Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] An alternative __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow enclave/host parameter passing using untrusted stack

From: Xing, Cedric
Date: Wed Jul 10 2019 - 14:08:40 EST


On 7/10/2019 4:17 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
On Tue, Apr 23, 2019 at 11:26:20PM -0700, Cedric Xing wrote:
The current proposed __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() requires enclaves to preserve
%rsp, which prohibits enclaves from allocating space on the untrusted stack.
However, there are existing enclaves (e.g. those built with current Intel SGX
SDK libraries) relying on the untrusted stack for passing parameters to
untrusted functions (aka. o-calls), which requires allocating space on the
untrusted stack by enclaves. And given its simplicity and convenience, it could
be desired by future SGX applications as well.

This patchset introduces a new ABI for __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to anchor its
stack frame on %rbp (instead of %rsp), so as to allow enclaves to "push" onto
the untrusted stack by decrementing the untrusted %rsp. Additionally, this new
__vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() will take one more parameter - a callback function,
to be invoked upon all enclave exits (both AEX and normal exits). The callback
function will be given the value of %rsp left off by the enclave, so that data
"pushed" by the enclave (if any) could be addressed/accessed. Please note that
the callback function is optional, and if not supplied (i.e. null),
__vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() will just return (i.e. behave the same as the
current implementation) after the enclave exits (or AEX due to exceptions).

The SGX selftest is augmented by two new tests. One exercises the new callback
interface, and serves as a simple example to showcase how to use it; while the
other validates the hand-crafted CFI directives in __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave()
by single-stepping through it and unwinding call stack at every instruction.

Why does the SDK anyway use real enclaves when step debugging? I don't
think kernel needs to scale to that. For me it looks more like a bad
architectural choice in the SDK implementation than anything else.

Intel's SGX SDK *does* support simulation mode for debugging enclaves outside of SGX mode, or even on non-SGX platforms. But nothing can replace the real SGX environment, hence SGX ISA supports debugging real enclaves.

You should design SDK in a way that it doesn't run the code inside real
enclave at first. It is just the sanest development model to use. The
current SDK has an unacceptable requirement that the workstation used to
develop code destined to run inside enclave must possess an appropriate
hardware. I don't think that is acceptable no matter what kind of API
kernel provides to invoke enclaves.

SDK supports simulation on non-SGX platforms.

I think "real" debug enclaves are only good for production testing when
you have more or less ready to release/deploy something but still want
to be able to get a memory dump of the enclave on occassion.

That's true.

With these conclusions I think the current vDSO API is sufficient for
Linux.

The new vDSO API is to support data exchange on stack. It has nothing to do with debugging. BTW, the community has closed on this.

The CFI directives are for stack unwinding. They don't affect what the code does so you can just treat them as NOPs if you don't understand what they do. However, they are useful to not only debuggers but also exception handling code. libunwind also has a setjmp()/longjmp() implementation based on CFI directives.

/Jarkko