Re: Linux 5.2.1

[Greg KH]

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
index ffc064c1ec68..49311f3da6f2 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
@@ -9,5 +9,6 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
 .. toctree::
    :maxdepth: 1
 
+   spectre
    l1tf
    mds
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..25f3b2532198
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,697 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+Spectre Side Channels
+=====================
+
+Spectre is a class of side channel attacks that exploit branch prediction
+and speculative execution on modern CPUs to read memory, possibly
+bypassing access controls. Speculative execution side channel exploits
+do not modify memory but attempt to infer privileged data in the memory.
+
+This document covers Spectre variant 1 and Spectre variant 2.
+
+Affected processors
+-------------------
+
+Speculative execution side channel methods affect a wide range of modern
+high performance processors, since most modern high speed processors
+use branch prediction and speculative execution.
+
+The following CPUs are vulnerable:
+
+    - Intel Core, Atom, Pentium, and Xeon processors
+
+    - AMD Phenom, EPYC, and Zen processors
+
+    - IBM POWER and zSeries processors
+
+    - Higher end ARM processors
+
+    - Apple CPUs
+
+    - Higher end MIPS CPUs
+
+    - Likely most other high performance CPUs. Contact your CPU vendor for details.
+
+Whether a processor is affected or not can be read out from the Spectre
+vulnerability files in sysfs. See :ref:`spectre_sys_info`.
+
+Related CVEs
+------------
+
+The following CVE entries describe Spectre variants:
+
+   =============   =======================  =================
+   CVE-2017-5753   Bounds check bypass      Spectre variant 1
+   CVE-2017-5715   Branch target injection  Spectre variant 2
+   =============   =======================  =================
+
+Problem
+-------
+
+CPUs use speculative operations to improve performance. That may leave
+traces of memory accesses or computations in the processor's caches,
+buffers, and branch predictors. Malicious software may be able to
+influence the speculative execution paths, and then use the side effects
+of the speculative execution in the CPUs' caches and buffers to infer
+privileged data touched during the speculative execution.
+
+Spectre variant 1 attacks take advantage of speculative execution of
+conditional branches, while Spectre variant 2 attacks use speculative
+execution of indirect branches to leak privileged memory.
+See :ref:`[1] <spec_ref1>` :ref:`[5] <spec_ref5>` :ref:`[7] <spec_ref7>`
+:ref:`[10] <spec_ref10>` :ref:`[11] <spec_ref11>`.
+
+Spectre variant 1 (Bounds Check Bypass)
+---------------------------------------
+
+The bounds check bypass attack :ref:`[2] <spec_ref2>` takes advantage
+of speculative execution that bypasses conditional branch instructions
+used for memory access bounds check (e.g. checking if the index of an
+array results in memory access within a valid range). This results in
+memory accesses to invalid memory (with out-of-bound index) that are
+done speculatively before validation checks resolve. Such speculative
+memory accesses can leave side effects, creating side channels which
+leak information to the attacker.
+
+There are some extensions of Spectre variant 1 attacks for reading data
+over the network, see :ref:`[12] <spec_ref12>`. However such attacks
+are difficult, low bandwidth, fragile, and are considered low risk.
+
+Spectre variant 2 (Branch Target Injection)
+-------------------------------------------
+
+The branch target injection attack takes advantage of speculative
+execution of indirect branches :ref:`[3] <spec_ref3>`.  The indirect
+branch predictors inside the processor used to guess the target of
+indirect branches can be influenced by an attacker, causing gadget code
+to be speculatively executed, thus exposing sensitive data touched by
+the victim. The side effects left in the CPU's caches during speculative
+execution can be measured to infer data values.
+
+.. _poison_btb:
+
+In Spectre variant 2 attacks, the attacker can steer speculative indirect
+branches in the victim to gadget code by poisoning the branch target
+buffer of a CPU used for predicting indirect branch addresses. Such
+poisoning could be done by indirect branching into existing code,
+with the address offset of the indirect branch under the attacker's
+control. Since the branch prediction on impacted hardware does not
+fully disambiguate branch address and uses the offset for prediction,
+this could cause privileged code's indirect branch to jump to a gadget
+code with the same offset.
+
+The most useful gadgets take an attacker-controlled input parameter (such
+as a register value) so that the memory read can be controlled. Gadgets
+without input parameters might be possible, but the attacker would have
+very little control over what memory can be read, reducing the risk of
+the attack revealing useful data.
+
+One other variant 2 attack vector is for the attacker to poison the
+return stack buffer (RSB) :ref:`[13] <spec_ref13>` to cause speculative
+subroutine return instruction execution to go to a gadget.  An attacker's
+imbalanced subroutine call instructions might "poison" entries in the
+return stack buffer which are later consumed by a victim's subroutine
+return instructions.  This attack can be mitigated by flushing the return
+stack buffer on context switch, or virtual machine (VM) exit.
+
+On systems with simultaneous multi-threading (SMT), attacks are possible
+from the sibling thread, as level 1 cache and branch target buffer
+(BTB) may be shared between hardware threads in a CPU core.  A malicious
+program running on the sibling thread may influence its peer's BTB to
+steer its indirect branch speculations to gadget code, and measure the
+speculative execution's side effects left in level 1 cache to infer the
+victim's data.
+
+Attack scenarios
+----------------
+
+The following list of attack scenarios have been anticipated, but may
+not cover all possible attack vectors.
+
+1. A user process attacking the kernel
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   The attacker passes a parameter to the kernel via a register or
+   via a known address in memory during a syscall. Such parameter may
+   be used later by the kernel as an index to an array or to derive
+   a pointer for a Spectre variant 1 attack.  The index or pointer
+   is invalid, but bound checks are bypassed in the code branch taken
+   for speculative execution. This could cause privileged memory to be
+   accessed and leaked.
+
+   For kernel code that has been identified where data pointers could
+   potentially be influenced for Spectre attacks, new "nospec" accessor
+   macros are used to prevent speculative loading of data.
+
+   Spectre variant 2 attacker can :ref:`poison <poison_btb>` the branch
+   target buffer (BTB) before issuing syscall to launch an attack.
+   After entering the kernel, the kernel could use the poisoned branch
+   target buffer on indirect jump and jump to gadget code in speculative
+   execution.
+
+   If an attacker tries to control the memory addresses leaked during
+   speculative execution, he would also need to pass a parameter to the
+   gadget, either through a register or a known address in memory. After
+   the gadget has executed, he can measure the side effect.
+
+   The kernel can protect itself against consuming poisoned branch
+   target buffer entries by using return trampolines (also known as
+   "retpoline") :ref:`[3] <spec_ref3>` :ref:`[9] <spec_ref9>` for all
+   indirect branches. Return trampolines trap speculative execution paths
+   to prevent jumping to gadget code during speculative execution.
+   x86 CPUs with Enhanced Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation
+   (Enhanced IBRS) available in hardware should use the feature to
+   mitigate Spectre variant 2 instead of retpoline. Enhanced IBRS is
+   more efficient than retpoline.
+
+   There may be gadget code in firmware which could be exploited with
+   Spectre variant 2 attack by a rogue user process. To mitigate such
+   attacks on x86, Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS) feature
+   is turned on before the kernel invokes any firmware code.
+
+2. A user process attacking another user process
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   A malicious user process can try to attack another user process,
+   either via a context switch on the same hardware thread, or from the
+   sibling hyperthread sharing a physical processor core on simultaneous
+   multi-threading (SMT) system.
+
+   Spectre variant 1 attacks generally require passing parameters
+   between the processes, which needs a data passing relationship, such
+   as remote procedure calls (RPC).  Those parameters are used in gadget
+   code to derive invalid data pointers accessing privileged memory in
+   the attacked process.
+
+   Spectre variant 2 attacks can be launched from a rogue process by
+   :ref:`poisoning <poison_btb>` the branch target buffer.  This can
+   influence the indirect branch targets for a victim process that either
+   runs later on the same hardware thread, or running concurrently on
+   a sibling hardware thread sharing the same physical core.
+
+   A user process can protect itself against Spectre variant 2 attacks
+   by using the prctl() syscall to disable indirect branch speculation
+   for itself.  An administrator can also cordon off an unsafe process
+   from polluting the branch target buffer by disabling the process's
+   indirect branch speculation. This comes with a performance cost
+   from not using indirect branch speculation and clearing the branch
+   target buffer.  When SMT is enabled on x86, for a process that has
+   indirect branch speculation disabled, Single Threaded Indirect Branch
+   Predictors (STIBP) :ref:`[4] <spec_ref4>` are turned on to prevent the
+   sibling thread from controlling branch target buffer.  In addition,
+   the Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB) is issued to clear the
+   branch target buffer when context switching to and from such process.
+
+   On x86, the return stack buffer is stuffed on context switch.
+   This prevents the branch target buffer from being used for branch
+   prediction when the return stack buffer underflows while switching to
+   a deeper call stack. Any poisoned entries in the return stack buffer
+   left by the previous process will also be cleared.
+
+   User programs should use address space randomization to make attacks
+   more difficult (Set /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space = 1 or 2).
+
+3. A virtualized guest attacking the host
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   The attack mechanism is similar to how user processes attack the
+   kernel.  The kernel is entered via hyper-calls or other virtualization
+   exit paths.
+
+   For Spectre variant 1 attacks, rogue guests can pass parameters
+   (e.g. in registers) via hyper-calls to derive invalid pointers to
+   speculate into privileged memory after entering the kernel.  For places
+   where such kernel code has been identified, nospec accessor macros
+   are used to stop speculative memory access.
+
+   For Spectre variant 2 attacks, rogue guests can :ref:`poison
+   <poison_btb>` the branch target buffer or return stack buffer, causing
+   the kernel to jump to gadget code in the speculative execution paths.
+
+   To mitigate variant 2, the host kernel can use return trampolines
+   for indirect branches to bypass the poisoned branch target buffer,
+   and flushing the return stack buffer on VM exit.  This prevents rogue
+   guests from affecting indirect branching in the host kernel.
+
+   To protect host processes from rogue guests, host processes can have
+   indirect branch speculation disabled via prctl().  The branch target
+   buffer is cleared before context switching to such processes.
+
+4. A virtualized guest attacking other guest
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   A rogue guest may attack another guest to get data accessible by the
+   other guest.
+
+   Spectre variant 1 attacks are possible if parameters can be passed
+   between guests.  This may be done via mechanisms such as shared memory
+   or message passing.  Such parameters could be used to derive data
+   pointers to privileged data in guest.  The privileged data could be
+   accessed by gadget code in the victim's speculation paths.
+
+   Spectre variant 2 attacks can be launched from a rogue guest by
+   :ref:`poisoning <poison_btb>` the branch target buffer or the return
+   stack buffer. Such poisoned entries could be used to influence
+   speculation execution paths in the victim guest.
+
+   Linux kernel mitigates attacks to other guests running in the same
+   CPU hardware thread by flushing the return stack buffer on VM exit,
+   and clearing the branch target buffer before switching to a new guest.
+
+   If SMT is used, Spectre variant 2 attacks from an untrusted guest
+   in the sibling hyperthread can be mitigated by the administrator,
+   by turning off the unsafe guest's indirect branch speculation via
+   prctl().  A guest can also protect itself by turning on microcode
+   based mitigations (such as IBPB or STIBP on x86) within the guest.
+
+.. _spectre_sys_info:
+
+Spectre system information
+--------------------------
+
+The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current
+mitigation status of the system for Spectre: whether the system is
+vulnerable, and which mitigations are active.
+
+The sysfs file showing Spectre variant 1 mitigation status is:
+
+   /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1
+
+The possible values in this file are:
+
+  =======================================  =================================
+  'Mitigation: __user pointer sanitation'  Protection in kernel on a case by
+                                           case base with explicit pointer
+                                           sanitation.
+  =======================================  =================================
+
+However, the protections are put in place on a case by case basis,
+and there is no guarantee that all possible attack vectors for Spectre
+variant 1 are covered.
+
+The spectre_v2 kernel file reports if the kernel has been compiled with
+retpoline mitigation or if the CPU has hardware mitigation, and if the
+CPU has support for additional process-specific mitigation.
+
+This file also reports CPU features enabled by microcode to mitigate
+attack between user processes:
+
+1. Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB) to add additional
+   isolation between processes of different users.
+2. Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors (STIBP) to add additional
+   isolation between CPU threads running on the same core.
+
+These CPU features may impact performance when used and can be enabled
+per process on a case-by-case base.
+
+The sysfs file showing Spectre variant 2 mitigation status is:
+
+   /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2
+
+The possible values in this file are:
+
+  - Kernel status:
+
+  ====================================  =================================
+  'Not affected'                        The processor is not vulnerable
+  'Vulnerable'                          Vulnerable, no mitigation
+  'Mitigation: Full generic retpoline'  Software-focused mitigation
+  'Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline'      AMD-specific software mitigation
+  'Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS'           Hardware-focused mitigation
+  ====================================  =================================
+
+  - Firmware status: Show if Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS) is
+    used to protect against Spectre variant 2 attacks when calling firmware (x86 only).
+
+  ========== =============================================================
+  'IBRS_FW'  Protection against user program attacks when calling firmware
+  ========== =============================================================
+
+  - Indirect branch prediction barrier (IBPB) status for protection between
+    processes of different users. This feature can be controlled through
+    prctl() per process, or through kernel command line options. This is
+    an x86 only feature. For more details see below.
+
+  ===================   ========================================================
+  'IBPB: disabled'      IBPB unused
+  'IBPB: always-on'     Use IBPB on all tasks
+  'IBPB: conditional'   Use IBPB on SECCOMP or indirect branch restricted tasks
+  ===================   ========================================================
+
+  - Single threaded indirect branch prediction (STIBP) status for protection
+    between different hyper threads. This feature can be controlled through
+    prctl per process, or through kernel command line options. This is x86
+    only feature. For more details see below.
+
+  ====================  ========================================================
+  'STIBP: disabled'     STIBP unused
+  'STIBP: forced'       Use STIBP on all tasks
+  'STIBP: conditional'  Use STIBP on SECCOMP or indirect branch restricted tasks
+  ====================  ========================================================
+
+  - Return stack buffer (RSB) protection status:
+
+  =============   ===========================================
+  'RSB filling'   Protection of RSB on context switch enabled
+  =============   ===========================================
+
+Full mitigation might require a microcode update from the CPU
+vendor. When the necessary microcode is not available, the kernel will
+report vulnerability.
+
+Turning on mitigation for Spectre variant 1 and Spectre variant 2
+-----------------------------------------------------------------
+
+1. Kernel mitigation
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   For the Spectre variant 1, vulnerable kernel code (as determined
+   by code audit or scanning tools) is annotated on a case by case
+   basis to use nospec accessor macros for bounds clipping :ref:`[2]
+   <spec_ref2>` to avoid any usable disclosure gadgets. However, it may
+   not cover all attack vectors for Spectre variant 1.
+
+   For Spectre variant 2 mitigation, the compiler turns indirect calls or
+   jumps in the kernel into equivalent return trampolines (retpolines)
+   :ref:`[3] <spec_ref3>` :ref:`[9] <spec_ref9>` to go to the target
+   addresses.  Speculative execution paths under retpolines are trapped
+   in an infinite loop to prevent any speculative execution jumping to
+   a gadget.
+
+   To turn on retpoline mitigation on a vulnerable CPU, the kernel
+   needs to be compiled with a gcc compiler that supports the
+   -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern -mindirect-branch-register options.
+   If the kernel is compiled with a Clang compiler, the compiler needs
+   to support -mretpoline-external-thunk option.  The kernel config
+   CONFIG_RETPOLINE needs to be turned on, and the CPU needs to run with
+   the latest updated microcode.
+
+   On Intel Skylake-era systems the mitigation covers most, but not all,
+   cases. See :ref:`[3] <spec_ref3>` for more details.
+
+   On CPUs with hardware mitigation for Spectre variant 2 (e.g. Enhanced
+   IBRS on x86), retpoline is automatically disabled at run time.
+
+   The retpoline mitigation is turned on by default on vulnerable
+   CPUs. It can be forced on or off by the administrator
+   via the kernel command line and sysfs control files. See
+   :ref:`spectre_mitigation_control_command_line`.
+
+   On x86, indirect branch restricted speculation is turned on by default
+   before invoking any firmware code to prevent Spectre variant 2 exploits
+   using the firmware.
+
+   Using kernel address space randomization (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_SLAB=y
+   and CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM=y in the kernel configuration) makes
+   attacks on the kernel generally more difficult.
+
+2. User program mitigation
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   User programs can mitigate Spectre variant 1 using LFENCE or "bounds
+   clipping". For more details see :ref:`[2] <spec_ref2>`.
+
+   For Spectre variant 2 mitigation, individual user programs
+   can be compiled with return trampolines for indirect branches.
+   This protects them from consuming poisoned entries in the branch
+   target buffer left by malicious software.  Alternatively, the
+   programs can disable their indirect branch speculation via prctl()
+   (See :ref:`Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst <set_spec_ctrl>`).
+   On x86, this will turn on STIBP to guard against attacks from the
+   sibling thread when the user program is running, and use IBPB to
+   flush the branch target buffer when switching to/from the program.
+
+   Restricting indirect branch speculation on a user program will
+   also prevent the program from launching a variant 2 attack
+   on x86.  All sand-boxed SECCOMP programs have indirect branch
+   speculation restricted by default.  Administrators can change
+   that behavior via the kernel command line and sysfs control files.
+   See :ref:`spectre_mitigation_control_command_line`.
+
+   Programs that disable their indirect branch speculation will have
+   more overhead and run slower.
+
+   User programs should use address space randomization
+   (/proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space = 1 or 2) to make attacks more
+   difficult.
+
+3. VM mitigation
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   Within the kernel, Spectre variant 1 attacks from rogue guests are
+   mitigated on a case by case basis in VM exit paths. Vulnerable code
+   uses nospec accessor macros for "bounds clipping", to avoid any
+   usable disclosure gadgets.  However, this may not cover all variant
+   1 attack vectors.
+
+   For Spectre variant 2 attacks from rogue guests to the kernel, the
+   Linux kernel uses retpoline or Enhanced IBRS to prevent consumption of
+   poisoned entries in branch target buffer left by rogue guests.  It also
+   flushes the return stack buffer on every VM exit to prevent a return
+   stack buffer underflow so poisoned branch target buffer could be used,
+   or attacker guests leaving poisoned entries in the return stack buffer.
+
+   To mitigate guest-to-guest attacks in the same CPU hardware thread,
+   the branch target buffer is sanitized by flushing before switching
+   to a new guest on a CPU.
+
+   The above mitigations are turned on by default on vulnerable CPUs.
+
+   To mitigate guest-to-guest attacks from sibling thread when SMT is
+   in use, an untrusted guest running in the sibling thread can have
+   its indirect branch speculation disabled by administrator via prctl().
+
+   The kernel also allows guests to use any microcode based mitigation
+   they choose to use (such as IBPB or STIBP on x86) to protect themselves.
+
+.. _spectre_mitigation_control_command_line:
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+---------------------------------------------
+
+Spectre variant 2 mitigation can be disabled or force enabled at the
+kernel command line.
+
+	nospectre_v2
+
+		[X86] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2
+		(indirect branch prediction) vulnerability. System may
+		allow data leaks with this option, which is equivalent
+		to spectre_v2=off.
+
+
+        spectre_v2=
+
+		[X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
+		(indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.
+		The default operation protects the kernel from
+		user space attacks.
+
+		on
+			unconditionally enable, implies
+			spectre_v2_user=on
+		off
+			unconditionally disable, implies
+		        spectre_v2_user=off
+		auto
+			kernel detects whether your CPU model is
+		        vulnerable
+
+		Selecting 'on' will, and 'auto' may, choose a
+		mitigation method at run time according to the
+		CPU, the available microcode, the setting of the
+		CONFIG_RETPOLINE configuration option, and the
+		compiler with which the kernel was built.
+
+		Selecting 'on' will also enable the mitigation
+		against user space to user space task attacks.
+
+		Selecting 'off' will disable both the kernel and
+		the user space protections.
+
+		Specific mitigations can also be selected manually:
+
+		retpoline
+					replace indirect branches
+		retpoline,generic
+					google's original retpoline
+		retpoline,amd
+					AMD-specific minimal thunk
+
+		Not specifying this option is equivalent to
+		spectre_v2=auto.
+
+For user space mitigation:
+
+        spectre_v2_user=
+
+		[X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
+		(indirect branch speculation) vulnerability between
+		user space tasks
+
+		on
+			Unconditionally enable mitigations. Is
+			enforced by spectre_v2=on
+
+		off
+			Unconditionally disable mitigations. Is
+			enforced by spectre_v2=off
+
+		prctl
+			Indirect branch speculation is enabled,
+			but mitigation can be enabled via prctl
+			per thread. The mitigation control state
+			is inherited on fork.
+
+		prctl,ibpb
+			Like "prctl" above, but only STIBP is
+			controlled per thread. IBPB is issued
+			always when switching between different user
+			space processes.
+
+		seccomp
+			Same as "prctl" above, but all seccomp
+			threads will enable the mitigation unless
+			they explicitly opt out.
+
+		seccomp,ibpb
+			Like "seccomp" above, but only STIBP is
+			controlled per thread. IBPB is issued
+			always when switching between different
+			user space processes.
+
+		auto
+			Kernel selects the mitigation depending on
+			the available CPU features and vulnerability.
+
+		Default mitigation:
+		If CONFIG_SECCOMP=y then "seccomp", otherwise "prctl"
+
+		Not specifying this option is equivalent to
+		spectre_v2_user=auto.
+
+		In general the kernel by default selects
+		reasonable mitigations for the current CPU. To
+		disable Spectre variant 2 mitigations, boot with
+		spectre_v2=off. Spectre variant 1 mitigations
+		cannot be disabled.
+
+Mitigation selection guide
+--------------------------
+
+1. Trusted userspace
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   If all userspace applications are from trusted sources and do not
+   execute externally supplied untrusted code, then the mitigations can
+   be disabled.
+
+2. Protect sensitive programs
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   For security-sensitive programs that have secrets (e.g. crypto
+   keys), protection against Spectre variant 2 can be put in place by
+   disabling indirect branch speculation when the program is running
+   (See :ref:`Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst <set_spec_ctrl>`).
+
+3. Sandbox untrusted programs
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   Untrusted programs that could be a source of attacks can be cordoned
+   off by disabling their indirect branch speculation when they are run
+   (See :ref:`Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst <set_spec_ctrl>`).
+   This prevents untrusted programs from polluting the branch target
+   buffer.  All programs running in SECCOMP sandboxes have indirect
+   branch speculation restricted by default. This behavior can be
+   changed via the kernel command line and sysfs control files. See
+   :ref:`spectre_mitigation_control_command_line`.
+
+3. High security mode
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   All Spectre variant 2 mitigations can be forced on
+   at boot time for all programs (See the "on" option in
+   :ref:`spectre_mitigation_control_command_line`).  This will add
+   overhead as indirect branch speculations for all programs will be
+   restricted.
+
+   On x86, branch target buffer will be flushed with IBPB when switching
+   to a new program. STIBP is left on all the time to protect programs
+   against variant 2 attacks originating from programs running on
+   sibling threads.
+
+   Alternatively, STIBP can be used only when running programs
+   whose indirect branch speculation is explicitly disabled,
+   while IBPB is still used all the time when switching to a new
+   program to clear the branch target buffer (See "ibpb" option in
+   :ref:`spectre_mitigation_control_command_line`).  This "ibpb" option
+   has less performance cost than the "on" option, which leaves STIBP
+   on all the time.
+
+References on Spectre
+---------------------
+
+Intel white papers:
+
+.. _spec_ref1:
+
+[1] `Intel analysis of speculative execution side channels <https://newsroom.intel.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2018/01/Intel-Analysis-of-Speculative-Execution-Side-Channels.pdf>`_.
+
+.. _spec_ref2:
+
+[2] `Bounds check bypass <https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/software-guidance/bounds-check-bypass>`_.
+
+.. _spec_ref3:
+
+[3] `Deep dive: Retpoline: A branch target injection mitigation <https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/deep-dive-retpoline-branch-target-injection-mitigation>`_.
+
+.. _spec_ref4:
+
+[4] `Deep Dive: Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors <https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/deep-dive-single-thread-indirect-branch-predictors>`_.
+
+AMD white papers:
+
+.. _spec_ref5:
+
+[5] `AMD64 technology indirect branch control extension <https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/Architecture_Guidelines_Update_Indirect_Branch_Control.pdf>`_.
+
+.. _spec_ref6:
+
+[6] `Software techniques for managing speculation on AMD processors <https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/90343-B_SoftwareTechniquesforManagingSpeculation_WP_7-18Update_FNL.pdf>`_.
+
+ARM white papers:
+
+.. _spec_ref7:
+
+[7] `Cache speculation side-channels <https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processor-vulnerability/download-the-whitepaper>`_.
+
+.. _spec_ref8:
+
+[8] `Cache speculation issues update <https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processor-vulnerability/latest-updates/cache-speculation-issues-update>`_.
+
+Google white paper:
+
+.. _spec_ref9:
+
+[9] `Retpoline: a software construct for preventing branch-target-injection <https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886>`_.
+
+MIPS white paper:
+
+.. _spec_ref10:
+
+[10] `MIPS: response on speculative execution and side channel vulnerabilities <https://www.mips.com/blog/mips-response-on-speculative-execution-and-side-channel-vulnerabilities/>`_.
+
+Academic papers:
+
+.. _spec_ref11:
+
+[11] `Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution <https://spectreattack.com/spectre.pdf>`_.
+
+.. _spec_ref12:
+
+[12] `NetSpectre: Read Arbitrary Memory over Network <https://arxiv.org/abs/1807.10535>`_.
+
+.. _spec_ref13:
+
+[13] `Spectre Returns! Speculation Attacks using the Return Stack Buffer <https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/woot18/woot18-paper-koruyeh.pdf>`_.
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 138f6664b2e2..0082d1e56999 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -5102,12 +5102,6 @@
 			emulate     [default] Vsyscalls turn into traps and are
 			            emulated reasonably safely.
 
