but why? How is that memory relevant?

>> >> >> >> > But the name "sev_active" makes me scared because at least AMD guys who
>> >> >> >> > were doing the sensible thing and setting ACCESS_PLATFORM
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> My understanding is, AMD guest-platform knows in advance that their
>> >> >> >> guest will run in secure mode and hence sets the flag at the time of VM
>> >> >> >> instantiation. Unfortunately we dont have that luxury on our platforms.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > Well you do have that luxury. It looks like that there are existing
>> >> >> > guests that already acknowledge ACCESS_PLATFORM and you are not happy
>> >> >> > with how that path is slow. So you are trying to optimize for
>> >> >> > them by clearing ACCESS_PLATFORM and then you have lost ability
>> >> >> > to invoke DMA API.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > For example if there was another flag just like ACCESS_PLATFORM
>> >> >> > just not yet used by anyone, you would be all fine using that right?
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Yes, a new flag sounds like a great idea. What about the definition
>> >> >> below?
>> >> >>
>> >> >> VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM_NO_IOMMU This feature has the same meaning as
>> >> >>     VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM both when set and when not set, with the
>> >> >>     exception that the IOMMU is explicitly defined to be off or bypassed
>> >> >>     when accessing memory addresses supplied to the device by the
>> >> >>     driver. This flag should be set by the guest if offered, but to
>> >> >>     allow for backward-compatibility device implementations allow for it
>> >> >>     to be left unset by the guest. It is an error to set both this flag
>> >> >>     and VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM.
>> >> >
>> >> > It looks kind of narrow but it's an option.
>> >>
>> >> Great!
>> >>
>> >> > I wonder how we'll define what's an iommu though.
>> >>
>> >> Hm, it didn't occur to me it could be an issue. I'll try.
>>
>> I rephrased it in terms of address translation. What do you think of
>> this version? The flag name is slightly different too:
>>
>>
>> VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM_NO_TRANSLATION This feature has the same
>>     meaning as VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM both when set and when not set,
>>     with the exception that address translation is guaranteed to be
>>     unnecessary when accessing memory addresses supplied to the device
>>     by the driver. Which is to say, the device will always use physical
>>     addresses matching addresses used by the driver (typically meaning
>>     physical addresses used by the CPU) and not translated further. This
>>     flag should be set by the guest if offered, but to allow for
>>     backward-compatibility device implementations allow for it to be
>>     left unset by the guest. It is an error to set both this flag and
>>     VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM.
>
> Thanks, I'll think about this approach. Will respond next week.

Thanks!

>> >> > Another idea is maybe something like virtio-iommu?
>> >>
>> >> You mean, have legacy guests use virtio-iommu to request an IOMMU
>> >> bypass? If so, it's an interesting idea for new guests but it doesn't
>> >> help with guests that are out today in the field, which don't have A
>> >> virtio-iommu driver.
>> >
>> > I presume legacy guests don't use encrypted memory so why do we
>> > worry about them at all?
>>
>> They don't use encrypted memory, but a host machine will run a mix of
>> secure and legacy guests. And since the hypervisor doesn't know whether
>> a guest will be secure or not at the time it is launched, legacy guests
>> will have to be launched with the same configuration as secure guests.
>
> OK and so I think the issue is that hosts generally fail if they set
> ACCESS_PLATFORM and guests do not negotiate it.
> So you can not just set ACCESS_PLATFORM for everyone.
> Is that the issue here?

Yes, that is one half of the issue. The other is that even if hosts
didn't fail, existing legacy guests wouldn't "take the initiative" of
not negotiating ACCESS_PLATFORM to get the improved performance. They'd
have to be modified to do that.

--
Thiago Jung Bauermann
IBM Linux Technology Center