Re: [RFC PATCH 8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX

[Sean Christopherson]

On Tue, Jun 04, 2019 at 01:29:10PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Fri, May 31, 2019 at 4:32 PM Sean Christopherson
> <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >  static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr,
> > diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> > index 47f58cfb6a19..0562775424a0 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> > @@ -1446,6 +1446,14 @@
> >   * @bpf_prog_free_security:
> >   *     Clean up the security information stored inside bpf prog.
> >   *
> > + * Security hooks for Intel SGX enclaves.
> > + *
> > + * @enclave_load:
> > + *     On success, returns 0 and optionally adjusts @allowed_prot
> > + *     @vma: the source memory region of the enclave page being loaded.
> > + *     @prot: the initial protection of the enclave page.
> 
> What do you mean "initial"?  The page is always mapped PROT_NONE when
> this is called, right?  I feel like I must be missing something here.

Initial protection in the EPCM.  Yet another reason to ignore SECINFO.