-			native      Vsyscalls are native syscall instructions.
-			            This is a little bit faster than trapping
-			            and makes a few dynamic recompilers work
-			            better than they would in emulation mode.
-			            It also makes exploits much easier to write.
-
 			none        Vsyscalls don't work at all.  This makes
 			            them quite hard to use for exploits but
 			            might break your system.
diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst
index 1129c7550a48..7ddd8f667459 100644
--- a/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst
+++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst
@@ -49,6 +49,8 @@ If PR_SPEC_PRCTL is set, then the per-task control of the mitigation is
 available. If not set, prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL) for the speculation
 misfeature will fail.
 
+.. _set_spec_ctrl:
+
 PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL
 -----------------------
 
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 3e4868a6498b..d8f5dbfd6b76 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 VERSION = 5
 PATCHLEVEL = 2
-SUBLEVEL = 0
+SUBLEVEL = 1
 EXTRAVERSION =
 NAME = Bobtail Squid
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
index a166c960bc9e..e9d0bc3a5e88 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
 #include <linux/export.h>
 #include <linux/context_tracking.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
@@ -643,9 +644,11 @@ static unsigned long ptrace_get_debugreg(struct task_struct *tsk, int n)
 {
 	struct thread_struct *thread = &tsk->thread;
 	unsigned long val = 0;
+	int index = n;
 
 	if (n < HBP_NUM) {
-		struct perf_event *bp = thread->ptrace_bps[n];
+		struct perf_event *bp = thread->ptrace_bps[index];
+		index = array_index_nospec(index, HBP_NUM);
 
 		if (bp)
 			val = bp->hw.info.address;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c
index a5b802a12212..71d3fef1edc9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
 #include <linux/user.h>
 #include <linux/regset.h>
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/desc.h>
@@ -220,6 +221,7 @@ int do_get_thread_area(struct task_struct *p, int idx,
 		       struct user_desc __user *u_info)
 {
 	struct user_desc info;
+	int index;
 
 	if (idx == -1 && get_user(idx, &u_info->entry_number))
 		return -EFAULT;
@@ -227,8 +229,11 @@ int do_get_thread_area(struct task_struct *p, int idx,
 	if (idx < GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN || idx > GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MAX)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	fill_user_desc(&info, idx,
-		       &p->thread.tls_array[idx - GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN]);
+	index = idx - GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN;
+	index = array_index_nospec(index,
+			GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MAX - GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN + 1);
+
+	fill_user_desc(&info, idx, &p->thread.tls_array[index]);
 
 	if (copy_to_user(u_info, &info, sizeof(info)))
 		return -EFAULT;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
index 0850b5149345..4d1517022a14 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
@@ -141,10 +141,10 @@ SECTIONS
 		*(.text.__x86.indirect_thunk)
 		__indirect_thunk_end = .;
 #endif
-	} :text = 0x9090
 
-	/* End of text section */
-	_etext = .;
+		/* End of text section */
+		_etext = .;
+	} :text = 0x9090
 
 	NOTES :text :note
 
diff --git a/block/bfq-iosched.c b/block/bfq-iosched.c
index f9269ae6da9c..e5db3856b194 100644
--- a/block/bfq-iosched.c
+++ b/block/bfq-iosched.c
@@ -4584,6 +4584,7 @@ static void bfq_exit_icq_bfqq(struct bfq_io_cq *bic, bool is_sync)
 		unsigned long flags;
 
 		spin_lock_irqsave(&bfqd->lock, flags);
+		bfqq->bic = NULL;
 		bfq_exit_bfqq(bfqd, bfqq);
 		bic_set_bfqq(bic, NULL, is_sync);
 		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&bfqd->lock, flags);
diff --git a/block/bio.c b/block/bio.c
index ce797d73bb43..67bba12d273b 100644
--- a/block/bio.c
+++ b/block/bio.c
@@ -731,7 +731,7 @@ static int __bio_add_pc_page(struct request_queue *q, struct bio *bio,
 		}
 	}
 
-	if (bio_full(bio))
+	if (bio_full(bio, len))
 		return 0;
 
 	if (bio->bi_phys_segments >= queue_max_segments(q))
@@ -807,7 +807,7 @@ void __bio_add_page(struct bio *bio, struct page *page,
 	struct bio_vec *bv = &bio->bi_io_vec[bio->bi_vcnt];
 
 	WARN_ON_ONCE(bio_flagged(bio, BIO_CLONED));
-	WARN_ON_ONCE(bio_full(bio));
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(bio_full(bio, len));
 
 	bv->bv_page = page;
 	bv->bv_offset = off;
@@ -834,7 +834,7 @@ int bio_add_page(struct bio *bio, struct page *page,
 	bool same_page = false;
 
 	if (!__bio_try_merge_page(bio, page, len, offset, &same_page)) {
-		if (bio_full(bio))
+		if (bio_full(bio, len))
 			return 0;
 		__bio_add_page(bio, page, len, offset);
 	}
@@ -922,7 +922,7 @@ static int __bio_iov_iter_get_pages(struct bio *bio, struct iov_iter *iter)
 			if (same_page)
 				put_page(page);
 		} else {
-			if (WARN_ON_ONCE(bio_full(bio)))
+			if (WARN_ON_ONCE(bio_full(bio, len)))
                                 return -EINVAL;
 			__bio_add_page(bio, page, len, offset);
 		}
@@ -966,7 +966,7 @@ int bio_iov_iter_get_pages(struct bio *bio, struct iov_iter *iter)
 			ret = __bio_iov_bvec_add_pages(bio, iter);
 		else
 			ret = __bio_iov_iter_get_pages(bio, iter);
-	} while (!ret && iov_iter_count(iter) && !bio_full(bio));
+	} while (!ret && iov_iter_count(iter) && !bio_full(bio, 0));
 
 	if (iov_iter_bvec_no_ref(iter))
 		bio_set_flag(bio, BIO_NO_PAGE_REF);
diff --git a/crypto/lrw.c b/crypto/lrw.c
index 58009cf63a6e..be829f6afc8e 100644
--- a/crypto/lrw.c
+++ b/crypto/lrw.c
@@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ static int create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
 	inst->alg.base.cra_priority = alg->base.cra_priority;
 	inst->alg.base.cra_blocksize = LRW_BLOCK_SIZE;
 	inst->alg.base.cra_alignmask = alg->base.cra_alignmask |
-				       (__alignof__(__be32) - 1);
+				       (__alignof__(be128) - 1);
 
 	inst->alg.ivsize = LRW_BLOCK_SIZE;
 	inst->alg.min_keysize = crypto_skcipher_alg_min_keysize(alg) +
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index bc26b5511f0a..38a59a630cd4 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -2059,10 +2059,9 @@ static size_t binder_get_object(struct binder_proc *proc,
 
 	read_size = min_t(size_t, sizeof(*object), buffer->data_size - offset);
 	if (offset > buffer->data_size || read_size < sizeof(*hdr) ||
-	    !IS_ALIGNED(offset, sizeof(u32)))
+	    binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&proc->alloc, object, buffer,
+					  offset, read_size))
 		return 0;
-	binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&proc->alloc, object, buffer,
-				      offset, read_size);
 
