On Mon, May 27, 2019 at 6:56 PM Wei Wang <wei.w.wang@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On 05/23/2019 06:23 AM, Eric Hankland wrote:Thanks for the feedback. I have a couple concerns with a KVM
- Add a VCPU ioctl that can control which events the guest can monitor.The general idea sounds good to me :)
Signed-off-by: ehankland <ehankland@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
Some events can provide a guest with information about other guests or the
host (e.g. L3 cache stats); providing the capability to restrict access
to a "safe" set of events would limit the potential for the PMU to be used
in any side channel attacks. This change introduces a new vcpu ioctl that
sets an event whitelist. If the guest attempts to program a counter for
any unwhitelisted event, the kernel counter won't be created, so any
RDPMC/RDMSR will show 0 instances of that event.
For the implementation, I would have the following suggestions:
1) Instead of using a whitelist, it would be better to use a blacklist to
forbid the guest from counting any core level information. So by default,
kvm maintains a list of those core level events, which are not supported to
the guest.
The userspace ioctl removes the related events from the blacklist to
make them usable by the guest.
2) Use vm ioctl, instead of vcpu ioctl. The blacklist-ed events can be
VM wide
(unnecessary to make each CPU to maintain the same copy).
Accordingly, put the pmu event blacklist into kvm->arch.
3) Returning 1 when the guest tries to set the evetlsel msr to count an
event which is on the blacklist.
Best,
Wei
maintained blacklist. First, I'm worried it will be difficult to keep
such a list up to date and accurate (both coming up with the initial
list since there are so many events, and updating it whenever any new
events are published or vulnerabilities are discovered).
Second, users
may want to differentiate between whole-socket and sub-socket VMs
(some events may be fine for the whole-socket case) - keeping a single
blacklist wouldn't allow for this.