[PATCH v5 1/8] KVM: VMX: Define CET VMCS fields and control bits

[Yang Weijiang]

CET(Control-flow Enforcement Technology) is an upcoming Intel processor
family feature that blocks return/jump-oriented programming (ROP) attacks.
It provides the following capabilities to defend
against ROP/JOP style control-flow subversion attacks:

- Shadow Stack (SHSTK):
  A second stack for the program that is used exclusively for
  control transfer operations.

- Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT):
  Free branch protection to defend against jump/call oriented
  programming.

Several new CET MSRs are defined in kernel to support CET:
MSR_IA32_{U,S}_CET - MSRs to control the CET settings for user
mode and suervisor mode respectively.

MSR_IA32_PL{0,1,2,3}_SSP - MSRs to store shadow stack pointers for
CPL-0,1,2,3 levels.

MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB - MSR to store base address of shadow stack
pointer table.

Two XSAVES state components are introduced for CET:
IA32_XSS:[bit 11] - bit for save/restor user mode CET states
IA32_XSS:[bit 12] - bit for save/restor supervisor mode CET states.

6 VMCS fields are introduced for CET, {HOST,GUEST}_S_CET is to store
CET settings in supervisor mode. {HOST,GUEST}_SSP is to store shadow
stack pointers in supervisor mode. {HOST,GUEST}_INTR_SSP_TABLE is to
store base address of shadow stack pointer table.

If VM_EXIT_LOAD_HOST_CET_STATE = 1, the host's CET MSRs are restored
from below VMCS fields at VM-Exit:
- HOST_S_CET
- HOST_SSP
- HOST_INTR_SSP_TABLE

If VM_ENTRY_LOAD_GUEST_CET_STATE = 1, the guest's CET MSRs are loaded
from below VMCS fields at VM-Entry:
- GUEST_S_CET
- GUEST_SSP
- GUEST_INTR_SSP_TABLE

Apart from VMCS auto-load fields, KVM calls kvm_load_guest_fpu() and
kvm_put_guest_fpu() to save/restore the guest CET MSR states at
VM exit/entry. XSAVES/XRSTORS are executed underneath these functions
if they are supported. The CET xsave area is consolidated with other
XSAVE components in thread_struct.fpu field.

When context switch happens during task switch/interrupt/exception etc.,
Kernel also relies on above functions to switch CET states properly.

Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@xxxxxxxxx>
Co-developed-by: Zhang Yi Z <yi.z.zhang@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
index 4e4133e86484..d84804c7ddaa 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
@@ -103,6 +103,7 @@
 #define VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS                   0x00800000
 #define VM_EXIT_PT_CONCEAL_PIP			0x01000000
 #define VM_EXIT_CLEAR_IA32_RTIT_CTL		0x02000000
+#define VM_EXIT_LOAD_HOST_CET_STATE             0x10000000
 
 #define VM_EXIT_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR	0x00036dff
 
@@ -116,6 +117,7 @@
 #define VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS                   0x00010000
 #define VM_ENTRY_PT_CONCEAL_PIP			0x00020000
 #define VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_RTIT_CTL		0x00040000
+#define VM_ENTRY_LOAD_GUEST_CET_STATE           0x00100000
 
 #define VM_ENTRY_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR	0x000011ff
 
@@ -334,6 +336,9 @@ enum vmcs_field {
 	GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS    = 0x00006822,
 	GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP              = 0x00006824,
 	GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP              = 0x00006826,
+	GUEST_S_CET                     = 0x00006828,
+	GUEST_SSP                       = 0x0000682a,
+	GUEST_INTR_SSP_TABLE            = 0x0000682c,
 	HOST_CR0                        = 0x00006c00,
 	HOST_CR3                        = 0x00006c02,
 	HOST_CR4                        = 0x00006c04,
@@ -346,6 +351,9 @@ enum vmcs_field {
 	HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP          = 0x00006c12,
 	HOST_RSP                        = 0x00006c14,
 	HOST_RIP                        = 0x00006c16,
+	HOST_S_CET                      = 0x00006c18,
+	HOST_SSP                        = 0x00006c1a,
+	HOST_INTR_SSP_TABLE             = 0x00006c1c
 };
 
 /*
-- 
2.17.2