 	/* Ok, now see if we read a complete object. */
 	hdr = &object->hdr;
@@ -2131,8 +2130,10 @@ static struct binder_buffer_object *binder_validate_ptr(
 		return NULL;
 
 	buffer_offset = start_offset + sizeof(binder_size_t) * index;
-	binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&proc->alloc, &object_offset,
-				      b, buffer_offset, sizeof(object_offset));
+	if (binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&proc->alloc, &object_offset,
+					  b, buffer_offset,
+					  sizeof(object_offset)))
+		return NULL;
 	object_size = binder_get_object(proc, b, object_offset, object);
 	if (!object_size || object->hdr.type != BINDER_TYPE_PTR)
 		return NULL;
@@ -2212,10 +2213,12 @@ static bool binder_validate_fixup(struct binder_proc *proc,
 			return false;
 		last_min_offset = last_bbo->parent_offset + sizeof(uintptr_t);
 		buffer_offset = objects_start_offset +
-			sizeof(binder_size_t) * last_bbo->parent,
-		binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&proc->alloc, &last_obj_offset,
-					      b, buffer_offset,
-					      sizeof(last_obj_offset));
+			sizeof(binder_size_t) * last_bbo->parent;
+		if (binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&proc->alloc,
+						  &last_obj_offset,
+						  b, buffer_offset,
+						  sizeof(last_obj_offset)))
+			return false;
 	}
 	return (fixup_offset >= last_min_offset);
 }
@@ -2301,15 +2304,15 @@ static void binder_transaction_buffer_release(struct binder_proc *proc,
 	for (buffer_offset = off_start_offset; buffer_offset < off_end_offset;
 	     buffer_offset += sizeof(binder_size_t)) {
 		struct binder_object_header *hdr;
-		size_t object_size;
+		size_t object_size = 0;
 		struct binder_object object;
 		binder_size_t object_offset;
 
-		binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&proc->alloc, &object_offset,
-					      buffer, buffer_offset,
-					      sizeof(object_offset));
-		object_size = binder_get_object(proc, buffer,
-						object_offset, &object);
+		if (!binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&proc->alloc, &object_offset,
+						   buffer, buffer_offset,
+						   sizeof(object_offset)))
+			object_size = binder_get_object(proc, buffer,
+							object_offset, &object);
 		if (object_size == 0) {
 			pr_err("transaction release %d bad object at offset %lld, size %zd\n",
 			       debug_id, (u64)object_offset, buffer->data_size);
@@ -2432,15 +2435,16 @@ static void binder_transaction_buffer_release(struct binder_proc *proc,
 			for (fd_index = 0; fd_index < fda->num_fds;
 			     fd_index++) {
 				u32 fd;
+				int err;
 				binder_size_t offset = fda_offset +
 					fd_index * sizeof(fd);
 
-				binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&proc->alloc,
-							      &fd,
-							      buffer,
-							      offset,
-							      sizeof(fd));
-				binder_deferred_fd_close(fd);
+				err = binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(
+						&proc->alloc, &fd, buffer,
+						offset, sizeof(fd));
+				WARN_ON(err);
+				if (!err)
+					binder_deferred_fd_close(fd);
 			}
 		} break;
 		default:
@@ -2683,11 +2687,12 @@ static int binder_translate_fd_array(struct binder_fd_array_object *fda,
 		int ret;
 		binder_size_t offset = fda_offset + fdi * sizeof(fd);
 
-		binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
-					      &fd, t->buffer,
-					      offset, sizeof(fd));
-		ret = binder_translate_fd(fd, offset, t, thread,
-					  in_reply_to);
+		ret = binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
+						    &fd, t->buffer,
+						    offset, sizeof(fd));
+		if (!ret)
+			ret = binder_translate_fd(fd, offset, t, thread,
+						  in_reply_to);
 		if (ret < 0)
 			return ret;
 	}
@@ -2740,8 +2745,12 @@ static int binder_fixup_parent(struct binder_transaction *t,
 	}
 	buffer_offset = bp->parent_offset +
 			(uintptr_t)parent->buffer - (uintptr_t)b->user_data;
-	binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc, b, buffer_offset,
-				    &bp->buffer, sizeof(bp->buffer));
+	if (binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc, b, buffer_offset,
+					&bp->buffer, sizeof(bp->buffer))) {
+		binder_user_error("%d:%d got transaction with invalid parent offset\n",
+				  proc->pid, thread->pid);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -3160,15 +3169,20 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
 		goto err_binder_alloc_buf_failed;
 	}
 	if (secctx) {
+		int err;
 		size_t buf_offset = ALIGN(tr->data_size, sizeof(void *)) +
 				    ALIGN(tr->offsets_size, sizeof(void *)) +
 				    ALIGN(extra_buffers_size, sizeof(void *)) -
 				    ALIGN(secctx_sz, sizeof(u64));
 
 		t->security_ctx = (uintptr_t)t->buffer->user_data + buf_offset;
-		binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
-					    t->buffer, buf_offset,
-					    secctx, secctx_sz);
+		err = binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
+						  t->buffer, buf_offset,
+						  secctx, secctx_sz);
+		if (err) {
+			t->security_ctx = 0;
+			WARN_ON(1);
+		}
 		security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_sz);
 		secctx = NULL;
 	}
@@ -3234,11 +3248,16 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
 		struct binder_object object;
 		binder_size_t object_offset;
 
-		binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
-					      &object_offset,
-					      t->buffer,
-					      buffer_offset,
-					      sizeof(object_offset));
+		if (binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
+						  &object_offset,
+						  t->buffer,
+						  buffer_offset,
+						  sizeof(object_offset))) {
+			return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
+			return_error_param = -EINVAL;
+			return_error_line = __LINE__;
+			goto err_bad_offset;
+		}
 		object_size = binder_get_object(target_proc, t->buffer,
 						object_offset, &object);
 		if (object_size == 0 || object_offset < off_min) {
@@ -3262,15 +3281,17 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
 
 			fp = to_flat_binder_object(hdr);
 			ret = binder_translate_binder(fp, t, thread);
-			if (ret < 0) {
+
+			if (ret < 0 ||
+			    binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
+							t->buffer,
+							object_offset,
+							fp, sizeof(*fp))) {
 				return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
 				return_error_param = ret;
 				return_error_line = __LINE__;
 				goto err_translate_failed;
 			}
-			binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
-						    t->buffer, object_offset,
-						    fp, sizeof(*fp));
 		} break;
 		case BINDER_TYPE_HANDLE:
 		case BINDER_TYPE_WEAK_HANDLE: {
@@ -3278,15 +3299,16 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
 
 			fp = to_flat_binder_object(hdr);
 			ret = binder_translate_handle(fp, t, thread);
-			if (ret < 0) {
+			if (ret < 0 ||
+			    binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
+							t->buffer,
+							object_offset,
+							fp, sizeof(*fp))) {
 				return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
 				return_error_param = ret;
 				return_error_line = __LINE__;
 				goto err_translate_failed;
 			}
-			binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
-						    t->buffer, object_offset,
-						    fp, sizeof(*fp));
 		} break;
 
 		case BINDER_TYPE_FD: {
@@ -3296,16 +3318,17 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
 			int ret = binder_translate_fd(fp->fd, fd_offset, t,
 						      thread, in_reply_to);
 
-			if (ret < 0) {
+			fp->pad_binder = 0;
+			if (ret < 0 ||
+			    binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
+							t->buffer,
+							object_offset,
+							fp, sizeof(*fp))) {
 				return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
 				return_error_param = ret;
 				return_error_line = __LINE__;
 				goto err_translate_failed;
 			}
-			fp->pad_binder = 0;
-			binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
-						    t->buffer, object_offset,
-						    fp, sizeof(*fp));
 		} break;
 		case BINDER_TYPE_FDA: {
 			struct binder_object ptr_object;
@@ -3393,15 +3416,16 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
 						  num_valid,
 						  last_fixup_obj_off,
 						  last_fixup_min_off);
-			if (ret < 0) {
+			if (ret < 0 ||
+			    binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
+							t->buffer,
+							object_offset,
+							bp, sizeof(*bp))) {
 				return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
 				return_error_param = ret;
 				return_error_line = __LINE__;
 				goto err_translate_failed;
 			}
-			binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
-						    t->buffer, object_offset,
-						    bp, sizeof(*bp));
 			last_fixup_obj_off = object_offset;
 			last_fixup_min_off = 0;
 		} break;
@@ -4140,20 +4164,27 @@ static int binder_apply_fd_fixups(struct binder_proc *proc,
 		trace_binder_transaction_fd_recv(t, fd, fixup->offset);
 		fd_install(fd, fixup->file);
 		fixup->file = NULL;
-		binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&proc->alloc, t->buffer,
-					    fixup->offset, &fd,
-					    sizeof(u32));
+		if (binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&proc->alloc, t->buffer,
+						fixup->offset, &fd,
+						sizeof(u32))) {
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			break;
+		}
 	}
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(fixup, tmp, &t->fd_fixups, fixup_entry) {
 		if (fixup->file) {
 			fput(fixup->file);
 		} else if (ret) {
 			u32 fd;
-
-			binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&proc->alloc, &fd,
-						      t->buffer, fixup->offset,
-						      sizeof(fd));
-			binder_deferred_fd_close(fd);
+			int err;
+
+			err = binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&proc->alloc, &fd,
+							    t->buffer,
+							    fixup->offset,
+							    sizeof(fd));
+			WARN_ON(err);
+			if (!err)
+				binder_deferred_fd_close(fd);
 		}
 		list_del(&fixup->fixup_entry);
 		kfree(fixup);
@@ -4268,6 +4299,8 @@ static int binder_thread_read(struct binder_proc *proc,
 		case BINDER_WORK_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE: {
 			binder_inner_proc_unlock(proc);
 			cmd = BR_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE;
+			kfree(w);
+			binder_stats_deleted(BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE);
 			if (put_user(cmd, (uint32_t __user *)ptr))
 				return -EFAULT;
 			ptr += sizeof(uint32_t);
@@ -4276,8 +4309,6 @@ static int binder_thread_read(struct binder_proc *proc,
 			binder_debug(BINDER_DEBUG_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE,
 				     "%d:%d BR_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE\n",
 				     proc->pid, thread->pid);
-			kfree(w);
-			binder_stats_deleted(BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE);
 		} break;
 		case BINDER_WORK_NODE: {
 			struct binder_node *node = container_of(w, struct binder_node, work);
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c b/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c
index ce5603c2291c..6d79a1b0d446 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c
@@ -1119,15 +1119,16 @@ binder_alloc_copy_user_to_buffer(struct binder_alloc *alloc,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static void binder_alloc_do_buffer_copy(struct binder_alloc *alloc,
-					bool to_buffer,
-					struct binder_buffer *buffer,
-					binder_size_t buffer_offset,
-					void *ptr,
-					size_t bytes)
+static int binder_alloc_do_buffer_copy(struct binder_alloc *alloc,
+				       bool to_buffer,
+				       struct binder_buffer *buffer,
+				       binder_size_t buffer_offset,
+				       void *ptr,
+				       size_t bytes)
 {
 	/* All copies must be 32-bit aligned and 32-bit size */
-	BUG_ON(!check_buffer(alloc, buffer, buffer_offset, bytes));
+	if (!check_buffer(alloc, buffer, buffer_offset, bytes))
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	while (bytes) {
 		unsigned long size;
@@ -1155,25 +1156,26 @@ static void binder_alloc_do_buffer_copy(struct binder_alloc *alloc,
 		ptr = ptr + size;
 		buffer_offset += size;
 	}
+	return 0;
 }
 
-void binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(struct binder_alloc *alloc,
-				 struct binder_buffer *buffer,
-				 binder_size_t buffer_offset,
-				 void *src,
-				 size_t bytes)
+int binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(struct binder_alloc *alloc,
+				struct binder_buffer *buffer,
+				binder_size_t buffer_offset,
+				void *src,
+				size_t bytes)
 {
-	binder_alloc_do_buffer_copy(alloc, true, buffer, buffer_offset,
-				    src, bytes);
+	return binder_alloc_do_buffer_copy(alloc, true, buffer, buffer_offset,
+					   src, bytes);
 }
 
-void binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(struct binder_alloc *alloc,
-				   void *dest,
-				   struct binder_buffer *buffer,
-				   binder_size_t buffer_offset,
-				   size_t bytes)
+int binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(struct binder_alloc *alloc,
+				  void *dest,
+				  struct binder_buffer *buffer,
+				  binder_size_t buffer_offset,
+				  size_t bytes)
 {
-	binder_alloc_do_buffer_copy(alloc, false, buffer, buffer_offset,
-				    dest, bytes);
+	return binder_alloc_do_buffer_copy(alloc, false, buffer, buffer_offset,
+					   dest, bytes);
 }
 
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder_alloc.h b/drivers/android/binder_alloc.h
index 71bfa95f8e09..db9c1b984695 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder_alloc.h
+++ b/drivers/android/binder_alloc.h
@@ -159,17 +159,17 @@ binder_alloc_copy_user_to_buffer(struct binder_alloc *alloc,
 				 const void __user *from,
 				 size_t bytes);
 
-void binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(struct binder_alloc *alloc,
-				 struct binder_buffer *buffer,
-				 binder_size_t buffer_offset,
-				 void *src,
-				 size_t bytes);
-
-void binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(struct binder_alloc *alloc,
-				   void *dest,
-				   struct binder_buffer *buffer,
-				   binder_size_t buffer_offset,
-				   size_t bytes);
+int binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(struct binder_alloc *alloc,
+				struct binder_buffer *buffer,
+				binder_size_t buffer_offset,
+				void *src,
+				size_t bytes);
+
+int binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(struct binder_alloc *alloc,
+				  void *dest,
+				  struct binder_buffer *buffer,
+				  binder_size_t buffer_offset,
+				  size_t bytes);
 
 #endif /* _LINUX_BINDER_ALLOC_H */
 
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
index 90325e1749fb..d47ad10a35fe 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
@@ -289,15 +289,15 @@ static int tpm_class_shutdown(struct device *dev)
 {
 	struct tpm_chip *chip = container_of(dev, struct tpm_chip, dev);
 
+	down_write(&chip->ops_sem);
 	if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) {
-		down_write(&chip->ops_sem);
 		if (!tpm_chip_start(chip)) {
 			tpm2_shutdown(chip, TPM2_SU_CLEAR);
 			tpm_chip_stop(chip);
 		}
-		chip->ops = NULL;
-		up_write(&chip->ops_sem);
 	}
+	chip->ops = NULL;
+	up_write(&chip->ops_sem);
 
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c
index 85dcf2654d11..faacbe1ffa1a 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c
@@ -510,7 +510,7 @@ struct tpm1_get_random_out {
  *
  * Return:
  * *  number of bytes read
- * * -errno or a TPM return code otherwise
+ * * -errno (positive TPM return codes are masked to -EIO)
  */
 int tpm1_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max)
 {
@@ -531,8 +531,11 @@ int tpm1_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max)
 
 		rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, sizeof(out->rng_data_len),
 				      "attempting get random");
-		if (rc)
+		if (rc) {
+			if (rc > 0)
+				rc = -EIO;
 			goto out;
+		}
 
 		out = (struct tpm1_get_random_out *)&buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE];
 
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
index 4de49924cfc4..d103545e4055 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ struct tpm2_get_random_out {
  *
  * Return:
  *   size of the buffer on success,
- *   -errno otherwise
+ *   -errno otherwise (positive TPM return codes are masked to -EIO)
  */
 int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max)
 {
@@ -324,8 +324,11 @@ int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max)
 				       offsetof(struct tpm2_get_random_out,
 						buffer),
 				       "attempting get random");
-		if (err)
+		if (err) {
+			if (err > 0)
+				err = -EIO;
 			goto out;
+		}
 
 		out = (struct tpm2_get_random_out *)
 			&buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE];
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/talitos.c b/drivers/crypto/talitos.c
index fbc7bf9d7380..427c78d4d948 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/talitos.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/talitos.c
@@ -2339,7 +2339,7 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template driver_algs[] = {
 			.base = {
 				.cra_name = "authenc(hmac(sha1),cbc(aes))",
 				.cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha1-"
-						   "cbc-aes-talitos",
+						   "cbc-aes-talitos-hsna",
 				.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
 				.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
 			},
@@ -2384,7 +2384,7 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template driver_algs[] = {
 				.cra_name = "authenc(hmac(sha1),"
 					    "cbc(des3_ede))",
 				.cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha1-"
-						   "cbc-3des-talitos",
+						   "cbc-3des-talitos-hsna",
 				.cra_blocksize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
 				.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
 			},
@@ -2427,7 +2427,7 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template driver_algs[] = {
 			.base = {
 				.cra_name = "authenc(hmac(sha224),cbc(aes))",
 				.cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha224-"
-						   "cbc-aes-talitos",
+						   "cbc-aes-talitos-hsna",
 				.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
 				.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
 			},
@@ -2472,7 +2472,7 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template driver_algs[] = {
 				.cra_name = "authenc(hmac(sha224),"
 					    "cbc(des3_ede))",
 				.cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha224-"
-						   "cbc-3des-talitos",
+						   "cbc-3des-talitos-hsna",
 				.cra_blocksize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
 				.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
 			},
@@ -2515,7 +2515,7 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template driver_algs[] = {
 			.base = {
 				.cra_name = "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes))",
 				.cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha256-"
-						   "cbc-aes-talitos",
+						   "cbc-aes-talitos-hsna",
 				.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
 				.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
 			},
@@ -2560,7 +2560,7 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template driver_algs[] = {
 				.cra_name = "authenc(hmac(sha256),"
 					    "cbc(des3_ede))",
 				.cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha256-"
-						   "cbc-3des-talitos",
+						   "cbc-3des-talitos-hsna",
 				.cra_blocksize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
 				.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
 			},
@@ -2689,7 +2689,7 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template driver_algs[] = {
 			.base = {
 				.cra_name = "authenc(hmac(md5),cbc(aes))",
 				.cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-md5-"
-						   "cbc-aes-talitos",
+						   "cbc-aes-talitos-hsna",
 				.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
 				.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
 			},
@@ -2732,7 +2732,7 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template driver_algs[] = {
 			.base = {
 				.cra_name = "authenc(hmac(md5),cbc(des3_ede))",
 				.cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-md5-"
-						   "cbc-3des-talitos",
+						   "cbc-3des-talitos-hsna",
 				.cra_blocksize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
 				.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
 			},
diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-ids.h b/drivers/hid/hid-ids.h
index b032d3899fa3..bfc584ada4eb 100644
--- a/drivers/hid/hid-ids.h
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-ids.h
@@ -1241,6 +1241,7 @@
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_PRIMAX_KEYBOARD	0x4e05
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_PRIMAX_REZEL	0x4e72
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_PRIMAX_PIXART_MOUSE_4D0F	0x4d0f
+#define USB_DEVICE_ID_PRIMAX_PIXART_MOUSE_4D65	0x4d65
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_PRIMAX_PIXART_MOUSE_4E22	0x4e22
 
 
diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-quirks.c b/drivers/hid/hid-quirks.c
index 671a285724f9..1549c7a2f04c 100644
--- a/drivers/hid/hid-quirks.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-quirks.c
@@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ static const struct hid_device_id hid_quirks[] = {
 	{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_PIXART, USB_DEVICE_ID_PIXART_USB_OPTICAL_MOUSE), HID_QUIRK_ALWAYS_POLL },
 	{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_PRIMAX, USB_DEVICE_ID_PRIMAX_MOUSE_4D22), HID_QUIRK_ALWAYS_POLL },
 	{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_PRIMAX, USB_DEVICE_ID_PRIMAX_PIXART_MOUSE_4D0F), HID_QUIRK_ALWAYS_POLL },
+	{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_PRIMAX, USB_DEVICE_ID_PRIMAX_PIXART_MOUSE_4D65), HID_QUIRK_ALWAYS_POLL },
 	{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_PRIMAX, USB_DEVICE_ID_PRIMAX_PIXART_MOUSE_4E22), HID_QUIRK_ALWAYS_POLL },
 	{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_PRODIGE, USB_DEVICE_ID_PRODIGE_CORDLESS), HID_QUIRK_NOGET },
 	{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_QUANTA, USB_DEVICE_ID_QUANTA_OPTICAL_TOUCH_3001), HID_QUIRK_NOGET },
diff --git a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etb10.c b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etb10.c
index 4ee4c80a4354..543cc3d36e1d 100644
--- a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etb10.c
+++ b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etb10.c
@@ -373,12 +373,10 @@ static void *etb_alloc_buffer(struct coresight_device *csdev,
 			      struct perf_event *event, void **pages,
 			      int nr_pages, bool overwrite)
 {
-	int node, cpu = event->cpu;
+	int node;
 	struct cs_buffers *buf;
 
-	if (cpu == -1)
-		cpu = smp_processor_id();
-	node = cpu_to_node(cpu);
+	node = (event->cpu == -1) ? NUMA_NO_NODE : cpu_to_node(event->cpu);
 
 	buf = kzalloc_node(sizeof(struct cs_buffers), GFP_KERNEL, node);
 	if (!buf)
diff --git a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-funnel.c b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-funnel.c
index 16b0c0e1e43a..ad6e16c96263 100644
--- a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-funnel.c
+++ b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-funnel.c
@@ -241,6 +241,7 @@ static int funnel_probe(struct device *dev, struct resource *res)
 	}
 
 	pm_runtime_put(dev);
+	ret = 0;
 
 out_disable_clk:
 	if (ret && !IS_ERR_OR_NULL(drvdata->atclk))
diff --git a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-tmc-etf.c b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-tmc-etf.c
index 2527b5d3b65e..8de109de171f 100644
--- a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-tmc-etf.c
+++ b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-tmc-etf.c
@@ -378,12 +378,10 @@ static void *tmc_alloc_etf_buffer(struct coresight_device *csdev,
 				  struct perf_event *event, void **pages,
 				  int nr_pages, bool overwrite)
 {
-	int node, cpu = event->cpu;
+	int node;
 	struct cs_buffers *buf;
 
-	if (cpu == -1)
-		cpu = smp_processor_id();
-	node = cpu_to_node(cpu);
+	node = (event->cpu == -1) ? NUMA_NO_NODE : cpu_to_node(event->cpu);
 
 	/* Allocate memory structure for interaction with Perf */
 	buf = kzalloc_node(sizeof(struct cs_buffers), GFP_KERNEL, node);
diff --git a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-tmc-etr.c b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-tmc-etr.c
index df6e4b0b84e9..9f293b9dce8c 100644
--- a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-tmc-etr.c
+++ b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-tmc-etr.c
@@ -1178,14 +1178,11 @@ static struct etr_buf *
 alloc_etr_buf(struct tmc_drvdata *drvdata, struct perf_event *event,
 	      int nr_pages, void **pages, bool snapshot)
 {
-	int node, cpu = event->cpu;
+	int node;
 	struct etr_buf *etr_buf;
 	unsigned long size;
 
-	if (cpu == -1)
-		cpu = smp_processor_id();
-	node = cpu_to_node(cpu);
-
+	node = (event->cpu == -1) ? NUMA_NO_NODE : cpu_to_node(event->cpu);
 	/*
 	 * Try to match the perf ring buffer size if it is larger
 	 * than the size requested via sysfs.
@@ -1317,13 +1314,11 @@ static struct etr_perf_buffer *
 tmc_etr_setup_perf_buf(struct tmc_drvdata *drvdata, struct perf_event *event,
 		       int nr_pages, void **pages, bool snapshot)
 {
-	int node, cpu = event->cpu;
+	int node;
 	struct etr_buf *etr_buf;
 	struct etr_perf_buffer *etr_perf;
 
-	if (cpu == -1)
-		cpu = smp_processor_id();
-	node = cpu_to_node(cpu);
+	node = (event->cpu == -1) ? NUMA_NO_NODE : cpu_to_node(event->cpu);
 
 	etr_perf = kzalloc_node(sizeof(*etr_perf), GFP_KERNEL, node);
 	if (!etr_perf)
diff --git a/drivers/iio/adc/stm32-adc-core.c b/drivers/iio/adc/stm32-adc-core.c
index 2327ec18b40c..1f7ce5186dfc 100644
--- a/drivers/iio/adc/stm32-adc-core.c
+++ b/drivers/iio/adc/stm32-adc-core.c
@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ struct stm32_adc_priv_cfg {
  * @domain:		irq domain reference
  * @aclk:		clock reference for the analog circuitry
  * @bclk:		bus clock common for all ADCs, depends on part used
+ * @vdda:		vdda analog supply reference
  * @vref:		regulator reference
  * @cfg:		compatible configuration data
  * @common:		common data for all ADC instances
@@ -97,6 +98,7 @@ struct stm32_adc_priv {
 	struct irq_domain		*domain;
 	struct clk			*aclk;
 	struct clk			*bclk;
+	struct regulator		*vdda;
 	struct regulator		*vref;
 	const struct stm32_adc_priv_cfg	*cfg;
 	struct stm32_adc_common		common;
@@ -394,10 +396,16 @@ static int stm32_adc_core_hw_start(struct device *dev)
 	struct stm32_adc_priv *priv = to_stm32_adc_priv(common);
 	int ret;
 
+	ret = regulator_enable(priv->vdda);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		dev_err(dev, "vdda enable failed %d\n", ret);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
 	ret = regulator_enable(priv->vref);
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		dev_err(dev, "vref enable failed\n");
-		return ret;
+		goto err_vdda_disable;
 	}
 
 	if (priv->bclk) {
@@ -425,6 +433,8 @@ static int stm32_adc_core_hw_start(struct device *dev)
 		clk_disable_unprepare(priv->bclk);
 err_regulator_disable:
 	regulator_disable(priv->vref);
+err_vdda_disable:
+	regulator_disable(priv->vdda);
 
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -441,6 +451,7 @@ static void stm32_adc_core_hw_stop(struct device *dev)
 	if (priv->bclk)
 		clk_disable_unprepare(priv->bclk);
 	regulator_disable(priv->vref);
+	regulator_disable(priv->vdda);
 }
 
 static int stm32_adc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
@@ -468,6 +479,14 @@ static int stm32_adc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 		return PTR_ERR(priv->common.base);
 	priv->common.phys_base = res->start;
 
+	priv->vdda = devm_regulator_get(&pdev->dev, "vdda");
+	if (IS_ERR(priv->vdda)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(priv->vdda);
+		if (ret != -EPROBE_DEFER)
+			dev_err(&pdev->dev, "vdda get failed, %d\n", ret);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
 	priv->vref = devm_regulator_get(&pdev->dev, "vref");
 	if (IS_ERR(priv->vref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(priv->vref);
diff --git a/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/stv0297.c b/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/stv0297.c
index dac396c95a59..6d5962d5697a 100644
--- a/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/stv0297.c
+++ b/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/stv0297.c
@@ -682,7 +682,7 @@ static const struct dvb_frontend_ops stv0297_ops = {
 	.delsys = { SYS_DVBC_ANNEX_A },
 	.info = {
 		 .name = "ST STV0297 DVB-C",
-		 .frequency_min_hz = 470 * MHz,
+		 .frequency_min_hz = 47 * MHz,
 		 .frequency_max_hz = 862 * MHz,
 		 .frequency_stepsize_hz = 62500,
 		 .symbol_rate_min = 870000,
diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/Makefile b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/Makefile
index 951c984de61a..fb10eafe9bde 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/Makefile
@@ -15,8 +15,7 @@ KCOV_INSTRUMENT_rodata.o	:= n
 
 OBJCOPYFLAGS :=
 OBJCOPYFLAGS_rodata_objcopy.o	:= \
-			--set-section-flags .text=alloc,readonly \
-			--rename-section .text=.rodata
+			--rename-section .text=.rodata,alloc,readonly,load
 targets += rodata.o rodata_objcopy.o
 $(obj)/rodata_objcopy.o: $(obj)/rodata.o FORCE
 	$(call if_changed,objcopy)
diff --git a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c
index 300ed69fe2c7..16695366ec92 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c
@@ -21,6 +21,9 @@
 #include "vmci_driver.h"
 #include "vmci_event.h"
 
+/* Use a wide upper bound for the maximum contexts. */
+#define VMCI_MAX_CONTEXTS 2000
+
 /*
  * List of current VMCI contexts.  Contexts can be added by
  * vmci_ctx_create() and removed via vmci_ctx_destroy().
@@ -117,19 +120,22 @@ struct vmci_ctx *vmci_ctx_create(u32 cid, u32 priv_flags,
 	/* Initialize host-specific VMCI context. */
 	init_waitqueue_head(&context->host_context.wait_queue);
 
-	context->queue_pair_array = vmci_handle_arr_create(0);
+	context->queue_pair_array =
+		vmci_handle_arr_create(0, VMCI_MAX_GUEST_QP_COUNT);
 	if (!context->queue_pair_array) {
 		error = -ENOMEM;
 		goto err_free_ctx;
 	}
 
-	context->doorbell_array = vmci_handle_arr_create(0);
+	context->doorbell_array =
+		vmci_handle_arr_create(0, VMCI_MAX_GUEST_DOORBELL_COUNT);
 	if (!context->doorbell_array) {
 		error = -ENOMEM;
 		goto err_free_qp_array;
 	}
 
-	context->pending_doorbell_array = vmci_handle_arr_create(0);
+	context->pending_doorbell_array =
+		vmci_handle_arr_create(0, VMCI_MAX_GUEST_DOORBELL_COUNT);
 	if (!context->pending_doorbell_array) {
 		error = -ENOMEM;
 		goto err_free_db_array;
@@ -204,7 +210,7 @@ static int ctx_fire_notification(u32 context_id, u32 priv_flags)
 	 * We create an array to hold the subscribers we find when
 	 * scanning through all contexts.
 	 */
-	subscriber_array = vmci_handle_arr_create(0);
+	subscriber_array = vmci_handle_arr_create(0, VMCI_MAX_CONTEXTS);
 	if (subscriber_array == NULL)
 		return VMCI_ERROR_NO_MEM;
 
@@ -623,20 +629,26 @@ int vmci_ctx_add_notification(u32 context_id, u32 remote_cid)
 
 	spin_lock(&context->lock);
 
-	list_for_each_entry(n, &context->notifier_list, node) {
-		if (vmci_handle_is_equal(n->handle, notifier->handle)) {
-			exists = true;
-			break;
+	if (context->n_notifiers < VMCI_MAX_CONTEXTS) {
+		list_for_each_entry(n, &context->notifier_list, node) {
+			if (vmci_handle_is_equal(n->handle, notifier->handle)) {
+				exists = true;
+				break;
+			}
 		}
-	}
 
-	if (exists) {
-		kfree(notifier);
-		result = VMCI_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS;
+		if (exists) {
+			kfree(notifier);
+			result = VMCI_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS;
+		} else {
+			list_add_tail_rcu(&notifier->node,
+					  &context->notifier_list);
+			context->n_notifiers++;
+			result = VMCI_SUCCESS;
+		}
 	} else {
-		list_add_tail_rcu(&notifier->node, &context->notifier_list);
-		context->n_notifiers++;
-		result = VMCI_SUCCESS;
+		kfree(notifier);
+		result = VMCI_ERROR_NO_MEM;
 	}
 
 	spin_unlock(&context->lock);
@@ -721,8 +733,7 @@ static int vmci_ctx_get_chkpt_doorbells(struct vmci_ctx *context,
 					u32 *buf_size, void **pbuf)
 {
 	struct dbell_cpt_state *dbells;
-	size_t n_doorbells;
-	int i;
+	u32 i, n_doorbells;
 
 	n_doorbells = vmci_handle_arr_get_size(context->doorbell_array);
 	if (n_doorbells > 0) {
@@ -860,7 +871,8 @@ int vmci_ctx_rcv_notifications_get(u32 context_id,
 	spin_lock(&context->lock);
 
 	*db_handle_array = context->pending_doorbell_array;
-	context->pending_doorbell_array = vmci_handle_arr_create(0);
+	context->pending_doorbell_array =
+		vmci_handle_arr_create(0, VMCI_MAX_GUEST_DOORBELL_COUNT);
 	if (!context->pending_doorbell_array) {
 		context->pending_doorbell_array = *db_handle_array;
 		*db_handle_array = NULL;
@@ -942,12 +954,11 @@ int vmci_ctx_dbell_create(u32 context_id, struct vmci_handle handle)
 		return VMCI_ERROR_NOT_FOUND;
 
 	spin_lock(&context->lock);
-	if (!vmci_handle_arr_has_entry(context->doorbell_array, handle)) {
-		vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(&context->doorbell_array, handle);
-		result = VMCI_SUCCESS;
-	} else {
+	if (!vmci_handle_arr_has_entry(context->doorbell_array, handle))
+		result = vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(&context->doorbell_array,
+						      handle);
+	else
 		result = VMCI_ERROR_DUPLICATE_ENTRY;
-	}
 
 	spin_unlock(&context->lock);
 	vmci_ctx_put(context);
@@ -1083,15 +1094,16 @@ int vmci_ctx_notify_dbell(u32 src_cid,
 			if (!vmci_handle_arr_has_entry(
 					dst_context->pending_doorbell_array,
 					handle)) {
-				vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(
+				result = vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(
 					&dst_context->pending_doorbell_array,
 					handle);
-
-				ctx_signal_notify(dst_context);
-				wake_up(&dst_context->host_context.wait_queue);
-
+				if (result == VMCI_SUCCESS) {
+					ctx_signal_notify(dst_context);
+					wake_up(&dst_context->host_context.wait_queue);
+				}
+			} else {
+				result = VMCI_SUCCESS;
 			}
-			result = VMCI_SUCCESS;
 		}
 		spin_unlock(&dst_context->lock);
 	}
@@ -1118,13 +1130,11 @@ int vmci_ctx_qp_create(struct vmci_ctx *context, struct vmci_handle handle)
 	if (context == NULL || vmci_handle_is_invalid(handle))
 		return VMCI_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS;
 
-	if (!vmci_handle_arr_has_entry(context->queue_pair_array, handle)) {
-		vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(&context->queue_pair_array,
-					     handle);
-		result = VMCI_SUCCESS;
-	} else {
+	if (!vmci_handle_arr_has_entry(context->queue_pair_array, handle))
+		result = vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(
+			&context->queue_pair_array, handle);
+	else
 		result = VMCI_ERROR_DUPLICATE_ENTRY;
-	}
 
 	return result;
 }
diff --git a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_handle_array.c b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_handle_array.c
index c527388f5d7b..de7fee7ead1b 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_handle_array.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_handle_array.c
@@ -8,24 +8,29 @@
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include "vmci_handle_array.h"
 
-static size_t handle_arr_calc_size(size_t capacity)
+static size_t handle_arr_calc_size(u32 capacity)
 {
-	return sizeof(struct vmci_handle_arr) +
+	return VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_HEADER_SIZE +
 	    capacity * sizeof(struct vmci_handle);
 }
 
-struct vmci_handle_arr *vmci_handle_arr_create(size_t capacity)
+struct vmci_handle_arr *vmci_handle_arr_create(u32 capacity, u32 max_capacity)
 {
 	struct vmci_handle_arr *array;
 
+	if (max_capacity == 0 || capacity > max_capacity)
+		return NULL;
+
 	if (capacity == 0)
-		capacity = VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_DEFAULT_SIZE;
+		capacity = min((u32)VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_DEFAULT_CAPACITY,
+			       max_capacity);
 
 	array = kmalloc(handle_arr_calc_size(capacity), GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (!array)
 		return NULL;
 
 	array->capacity = capacity;
+	array->max_capacity = max_capacity;
 	array->size = 0;
 
 	return array;
@@ -36,27 +41,34 @@ void vmci_handle_arr_destroy(struct vmci_handle_arr *array)
 	kfree(array);
 }
 
-void vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(struct vmci_handle_arr **array_ptr,
-				  struct vmci_handle handle)
+int vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(struct vmci_handle_arr **array_ptr,
+				 struct vmci_handle handle)
 {
 	struct vmci_handle_arr *array = *array_ptr;
 
 	if (unlikely(array->size >= array->capacity)) {
 		/* reallocate. */
 		struct vmci_handle_arr *new_array;
-		size_t new_capacity = array->capacity * VMCI_ARR_CAP_MULT;
-		size_t new_size = handle_arr_calc_size(new_capacity);
+		u32 capacity_bump = min(array->max_capacity - array->capacity,
+					array->capacity);
+		size_t new_size = handle_arr_calc_size(array->capacity +
+						       capacity_bump);
+
+		if (array->size >= array->max_capacity)
+			return VMCI_ERROR_NO_MEM;
 
 		new_array = krealloc(array, new_size, GFP_ATOMIC);
 		if (!new_array)
-			return;
+			return VMCI_ERROR_NO_MEM;
 
-		new_array->capacity = new_capacity;
+		new_array->capacity += capacity_bump;
 		*array_ptr = array = new_array;
 	}
 
 	array->entries[array->size] = handle;
 	array->size++;
+
+	return VMCI_SUCCESS;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -66,7 +78,7 @@ struct vmci_handle vmci_handle_arr_remove_entry(struct vmci_handle_arr *array,
 						struct vmci_handle entry_handle)
 {
 	struct vmci_handle handle = VMCI_INVALID_HANDLE;
-	size_t i;
+	u32 i;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < array->size; i++) {
 		if (vmci_handle_is_equal(array->entries[i], entry_handle)) {
@@ -101,7 +113,7 @@ struct vmci_handle vmci_handle_arr_remove_tail(struct vmci_handle_arr *array)
  * Handle at given index, VMCI_INVALID_HANDLE if invalid index.
  */
 struct vmci_handle
-vmci_handle_arr_get_entry(const struct vmci_handle_arr *array, size_t index)
+vmci_handle_arr_get_entry(const struct vmci_handle_arr *array, u32 index)
 {
 	if (unlikely(index >= array->size))
 		return VMCI_INVALID_HANDLE;
@@ -112,7 +124,7 @@ vmci_handle_arr_get_entry(const struct vmci_handle_arr *array, size_t index)
 bool vmci_handle_arr_has_entry(const struct vmci_handle_arr *array,
 			       struct vmci_handle entry_handle)
 {
-	size_t i;
+	u32 i;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < array->size; i++)
 		if (vmci_handle_is_equal(array->entries[i], entry_handle))
diff --git a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_handle_array.h b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_handle_array.h
index bd1559a548e9..96193f85be5b 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_handle_array.h
+++ b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_handle_array.h
@@ -9,32 +9,41 @@
 #define _VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_H_
 
 #include <linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h>
+#include <linux/limits.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
 
-#define VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_DEFAULT_SIZE 4
-#define VMCI_ARR_CAP_MULT 2	/* Array capacity multiplier */
-
 struct vmci_handle_arr {
-	size_t capacity;
-	size_t size;
+	u32 capacity;
+	u32 max_capacity;
+	u32 size;
+	u32 pad;
 	struct vmci_handle entries[];
 };
 
-struct vmci_handle_arr *vmci_handle_arr_create(size_t capacity);
+#define VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_HEADER_SIZE				\
+	offsetof(struct vmci_handle_arr, entries)
+/* Select a default capacity that results in a 64 byte sized array */
+#define VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_DEFAULT_CAPACITY			6
+/* Make sure that the max array size can be expressed by a u32 */
+#define VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_MAX_CAPACITY				\
+	((U32_MAX - VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_HEADER_SIZE - 1) /	\
+	sizeof(struct vmci_handle))
+
+struct vmci_handle_arr *vmci_handle_arr_create(u32 capacity, u32 max_capacity);
 void vmci_handle_arr_destroy(struct vmci_handle_arr *array);
-void vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(struct vmci_handle_arr **array_ptr,
-				  struct vmci_handle handle);
+int vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(struct vmci_handle_arr **array_ptr,
+				 struct vmci_handle handle);
 struct vmci_handle vmci_handle_arr_remove_entry(struct vmci_handle_arr *array,
 						struct vmci_handle
 						entry_handle);
 struct vmci_handle vmci_handle_arr_remove_tail(struct vmci_handle_arr *array);
 struct vmci_handle
-vmci_handle_arr_get_entry(const struct vmci_handle_arr *array, size_t index);
+vmci_handle_arr_get_entry(const struct vmci_handle_arr *array, u32 index);
 bool vmci_handle_arr_has_entry(const struct vmci_handle_arr *array,
 			       struct vmci_handle entry_handle);
 struct vmci_handle *vmci_handle_arr_get_handles(struct vmci_handle_arr *array);
 
-static inline size_t vmci_handle_arr_get_size(
+static inline u32 vmci_handle_arr_get_size(
 	const struct vmci_handle_arr *array)
 {
 	return array->size;
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/usb.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/usb.c
index e7c3f3b8457d..99f1897a775d 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/usb.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/usb.c
@@ -128,6 +128,8 @@ static const struct usb_device_id carl9170_usb_ids[] = {
 };
 MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(usb, carl9170_usb_ids);
 
+static struct usb_driver carl9170_driver;
+
 static void carl9170_usb_submit_data_urb(struct ar9170 *ar)
 {
 	struct urb *urb;
@@ -966,32 +968,28 @@ static int carl9170_usb_init_device(struct ar9170 *ar)
 
 static void carl9170_usb_firmware_failed(struct ar9170 *ar)
 {
-	struct device *parent = ar->udev->dev.parent;
-	struct usb_device *udev;
-
-	/*
-	 * Store a copy of the usb_device pointer locally.
-	 * This is because device_release_driver initiates
-	 * carl9170_usb_disconnect, which in turn frees our
-	 * driver context (ar).
+	/* Store a copies of the usb_interface and usb_device pointer locally.
+	 * This is because release_driver initiates carl9170_usb_disconnect,
+	 * which in turn frees our driver context (ar).
 	 */
-	udev = ar->udev;
+	struct usb_interface *intf = ar->intf;
+	struct usb_device *udev = ar->udev;
 
 	complete(&ar->fw_load_wait);
+	/* at this point 'ar' could be already freed. Don't use it anymore */
+	ar = NULL;
 
 	/* unbind anything failed */
-	if (parent)
-		device_lock(parent);
-
-	device_release_driver(&udev->dev);
-	if (parent)
-		device_unlock(parent);
+	usb_lock_device(udev);
+	usb_driver_release_interface(&carl9170_driver, intf);
+	usb_unlock_device(udev);
 
-	usb_put_dev(udev);
+	usb_put_intf(intf);
 }
 
 static void carl9170_usb_firmware_finish(struct ar9170 *ar)
 {
+	struct usb_interface *intf = ar->intf;
 	int err;
 
 	err = carl9170_parse_firmware(ar);
@@ -1009,7 +1007,7 @@ static void carl9170_usb_firmware_finish(struct ar9170 *ar)
 		goto err_unrx;
 
 	complete(&ar->fw_load_wait);
-	usb_put_dev(ar->udev);
+	usb_put_intf(intf);
 	return;
 
 err_unrx:
@@ -1052,7 +1050,6 @@ static int carl9170_usb_probe(struct usb_interface *intf,
 		return PTR_ERR(ar);
 
 	udev = interface_to_usbdev(intf);
-	usb_get_dev(udev);
 	ar->udev = udev;
 	ar->intf = intf;
 	ar->features = id->driver_info;
@@ -1094,15 +1091,14 @@ static int carl9170_usb_probe(struct usb_interface *intf,
 	atomic_set(&ar->rx_anch_urbs, 0);
 	atomic_set(&ar->rx_pool_urbs, 0);
 
-	usb_get_dev(ar->udev);
+	usb_get_intf(intf);
 
 	carl9170_set_state(ar, CARL9170_STOPPED);
 
 	err = request_firmware_nowait(THIS_MODULE, 1, CARL9170FW_NAME,
 		&ar->udev->dev, GFP_KERNEL, ar, carl9170_usb_firmware_step2);
 	if (err) {
-		usb_put_dev(udev);
-		usb_put_dev(udev);
+		usb_put_intf(intf);
 		carl9170_free(ar);
 	}
 	return err;
@@ -1131,7 +1127,6 @@ static void carl9170_usb_disconnect(struct usb_interface *intf)
 
 	carl9170_release_firmware(ar);
 	carl9170_free(ar);
-	usb_put_dev(udev);
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PM
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/p54usb.c b/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/p54usb.c
index f937815f0f2c..b94764c88750 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/p54usb.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/p54usb.c
@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ MODULE_ALIAS("prism54usb");
 MODULE_FIRMWARE("isl3886usb");
 MODULE_FIRMWARE("isl3887usb");
 
+static struct usb_driver p54u_driver;
+
 /*
  * Note:
  *
@@ -918,9 +920,9 @@ static void p54u_load_firmware_cb(const struct firmware *firmware,
 {
 	struct p54u_priv *priv = context;
 	struct usb_device *udev = priv->udev;
+	struct usb_interface *intf = priv->intf;
 	int err;
 
-	complete(&priv->fw_wait_load);
 	if (firmware) {
 		priv->fw = firmware;
 		err = p54u_start_ops(priv);
@@ -929,26 +931,22 @@ static void p54u_load_firmware_cb(const struct firmware *firmware,
 		dev_err(&udev->dev, "Firmware not found.\n");
 	}
 
-	if (err) {
-		struct device *parent = priv->udev->dev.parent;
-
-		dev_err(&udev->dev, "failed to initialize device (%d)\n", err);
-
-		if (parent)
-			device_lock(parent);
+	complete(&priv->fw_wait_load);
+	/*
+	 * At this point p54u_disconnect may have already freed
+	 * the "priv" context. Do not use it anymore!
+	 */
+	priv = NULL;
 
-		device_release_driver(&udev->dev);
-		/*
-		 * At this point p54u_disconnect has already freed
-		 * the "priv" context. Do not use it anymore!
-		 */
-		priv = NULL;
+	if (err) {
+		dev_err(&intf->dev, "failed to initialize device (%d)\n", err);
 
-		if (parent)
-			device_unlock(parent);
+		usb_lock_device(udev);
+		usb_driver_release_interface(&p54u_driver, intf);
+		usb_unlock_device(udev);
 	}
 
-	usb_put_dev(udev);
+	usb_put_intf(intf);
 }
 
 static int p54u_load_firmware(struct ieee80211_hw *dev,
@@ -969,14 +967,14 @@ static int p54u_load_firmware(struct ieee80211_hw *dev,
 	dev_info(&priv->udev->dev, "Loading firmware file %s\n",
 	       p54u_fwlist[i].fw);
 
-	usb_get_dev(udev);
+	usb_get_intf(intf);
 	err = request_firmware_nowait(THIS_MODULE, 1, p54u_fwlist[i].fw,
 				      device, GFP_KERNEL, priv,
 				      p54u_load_firmware_cb);
 	if (err) {
 		dev_err(&priv->udev->dev, "(p54usb) cannot load firmware %s "
 					  "(%d)!\n", p54u_fwlist[i].fw, err);
-		usb_put_dev(udev);
+		usb_put_intf(intf);
 	}
 
 	return err;
@@ -1008,8 +1006,6 @@ static int p54u_probe(struct usb_interface *intf,
 	skb_queue_head_init(&priv->rx_queue);
 	init_usb_anchor(&priv->submitted);
 
-	usb_get_dev(udev);
-
 	/* really lazy and simple way of figuring out if we're a 3887 */
 	/* TODO: should just stick the identification in the device table */
 	i = intf->altsetting->desc.bNumEndpoints;
@@ -1050,10 +1046,8 @@ static int p54u_probe(struct usb_interface *intf,
 		priv->upload_fw = p54u_upload_firmware_net2280;
 	}
 	err = p54u_load_firmware(dev, intf);
-	if (err) {
-		usb_put_dev(udev);
+	if (err)
 		p54_free_common(dev);
-	}
 	return err;
 }
 
@@ -1069,7 +1063,6 @@ static void p54u_disconnect(struct usb_interface *intf)
 	wait_for_completion(&priv->fw_wait_load);
 	p54_unregister_common(dev);
 
-	usb_put_dev(interface_to_usbdev(intf));
 	release_firmware(priv->fw);
 	p54_free_common(dev);
 }
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/txrx.c b/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/txrx.c
index ff9acd1563f4..5892898f8853 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/txrx.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/txrx.c
@@ -139,7 +139,10 @@ static int p54_assign_address(struct p54_common *priv, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	    unlikely(GET_HW_QUEUE(skb) == P54_QUEUE_BEACON))
 		priv->beacon_req_id = data->req_id;
 
-	__skb_queue_after(&priv->tx_queue, target_skb, skb);
+	if (target_skb)
+		__skb_queue_after(&priv->tx_queue, target_skb, skb);
+	else
+		__skb_queue_head(&priv->tx_queue, skb);
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->tx_queue.lock, flags);
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/fw.h b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/fw.h
index b73f99dc5a72..1fb76d2f5d3f 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/fw.h
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/fw.h
@@ -1759,9 +1759,10 @@ struct mwifiex_ie_types_wmm_queue_status {
 struct ieee_types_vendor_header {
 	u8 element_id;
 	u8 len;
-	u8 oui[4];	/* 0~2: oui, 3: oui_type */
-	u8 oui_subtype;
-	u8 version;
+	struct {
+		u8 oui[3];
+		u8 oui_type;
+	} __packed oui;
 } __packed;
 
 struct ieee_types_wmm_parameter {
@@ -1775,6 +1776,9 @@ struct ieee_types_wmm_parameter {
 	 *   Version     [1]
 	 */
 	struct ieee_types_vendor_header vend_hdr;
+	u8 oui_subtype;
+	u8 version;
+
 	u8 qos_info_bitmap;
 	u8 reserved;
 	struct ieee_types_wmm_ac_parameters ac_params[IEEE80211_NUM_ACS];
@@ -1792,6 +1796,8 @@ struct ieee_types_wmm_info {
 	 *   Version     [1]
 	 */
 	struct ieee_types_vendor_header vend_hdr;
+	u8 oui_subtype;
+	u8 version;
 
 	u8 qos_info_bitmap;
 } __packed;
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c
index c269a0de9413..e2786ab612ca 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c
@@ -1361,21 +1361,25 @@ int mwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie(struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter,
 			break;
 
 		case WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC:
-			if (element_len + 2 < sizeof(vendor_ie->vend_hdr))
-				return -EINVAL;
-
 			vendor_ie = (struct ieee_types_vendor_specific *)
 					current_ptr;
 
-			if (!memcmp
-			    (vendor_ie->vend_hdr.oui, wpa_oui,
-			     sizeof(wpa_oui))) {
+			/* 802.11 requires at least 3-byte OUI. */
+			if (element_len < sizeof(vendor_ie->vend_hdr.oui.oui))
+				return -EINVAL;
+
+			/* Not long enough for a match? Skip it. */
+			if (element_len < sizeof(wpa_oui))
+				break;
+
+			if (!memcmp(&vendor_ie->vend_hdr.oui, wpa_oui,
+				    sizeof(wpa_oui))) {
 				bss_entry->bcn_wpa_ie =
 					(struct ieee_types_vendor_specific *)
 					current_ptr;
 				bss_entry->wpa_offset = (u16)
 					(current_ptr - bss_entry->beacon_buf);
-			} else if (!memcmp(vendor_ie->vend_hdr.oui, wmm_oui,
+			} else if (!memcmp(&vendor_ie->vend_hdr.oui, wmm_oui,
 				    sizeof(wmm_oui))) {
 				if (total_ie_len ==
 				    sizeof(struct ieee_types_wmm_parameter) ||
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sta_ioctl.c b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sta_ioctl.c
index ebc0e41e5d3b..74e50566db1f 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sta_ioctl.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sta_ioctl.c
@@ -1351,7 +1351,7 @@ mwifiex_set_gen_ie_helper(struct mwifiex_private *priv, u8 *ie_data_ptr,
 			/* Test to see if it is a WPA IE, if not, then
 			 * it is a gen IE
 			 */
-			if (!memcmp(pvendor_ie->oui, wpa_oui,
+			if (!memcmp(&pvendor_ie->oui, wpa_oui,
 				    sizeof(wpa_oui))) {
 				/* IE is a WPA/WPA2 IE so call set_wpa function
 				 */
@@ -1361,7 +1361,7 @@ mwifiex_set_gen_ie_helper(struct mwifiex_private *priv, u8 *ie_data_ptr,
 				goto next_ie;
 			}
 
-			if (!memcmp(pvendor_ie->oui, wps_oui,
+			if (!memcmp(&pvendor_ie->oui, wps_oui,
 				    sizeof(wps_oui))) {
 				/* Test to see if it is a WPS IE,
 				 * if so, enable wps session flag
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/wmm.c b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/wmm.c
index 407b9932ca4d..64916ba15df5 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/wmm.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/wmm.c
@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ mwifiex_wmm_setup_queue_priorities(struct mwifiex_private *priv,
 	mwifiex_dbg(priv->adapter, INFO,
 		    "info: WMM Parameter IE: version=%d,\t"
 		    "qos_info Parameter Set Count=%d, Reserved=%#x\n",
-		    wmm_ie->vend_hdr.version, wmm_ie->qos_info_bitmap &
+		    wmm_ie->version, wmm_ie->qos_info_bitmap &
 		    IEEE80211_WMM_IE_AP_QOSINFO_PARAM_SET_CNT_MASK,
 		    wmm_ie->reserved);
 
diff --git a/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/amplc_pci230.c b/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/amplc_pci230.c
index 65f60c2b702a..f7e673121864 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/amplc_pci230.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/amplc_pci230.c
@@ -2330,7 +2330,8 @@ static irqreturn_t pci230_interrupt(int irq, void *d)
 	devpriv->intr_running = false;
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&devpriv->isr_spinlock, irqflags);
 
-	comedi_handle_events(dev, s_ao);
+	if (s_ao)
+		comedi_handle_events(dev, s_ao);
 	comedi_handle_events(dev, s_ai);
 
 	return IRQ_HANDLED;
diff --git a/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/dt282x.c b/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/dt282x.c
index 3be927f1d3a9..e15e33ed94ae 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/dt282x.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/dt282x.c
@@ -557,7 +557,8 @@ static irqreturn_t dt282x_interrupt(int irq, void *d)
 	}
 #endif
 	comedi_handle_events(dev, s);
-	comedi_handle_events(dev, s_ao);
+	if (s_ao)
+		comedi_handle_events(dev, s_ao);
 
 	return IRQ_RETVAL(handled);
 }
diff --git a/drivers/staging/fsl-dpaa2/ethsw/ethsw.c b/drivers/staging/fsl-dpaa2/ethsw/ethsw.c
index e3c3e427309a..f73edaf6ce87 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/fsl-dpaa2/ethsw/ethsw.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/fsl-dpaa2/ethsw/ethsw.c
@@ -1086,6 +1086,7 @@ static int port_switchdev_event(struct notifier_block *unused,
 		dev_hold(dev);
 		break;
 	default:
+		kfree(switchdev_work);
 		return NOTIFY_DONE;
 	}
 
diff --git a/drivers/staging/mt7621-pci/pci-mt7621.c b/drivers/staging/mt7621-pci/pci-mt7621.c
index 03d919a94552..93763d40e3a1 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/mt7621-pci/pci-mt7621.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/mt7621-pci/pci-mt7621.c
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
 /* MediaTek specific configuration registers */
 #define PCIE_FTS_NUM			0x70c
 #define PCIE_FTS_NUM_MASK		GENMASK(15, 8)
-#define PCIE_FTS_NUM_L0(x)		((x) & 0xff << 8)
+#define PCIE_FTS_NUM_L0(x)		(((x) & 0xff) << 8)
 
 /* rt_sysc_membase relative registers */
 #define RALINK_PCIE_CLK_GEN		0x7c
diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8712/rtl871x_ioctl_linux.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8712/rtl871x_ioctl_linux.c
index a7230c0c7b23..8f5a8ac1b010 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/rtl8712/rtl871x_ioctl_linux.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8712/rtl871x_ioctl_linux.c
@@ -124,10 +124,91 @@ static inline void handle_group_key(struct ieee_param *param,
 	}
 }
 
-static noinline_for_stack char *translate_scan(struct _adapter *padapter,
-				   struct iw_request_info *info,
-				   struct wlan_network *pnetwork,
-				   char *start, char *stop)
+static noinline_for_stack char *translate_scan_wpa(struct iw_request_info *info,
+						   struct wlan_network *pnetwork,
+						   struct iw_event *iwe,
+						   char *start, char *stop)
+{
+	/* parsing WPA/WPA2 IE */
+	u8 buf[MAX_WPA_IE_LEN];
+	u8 wpa_ie[255], rsn_ie[255];
+	u16 wpa_len = 0, rsn_len = 0;
+	int n, i;
+
+	r8712_get_sec_ie(pnetwork->network.IEs,
+			 pnetwork->network.IELength, rsn_ie, &rsn_len,
+			 wpa_ie, &wpa_len);
+	if (wpa_len > 0) {
+		memset(buf, 0, MAX_WPA_IE_LEN);
+		n = sprintf(buf, "wpa_ie=");
+		for (i = 0; i < wpa_len; i++) {
+			n += snprintf(buf + n, MAX_WPA_IE_LEN - n,
+						"%02x", wpa_ie[i]);
+			if (n >= MAX_WPA_IE_LEN)
+				break;
+		}
+		memset(iwe, 0, sizeof(*iwe));
+		iwe->cmd = IWEVCUSTOM;
+		iwe->u.data.length = (u16)strlen(buf);
+		start = iwe_stream_add_point(info, start, stop,
+			iwe, buf);
+		memset(iwe, 0, sizeof(*iwe));
+		iwe->cmd = IWEVGENIE;
+		iwe->u.data.length = (u16)wpa_len;
+		start = iwe_stream_add_point(info, start, stop,
+			iwe, wpa_ie);
+	}
+	if (rsn_len > 0) {
+		memset(buf, 0, MAX_WPA_IE_LEN);
+		n = sprintf(buf, "rsn_ie=");
+		for (i = 0; i < rsn_len; i++) {
+			n += snprintf(buf + n, MAX_WPA_IE_LEN - n,
+						"%02x", rsn_ie[i]);
+			if (n >= MAX_WPA_IE_LEN)
+				break;
+		}
+		memset(iwe, 0, sizeof(*iwe));
+		iwe->cmd = IWEVCUSTOM;
+		iwe->u.data.length = strlen(buf);
+		start = iwe_stream_add_point(info, start, stop,
+			iwe, buf);
+		memset(iwe, 0, sizeof(*iwe));
+		iwe->cmd = IWEVGENIE;
+		iwe->u.data.length = rsn_len;
+		start = iwe_stream_add_point(info, start, stop, iwe,
+			rsn_ie);
+	}
+
+	return start;
+}
+
+static noinline_for_stack char *translate_scan_wps(struct iw_request_info *info,
+						   struct wlan_network *pnetwork,
+						   struct iw_event *iwe,
+						   char *start, char *stop)
+{
+	/* parsing WPS IE */
+	u8 wps_ie[512];
+	uint wps_ielen;
+
+	if (r8712_get_wps_ie(pnetwork->network.IEs,
+	    pnetwork->network.IELength,
+	    wps_ie, &wps_ielen)) {
+		if (wps_ielen > 2) {
+			iwe->cmd = IWEVGENIE;
+			iwe->u.data.length = (u16)wps_ielen;
+			start = iwe_stream_add_point(info, start, stop,
+				iwe, wps_ie);
+		}
+	}
+
+	return start;
+}
+
+static char *translate_scan(struct _adapter *padapter,
+			    struct iw_request_info *info,
+			    struct wlan_network *pnetwork,
+			    char *start, char *stop)
 {
 	struct iw_event iwe;
 	struct ieee80211_ht_cap *pht_capie;
@@ -240,73 +321,11 @@ static noinline_for_stack char *translate_scan(struct _adapter *padapter,
 	/* Check if we added any event */
 	if ((current_val - start) > iwe_stream_lcp_len(info))
 		start = current_val;
-	/* parsing WPA/WPA2 IE */
-	{
-		u8 buf[MAX_WPA_IE_LEN];
-		u8 wpa_ie[255], rsn_ie[255];
-		u16 wpa_len = 0, rsn_len = 0;
-		int n;
-
-		r8712_get_sec_ie(pnetwork->network.IEs,
-				 pnetwork->network.IELength, rsn_ie, &rsn_len,
-				 wpa_ie, &wpa_len);
-		if (wpa_len > 0) {
-			memset(buf, 0, MAX_WPA_IE_LEN);
-			n = sprintf(buf, "wpa_ie=");
-			for (i = 0; i < wpa_len; i++) {
-				n += snprintf(buf + n, MAX_WPA_IE_LEN - n,
-							"%02x", wpa_ie[i]);
-				if (n >= MAX_WPA_IE_LEN)
-					break;
-			}
-			memset(&iwe, 0, sizeof(iwe));
-			iwe.cmd = IWEVCUSTOM;
-			iwe.u.data.length = (u16)strlen(buf);
-			start = iwe_stream_add_point(info, start, stop,
-				&iwe, buf);
-			memset(&iwe, 0, sizeof(iwe));
-			iwe.cmd = IWEVGENIE;
-			iwe.u.data.length = (u16)wpa_len;
-			start = iwe_stream_add_point(info, start, stop,
-				&iwe, wpa_ie);
-		}
-		if (rsn_len > 0) {
-			memset(buf, 0, MAX_WPA_IE_LEN);
-			n = sprintf(buf, "rsn_ie=");
-			for (i = 0; i < rsn_len; i++) {
-				n += snprintf(buf + n, MAX_WPA_IE_LEN - n,
-							"%02x", rsn_ie[i]);
-				if (n >= MAX_WPA_IE_LEN)
-					break;
-			}
-			memset(&iwe, 0, sizeof(iwe));
-			iwe.cmd = IWEVCUSTOM;
-			iwe.u.data.length = strlen(buf);
-			start = iwe_stream_add_point(info, start, stop,
-				&iwe, buf);
-			memset(&iwe, 0, sizeof(iwe));
-			iwe.cmd = IWEVGENIE;
-			iwe.u.data.length = rsn_len;
-			start = iwe_stream_add_point(info, start, stop, &iwe,
-				rsn_ie);
-		}
-	}
 
-	{ /* parsing WPS IE */
-		u8 wps_ie[512];
-		uint wps_ielen;
+	start = translate_scan_wpa(info, pnetwork, &iwe, start, stop);
+
+	start = translate_scan_wps(info, pnetwork, &iwe, start, stop);
 
-		if (r8712_get_wps_ie(pnetwork->network.IEs,
-		    pnetwork->network.IELength,
-		    wps_ie, &wps_ielen)) {
-			if (wps_ielen > 2) {
-				iwe.cmd = IWEVGENIE;
-				iwe.u.data.length = (u16)wps_ielen;
-				start = iwe_stream_add_point(info, start, stop,
-					&iwe, wps_ie);
-			}
-		}
-	}
 	/* Add quality statistics */
 	iwe.cmd = IWEVQUAL;
 	rssi = r8712_signal_scale_mapping(pnetwork->network.Rssi);
diff --git a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/bcm2835-camera.c b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/bcm2835-camera.c
index 68f08dc18da9..5e9187edeef4 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/bcm2835-camera.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/bcm2835-camera.c
@@ -336,16 +336,13 @@ static void buffer_cb(struct vchiq_mmal_instance *instance,
 		return;
 	} else if (length == 0) {
 		/* stream ended */
-		if (buf) {
-			/* this should only ever happen if the port is
-			 * disabled and there are buffers still queued
+		if (dev->capture.frame_count) {
+			/* empty buffer whilst capturing - expected to be an
+			 * EOS, so grab another frame
 			 */
-			vb2_buffer_done(&buf->vb.vb2_buf, VB2_BUF_STATE_ERROR);
-			pr_debug("Empty buffer");
-		} else if (dev->capture.frame_count) {
-			/* grab another frame */
 			if (is_capturing(dev)) {
-				pr_debug("Grab another frame");
+				v4l2_dbg(1, bcm2835_v4l2_debug, &dev->v4l2_dev,
+					 "Grab another frame");
 				vchiq_mmal_port_parameter_set(
 					instance,
 					dev->capture.camera_port,
@@ -353,8 +350,14 @@ static void buffer_cb(struct vchiq_mmal_instance *instance,
 					&dev->capture.frame_count,
 					sizeof(dev->capture.frame_count));
 			}
+			if (vchiq_mmal_submit_buffer(instance, port, buf))
+				v4l2_dbg(1, bcm2835_v4l2_debug, &dev->v4l2_dev,
+					 "Failed to return EOS buffer");
 		} else {
-			/* signal frame completion */
+			/* stopping streaming.
+			 * return buffer, and signal frame completion
+			 */
+			vb2_buffer_done(&buf->vb.vb2_buf, VB2_BUF_STATE_ERROR);
 			complete(&dev->capture.frame_cmplt);
 		}
 	} else {
@@ -576,6 +579,7 @@ static void stop_streaming(struct vb2_queue *vq)
 	int ret;
 	unsigned long timeout;
 	struct bm2835_mmal_dev *dev = vb2_get_drv_priv(vq);
+	struct vchiq_mmal_port *port = dev->capture.port;
 
 	v4l2_dbg(1, bcm2835_v4l2_debug, &dev->v4l2_dev, "%s: dev:%p\n",
 		 __func__, dev);
@@ -599,12 +603,6 @@ static void stop_streaming(struct vb2_queue *vq)
 				      &dev->capture.frame_count,
 				      sizeof(dev->capture.frame_count));
 
-	/* wait for last frame to complete */
-	timeout = wait_for_completion_timeout(&dev->capture.frame_cmplt, HZ);
-	if (timeout == 0)
-		v4l2_err(&dev->v4l2_dev,
-			 "timed out waiting for frame completion\n");
-
 	v4l2_dbg(1, bcm2835_v4l2_debug, &dev->v4l2_dev,
 		 "disabling connection\n");
 
@@ -619,6 +617,21 @@ static void stop_streaming(struct vb2_queue *vq)
 			 ret);
 	}
 
+	/* wait for all buffers to be returned */
+	while (atomic_read(&port->buffers_with_vpu)) {
+		v4l2_dbg(1, bcm2835_v4l2_debug, &dev->v4l2_dev,
+			 "%s: Waiting for buffers to be returned - %d outstanding\n",
+			 __func__, atomic_read(&port->buffers_with_vpu));
+		timeout = wait_for_completion_timeout(&dev->capture.frame_cmplt,
+						      HZ);
+		if (timeout == 0) {
+			v4l2_err(&dev->v4l2_dev, "%s: Timeout waiting for buffers to be returned - %d outstanding\n",
+				 __func__,
+				 atomic_read(&port->buffers_with_vpu));
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
 	if (disable_camera(dev) < 0)
 		v4l2_err(&dev->v4l2_dev, "Failed to disable camera\n");
 }
diff --git a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/controls.c b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/controls.c
index dade79738a29..12ac3ef61fe6 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/controls.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/controls.c
@@ -603,15 +603,28 @@ static int ctrl_set_bitrate(struct bm2835_mmal_dev *dev,
 			    struct v4l2_ctrl *ctrl,
 			    const struct bm2835_mmal_v4l2_ctrl *mmal_ctrl)
 {
+	int ret;
 	struct vchiq_mmal_port *encoder_out;
 
 	dev->capture.encode_bitrate = ctrl->val;
 
 	encoder_out = &dev->component[MMAL_COMPONENT_VIDEO_ENCODE]->output[0];
 
-	return vchiq_mmal_port_parameter_set(dev->instance, encoder_out,
-					     mmal_ctrl->mmal_id, &ctrl->val,
-					     sizeof(ctrl->val));
+	ret = vchiq_mmal_port_parameter_set(dev->instance, encoder_out,
+					    mmal_ctrl->mmal_id, &ctrl->val,
+					    sizeof(ctrl->val));
+
+	v4l2_dbg(1, bcm2835_v4l2_debug, &dev->v4l2_dev,
+		 "%s: After: mmal_ctrl:%p ctrl id:0x%x ctrl val:%d ret %d(%d)\n",
+		 __func__, mmal_ctrl, ctrl->id, ctrl->val, ret,
+		 (ret == 0 ? 0 : -EINVAL));
+
+	/*
+	 * Older firmware versions (pre July 2019) have a bug in handling
+	 * MMAL_PARAMETER_VIDEO_BIT_RATE that result in the call
+	 * returning -MMAL_MSG_STATUS_EINVAL. So ignore errors from this call.
+	 */
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static int ctrl_set_bitrate_mode(struct bm2835_mmal_dev *dev,
diff --git a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/mmal-vchiq.c b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/mmal-vchiq.c
index 16af735af5c3..29761f6c3b55 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/mmal-vchiq.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/mmal-vchiq.c
@@ -161,7 +161,8 @@ struct vchiq_mmal_instance {
 	void *bulk_scratch;
 
 	struct idr context_map;
-	spinlock_t context_map_lock;
+	/* protect accesses to context_map */
+	struct mutex context_map_lock;
 
 	/* component to use next */
 	int component_idx;
@@ -184,10 +185,10 @@ get_msg_context(struct vchiq_mmal_instance *instance)
 	 * that when we service the VCHI reply, we can look up what
 	 * message is being replied to.
 	 */
-	spin_lock(&instance->context_map_lock);
+	mutex_lock(&instance->context_map_lock);
 	handle = idr_alloc(&instance->context_map, msg_context,
 			   0, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
-	spin_unlock(&instance->context_map_lock);
+	mutex_unlock(&instance->context_map_lock);
 
 	if (handle < 0) {
 		kfree(msg_context);
@@ -211,9 +212,9 @@ release_msg_context(struct mmal_msg_context *msg_context)
 {
 	struct vchiq_mmal_instance *instance = msg_context->instance;
 
-	spin_lock(&instance->context_map_lock);
+	mutex_lock(&instance->context_map_lock);
 	idr_remove(&instance->context_map, msg_context->handle);
-	spin_unlock(&instance->context_map_lock);
+	mutex_unlock(&instance->context_map_lock);
 	kfree(msg_context);
 }
 
@@ -239,6 +240,8 @@ static void buffer_work_cb(struct work_struct *work)
 	struct mmal_msg_context *msg_context =
 		container_of(work, struct mmal_msg_context, u.bulk.work);
 
+	atomic_dec(&msg_context->u.bulk.port->buffers_with_vpu);
+
 	msg_context->u.bulk.port->buffer_cb(msg_context->u.bulk.instance,
 					    msg_context->u.bulk.port,
 					    msg_context->u.bulk.status,
@@ -287,8 +290,6 @@ static int bulk_receive(struct vchiq_mmal_instance *instance,
 
 	/* store length */
 	msg_context->u.bulk.buffer_used = rd_len;
-	msg_context->u.bulk.mmal_flags =
-	    msg->u.buffer_from_host.buffer_header.flags;
 	msg_context->u.bulk.dts = msg->u.buffer_from_host.buffer_header.dts;
 	msg_context->u.bulk.pts = msg->u.buffer_from_host.buffer_header.pts;
 
@@ -379,6 +380,8 @@ buffer_from_host(struct vchiq_mmal_instance *instance,
 	/* initialise work structure ready to schedule callback */
 	INIT_WORK(&msg_context->u.bulk.work, buffer_work_cb);
 
+	atomic_inc(&port->buffers_with_vpu);
+
 	/* prep the buffer from host message */
 	memset(&m, 0xbc, sizeof(m));	/* just to make debug clearer */
 
@@ -447,6 +450,9 @@ static void buffer_to_host_cb(struct vchiq_mmal_instance *instance,
 		return;
 	}
 
+	msg_context->u.bulk.mmal_flags =
+				msg->u.buffer_from_host.buffer_header.flags;
+
 	if (msg->h.status != MMAL_MSG_STATUS_SUCCESS) {
 		/* message reception had an error */
 		pr_warn("error %d in reply\n", msg->h.status);
@@ -1323,16 +1329,6 @@ static int port_enable(struct vchiq_mmal_instance *instance,
 	if (port->enabled)
 		return 0;
 
-	/* ensure there are enough buffers queued to cover the buffer headers */
-	if (port->buffer_cb) {
-		hdr_count = 0;
-		list_for_each(buf_head, &port->buffers) {
-			hdr_count++;
-		}
-		if (hdr_count < port->current_buffer.num)
-			return -ENOSPC;
-	}
-
 	ret = port_action_port(instance, port,
 			       MMAL_MSG_PORT_ACTION_TYPE_ENABLE);
 	if (ret)
@@ -1849,7 +1845,7 @@ int vchiq_mmal_init(struct vchiq_mmal_instance **out_instance)
 
 	instance->bulk_scratch = vmalloc(PAGE_SIZE);
 
-	spin_lock_init(&instance->context_map_lock);
+	mutex_init(&instance->context_map_lock);
 	idr_init_base(&instance->context_map, 1);
 
 	params.callback_param = instance;
diff --git a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/mmal-vchiq.h b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/mmal-vchiq.h
index 22b839ecd5f0..b0ee1716525b 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/mmal-vchiq.h
+++ b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/mmal-vchiq.h
@@ -71,6 +71,9 @@ struct vchiq_mmal_port {
 	struct list_head buffers;
 	/* lock to serialise adding and removing buffers from list */
 	spinlock_t slock;
+
+	/* Count of buffers the VPU has yet to return */
+	atomic_t buffers_with_vpu;
 	/* callback on buffer completion */
 	vchiq_mmal_buffer_cb buffer_cb;
 	/* callback context */
diff --git a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_2835_arm.c b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_2835_arm.c
index c557c9953724..aa20fcaefa9d 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_2835_arm.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_2835_arm.c
@@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ create_pagelist(char __user *buf, size_t count, unsigned short type)
 		(g_cache_line_size - 1)))) {
 		char *fragments;
 
-		if (down_killable(&g_free_fragments_sema)) {
+		if (down_interruptible(&g_free_fragments_sema) != 0) {
 			cleanup_pagelistinfo(pagelistinfo);
 			return NULL;
 		}
diff --git a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_arm.c b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_arm.c
index ab7d6a0ce94c..62d8f599e765 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_arm.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_arm.c
@@ -532,7 +532,8 @@ add_completion(VCHIQ_INSTANCE_T instance, VCHIQ_REASON_T reason,
 		vchiq_log_trace(vchiq_arm_log_level,
 			"%s - completion queue full", __func__);
 		DEBUG_COUNT(COMPLETION_QUEUE_FULL_COUNT);
-		if (wait_for_completion_killable(&instance->remove_event)) {
+		if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(
+					&instance->remove_event)) {
 			vchiq_log_info(vchiq_arm_log_level,
 				"service_callback interrupted");
 			return VCHIQ_RETRY;
@@ -643,7 +644,7 @@ service_callback(VCHIQ_REASON_T reason, struct vchiq_header *header,
 			}
 
 			DEBUG_TRACE(SERVICE_CALLBACK_LINE);
-			if (wait_for_completion_killable(
+			if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(
 						&user_service->remove_event)
 				!= 0) {
 				vchiq_log_info(vchiq_arm_log_level,
@@ -978,7 +979,7 @@ vchiq_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 		   has been closed until the client library calls the
 		   CLOSE_DELIVERED ioctl, signalling close_event. */
 		if (user_service->close_pending &&
-			wait_for_completion_killable(
+			wait_for_completion_interruptible(
 				&user_service->close_event))
 			status = VCHIQ_RETRY;
 		break;
@@ -1154,7 +1155,7 @@ vchiq_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 
 			DEBUG_TRACE(AWAIT_COMPLETION_LINE);
 			mutex_unlock(&instance->completion_mutex);
-			rc = wait_for_completion_killable(
+			rc = wait_for_completion_interruptible(
 						&instance->insert_event);
 			mutex_lock(&instance->completion_mutex);
 			if (rc != 0) {
@@ -1324,7 +1325,7 @@ vchiq_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 			do {
 				spin_unlock(&msg_queue_spinlock);
 				DEBUG_TRACE(DEQUEUE_MESSAGE_LINE);
-				if (wait_for_completion_killable(
+				if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(
 					&user_service->insert_event)) {
 					vchiq_log_info(vchiq_arm_log_level,
 						"DEQUEUE_MESSAGE interrupted");
@@ -2328,7 +2329,7 @@ vchiq_keepalive_thread_func(void *v)
 	while (1) {
 		long rc = 0, uc = 0;
 
-		if (wait_for_completion_killable(&arm_state->ka_evt)
+		if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(&arm_state->ka_evt)
 				!= 0) {
 			vchiq_log_error(vchiq_susp_log_level,
 				"%s interrupted", __func__);
@@ -2579,7 +2580,7 @@ block_resume(struct vchiq_arm_state *arm_state)
 		write_unlock_bh(&arm_state->susp_res_lock);
 		vchiq_log_info(vchiq_susp_log_level, "%s wait for previously "
 			"blocked clients", __func__);
-		if (wait_for_completion_killable_timeout(
+		if (wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout(
 				&arm_state->blocked_blocker, timeout_val)
 					<= 0) {
 			vchiq_log_error(vchiq_susp_log_level, "%s wait for "
@@ -2605,7 +2606,7 @@ block_resume(struct vchiq_arm_state *arm_state)
 		write_unlock_bh(&arm_state->susp_res_lock);
 		vchiq_log_info(vchiq_susp_log_level, "%s wait for resume",
 			__func__);
-		if (wait_for_completion_killable_timeout(
+		if (wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout(
 				&arm_state->vc_resume_complete, timeout_val)
 					<= 0) {
 			vchiq_log_error(vchiq_susp_log_level, "%s wait for "
@@ -2812,7 +2813,7 @@ vchiq_arm_force_suspend(struct vchiq_state *state)
 	do {
 		write_unlock_bh(&arm_state->susp_res_lock);
 
-		rc = wait_for_completion_killable_timeout(
+		rc = wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout(
 				&arm_state->vc_suspend_complete,
 				msecs_to_jiffies(FORCE_SUSPEND_TIMEOUT_MS));
 
@@ -2908,7 +2909,7 @@ vchiq_arm_allow_resume(struct vchiq_state *state)
 	write_unlock_bh(&arm_state->susp_res_lock);
 
 	if (resume) {
-		if (wait_for_completion_killable(
+		if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(
 			&arm_state->vc_resume_complete) < 0) {
 			vchiq_log_error(vchiq_susp_log_level,
 				"%s interrupted", __func__);
diff --git a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_core.c b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_core.c
index 0c387b6473a5..44bfa890e0e5 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_core.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_core.c
@@ -395,13 +395,21 @@ remote_event_create(wait_queue_head_t *wq, struct remote_event *event)
 	init_waitqueue_head(wq);
 }
 
+/*
+ * All the event waiting routines in VCHIQ used a custom semaphore
+ * implementation that filtered most signals. This achieved a behaviour similar
+ * to the "killable" family of functions. While cleaning up this code all the
+ * routines where switched to the "interruptible" family of functions, as the
+ * former was deemed unjustified and the use "killable" set all VCHIQ's
+ * threads in D state.
+ */
 static inline int
 remote_event_wait(wait_queue_head_t *wq, struct remote_event *event)
 {
 	if (!event->fired) {
 		event->armed = 1;
 		dsb(sy);
-		if (wait_event_killable(*wq, event->fired)) {
+		if (wait_event_interruptible(*wq, event->fired)) {
 			event->armed = 0;
 			return 0;
 		}
@@ -560,7 +568,7 @@ reserve_space(struct vchiq_state *state, size_t space, int is_blocking)
 			remote_event_signal(&state->remote->trigger);
 
 			if (!is_blocking ||
-				(wait_for_completion_killable(
+				(wait_for_completion_interruptible(
 				&state->slot_available_event)))
 				return NULL; /* No space available */
 		}
@@ -830,7 +838,7 @@ queue_message(struct vchiq_state *state, struct vchiq_service *service,
 			spin_unlock(&quota_spinlock);
 			mutex_unlock(&state->slot_mutex);
 
-			if (wait_for_completion_killable(
+			if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(
 						&state->data_quota_event))
 				return VCHIQ_RETRY;
 
@@ -861,7 +869,7 @@ queue_message(struct vchiq_state *state, struct vchiq_service *service,
 				service_quota->slot_use_count);
 			VCHIQ_SERVICE_STATS_INC(service, quota_stalls);
 			mutex_unlock(&state->slot_mutex);
-			if (wait_for_completion_killable(
+			if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(
 						&service_quota->quota_event))
 				return VCHIQ_RETRY;
 			if (service->closing)
@@ -1710,7 +1718,8 @@ parse_rx_slots(struct vchiq_state *state)
 					&service->bulk_rx : &service->bulk_tx;
 
 				DEBUG_TRACE(PARSE_LINE);
-				if (mutex_lock_killable(&service->bulk_mutex)) {
+				if (mutex_lock_killable(
+					&service->bulk_mutex) != 0) {
 					DEBUG_TRACE(PARSE_LINE);
 					goto bail_not_ready;
 				}
@@ -2428,7 +2437,7 @@ vchiq_open_service_internal(struct vchiq_service *service, int client_id)
 			       QMFLAGS_IS_BLOCKING);
 	if (status == VCHIQ_SUCCESS) {
 		/* Wait for the ACK/NAK */
-		if (wait_for_completion_killable(&service->remove_event)) {
+		if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(&service->remove_event)) {
 			status = VCHIQ_RETRY;
 			vchiq_release_service_internal(service);
 		} else if ((service->srvstate != VCHIQ_SRVSTATE_OPEN) &&
@@ -2795,7 +2804,7 @@ vchiq_connect_internal(struct vchiq_state *state, VCHIQ_INSTANCE_T instance)
 	}
 
 	if (state->conn_state == VCHIQ_CONNSTATE_CONNECTING) {
-		if (wait_for_completion_killable(&state->connect))
+		if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(&state->connect))
 			return VCHIQ_RETRY;
 
 		vchiq_set_conn_state(state, VCHIQ_CONNSTATE_CONNECTED);
@@ -2894,7 +2903,7 @@ vchiq_close_service(VCHIQ_SERVICE_HANDLE_T handle)
 	}
 
 	while (1) {
-		if (wait_for_completion_killable(&service->remove_event)) {
+		if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(&service->remove_event)) {
 			status = VCHIQ_RETRY;
 			break;
 		}
@@ -2955,7 +2964,7 @@ vchiq_remove_service(VCHIQ_SERVICE_HANDLE_T handle)
 		request_poll(service->state, service, VCHIQ_POLL_REMOVE);
 	}
 	while (1) {
-		if (wait_for_completion_killable(&service->remove_event)) {
+		if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(&service->remove_event)) {
 			status = VCHIQ_RETRY;
 			break;
 		}
@@ -3038,7 +3047,7 @@ VCHIQ_STATUS_T vchiq_bulk_transfer(VCHIQ_SERVICE_HANDLE_T handle,
 		VCHIQ_SERVICE_STATS_INC(service, bulk_stalls);
 		do {
 			mutex_unlock(&service->bulk_mutex);
-			if (wait_for_completion_killable(
+			if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(
 						&service->bulk_remove_event)) {
 				status = VCHIQ_RETRY;
 				goto error_exit;
@@ -3115,7 +3124,7 @@ VCHIQ_STATUS_T vchiq_bulk_transfer(VCHIQ_SERVICE_HANDLE_T handle,
 
 	if (bulk_waiter) {
 		bulk_waiter->bulk = bulk;
-		if (wait_for_completion_killable(&bulk_waiter->event))
+		if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(&bulk_waiter->event))
 			status = VCHIQ_RETRY;
 		else if (bulk_waiter->actual == VCHIQ_BULK_ACTUAL_ABORTED)
 			status = VCHIQ_ERROR;
diff --git a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_util.c b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_util.c
index 6c519d8e48cb..8ee85c5e6f77 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_util.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_util.c
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ void vchiu_queue_push(struct vchiu_queue *queue, struct vchiq_header *header)
 		return;
 
 	while (queue->write == queue->read + queue->size) {
-		if (wait_for_completion_killable(&queue->pop))
+		if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(&queue->pop))
 			flush_signals(current);
 	}
 
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ void vchiu_queue_push(struct vchiu_queue *queue, struct vchiq_header *header)
 struct vchiq_header *vchiu_queue_peek(struct vchiu_queue *queue)
 {
 	while (queue->write == queue->read) {
-		if (wait_for_completion_killable(&queue->push))
+		if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(&queue->push))
 			flush_signals(current);
 	}
 
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ struct vchiq_header *vchiu_queue_pop(struct vchiu_queue *queue)
 	struct vchiq_header *header;
 
 	while (queue->write == queue->read) {
-		if (wait_for_completion_killable(&queue->push))
+		if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(&queue->push))
 			flush_signals(current);
 	}
 
diff --git a/drivers/staging/wilc1000/wilc_netdev.c b/drivers/staging/wilc1000/wilc_netdev.c
index ba78c08a17f1..5338d7d2b248 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/wilc1000/wilc_netdev.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/wilc1000/wilc_netdev.c
@@ -530,17 +530,17 @@ static int wilc_wlan_initialize(struct net_device *dev, struct wilc_vif *vif)
 			goto fail_locks;
 		}
 
-		if (wl->gpio_irq && init_irq(dev)) {
-			ret = -EIO;
-			goto fail_locks;
-		}
-
 		ret = wlan_initialize_threads(dev);
 		if (ret < 0) {
 			ret = -EIO;
 			goto fail_wilc_wlan;
 		}
 
+		if (wl->gpio_irq && init_irq(dev)) {
+			ret = -EIO;
+			goto fail_threads;
+		}
+
 		if (!wl->dev_irq_num &&
 		    wl->hif_func->enable_interrupt &&
 		    wl->hif_func->enable_interrupt(wl)) {
@@ -596,7 +596,7 @@ static int wilc_wlan_initialize(struct net_device *dev, struct wilc_vif *vif)
 fail_irq_init:
 		if (wl->dev_irq_num)
 			deinit_irq(dev);
-
+fail_threads:
 		wlan_deinitialize_threads(dev);
 fail_wilc_wlan:
 		wilc_wlan_cleanup(dev);
diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c b/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c
index d2f3310abe54..682300713be4 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c
@@ -1869,8 +1869,7 @@ int serial8250_handle_irq(struct uart_port *port, unsigned int iir)
 
 	status = serial_port_in(port, UART_LSR);
 
-	if (status & (UART_LSR_DR | UART_LSR_BI) &&
-	    iir & UART_IIR_RDI) {
+	if (status & (UART_LSR_DR | UART_LSR_BI)) {
 		if (!up->dma || handle_rx_dma(up, iir))
 			status = serial8250_rx_chars(up, status);
 	}
diff --git a/drivers/usb/dwc2/core.c b/drivers/usb/dwc2/core.c
index 8b499d643461..8e41d70fd298 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/dwc2/core.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/dwc2/core.c
@@ -531,7 +531,7 @@ int dwc2_core_reset(struct dwc2_hsotg *hsotg, bool skip_wait)
 	}
 
 	/* Wait for AHB master IDLE state */
-	if (dwc2_hsotg_wait_bit_set(hsotg, GRSTCTL, GRSTCTL_AHBIDLE, 50)) {
+	if (dwc2_hsotg_wait_bit_set(hsotg, GRSTCTL, GRSTCTL_AHBIDLE, 10000)) {
 		dev_warn(hsotg->dev, "%s: HANG! AHB Idle timeout GRSTCTL GRSTCTL_AHBIDLE\n",
 			 __func__);
 		return -EBUSY;
diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c
index 47be961f1bf3..c7ed90084d1a 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c
@@ -997,7 +997,6 @@ static ssize_t ffs_epfile_io(struct file *file, struct ffs_io_data *io_data)
 		 * earlier
 		 */
 		gadget = epfile->ffs->gadget;
-		io_data->use_sg = gadget->sg_supported && data_len > PAGE_SIZE;
 
 		spin_lock_irq(&epfile->ffs->eps_lock);
 		/* In the meantime, endpoint got disabled or changed. */
@@ -1012,6 +1011,8 @@ static ssize_t ffs_epfile_io(struct file *file, struct ffs_io_data *io_data)
 		 */
 		if (io_data->read)
 			data_len = usb_ep_align_maybe(gadget, ep->ep, data_len);
+
+		io_data->use_sg = gadget->sg_supported && data_len > PAGE_SIZE;
 		spin_unlock_irq(&epfile->ffs->eps_lock);
 
 		data = ffs_alloc_buffer(io_data, data_len);
diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c
index 737bd77a575d..2929bb47a618 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c
@@ -186,11 +186,12 @@ rx_submit(struct eth_dev *dev, struct usb_request *req, gfp_t gfp_flags)
 		out = dev->port_usb->out_ep;
 	else
 		out = NULL;
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
 
 	if (!out)
+	{
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
 		return -ENOTCONN;
-
+	}
 
 	/* Padding up to RX_EXTRA handles minor disagreements with host.
 	 * Normally we use the USB "terminate on short read" convention;
@@ -214,6 +215,7 @@ rx_submit(struct eth_dev *dev, struct usb_request *req, gfp_t gfp_flags)
 
 	if (dev->port_usb->is_fixed)
 		size = max_t(size_t, size, dev->port_usb->fixed_out_len);
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
 
 	skb = __netdev_alloc_skb(dev->net, size + NET_IP_ALIGN, gfp_flags);
 	if (skb == NULL) {
diff --git a/drivers/usb/renesas_usbhs/fifo.c b/drivers/usb/renesas_usbhs/fifo.c
index 39fa2fc1b8b7..6036cbae8c78 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/renesas_usbhs/fifo.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/renesas_usbhs/fifo.c
@@ -802,9 +802,8 @@ static int __usbhsf_dma_map_ctrl(struct usbhs_pkt *pkt, int map)
 }
 
 static void usbhsf_dma_complete(void *arg);
-static void xfer_work(struct work_struct *work)
+static void usbhsf_dma_xfer_preparing(struct usbhs_pkt *pkt)
 {
-	struct usbhs_pkt *pkt = container_of(work, struct usbhs_pkt, work);
 	struct usbhs_pipe *pipe = pkt->pipe;
 	struct usbhs_fifo *fifo;
 	struct usbhs_priv *priv = usbhs_pipe_to_priv(pipe);
@@ -812,12 +811,10 @@ static void xfer_work(struct work_struct *work)
 	struct dma_chan *chan;
 	struct device *dev = usbhs_priv_to_dev(priv);
 	enum dma_transfer_direction dir;
-	unsigned long flags;
 
-	usbhs_lock(priv, flags);
 	fifo = usbhs_pipe_to_fifo(pipe);
 	if (!fifo)
-		goto xfer_work_end;
+		return;
 
 	chan = usbhsf_dma_chan_get(fifo, pkt);
 	dir = usbhs_pipe_is_dir_in(pipe) ? DMA_DEV_TO_MEM : DMA_MEM_TO_DEV;
@@ -826,7 +823,7 @@ static void xfer_work(struct work_struct *work)
 					pkt->trans, dir,
 					DMA_PREP_INTERRUPT | DMA_CTRL_ACK);
 	if (!desc)
-		goto xfer_work_end;
+		return;
 
 	desc->callback		= usbhsf_dma_complete;
 	desc->callback_param	= pipe;
@@ -834,7 +831,7 @@ static void xfer_work(struct work_struct *work)
 	pkt->cookie = dmaengine_submit(desc);
 	if (pkt->cookie < 0) {
 		dev_err(dev, "Failed to submit dma descriptor\n");
-		goto xfer_work_end;
+		return;
 	}
 
 	dev_dbg(dev, "  %s %d (%d/ %d)\n",
@@ -845,8 +842,17 @@ static void xfer_work(struct work_struct *work)
 	dma_async_issue_pending(chan);
 	usbhsf_dma_start(pipe, fifo);
 	usbhs_pipe_enable(pipe);
+}
+
+static void xfer_work(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+	struct usbhs_pkt *pkt = container_of(work, struct usbhs_pkt, work);
+	struct usbhs_pipe *pipe = pkt->pipe;
+	struct usbhs_priv *priv = usbhs_pipe_to_priv(pipe);
+	unsigned long flags;
 
-xfer_work_end:
+	usbhs_lock(priv, flags);
+	usbhsf_dma_xfer_preparing(pkt);
 	usbhs_unlock(priv, flags);
 }
 
@@ -899,8 +905,13 @@ static int usbhsf_dma_prepare_push(struct usbhs_pkt *pkt, int *is_done)
 	pkt->trans = len;
 
 	usbhsf_tx_irq_ctrl(pipe, 0);
-	INIT_WORK(&pkt->work, xfer_work);
-	schedule_work(&pkt->work);
+	/* FIXME: Workaound for usb dmac that driver can be used in atomic */
+	if (usbhs_get_dparam(priv, has_usb_dmac)) {
+		usbhsf_dma_xfer_preparing(pkt);
+	} else {
+		INIT_WORK(&pkt->work, xfer_work);
+		schedule_work(&pkt->work);
+	}
 
 	return 0;
 
@@ -1006,8 +1017,7 @@ static int usbhsf_dma_prepare_pop_with_usb_dmac(struct usbhs_pkt *pkt,
 
 	pkt->trans = pkt->length;
 
-	INIT_WORK(&pkt->work, xfer_work);
-	schedule_work(&pkt->work);
+	usbhsf_dma_xfer_preparing(pkt);
 
 	return 0;
 
diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio.c b/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio.c
index 1d8461ae2c34..23669a584bae 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio.c
@@ -1029,6 +1029,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_table_combined[] = {
 	{ USB_DEVICE(AIRBUS_DS_VID, AIRBUS_DS_P8GR) },
 	/* EZPrototypes devices */
 	{ USB_DEVICE(EZPROTOTYPES_VID, HJELMSLUND_USB485_ISO_PID) },
+	{ USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_NUMBER(UNJO_VID, UNJO_ISODEBUG_V1_PID, 1) },
 	{ }					/* Terminating entry */
 };
 
diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio_ids.h b/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio_ids.h
index 5755f0df0025..f12d806220b4 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio_ids.h
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio_ids.h
@@ -1543,3 +1543,9 @@
 #define CHETCO_SEASMART_DISPLAY_PID	0xA5AD /* SeaSmart NMEA2000 Display */
 #define CHETCO_SEASMART_LITE_PID	0xA5AE /* SeaSmart Lite USB Adapter */
 #define CHETCO_SEASMART_ANALOG_PID	0xA5AF /* SeaSmart Analog Adapter */
+
+/*
+ * Unjo AB
+ */
+#define UNJO_VID			0x22B7
+#define UNJO_ISODEBUG_V1_PID		0x150D
diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/option.c b/drivers/usb/serial/option.c
index a0aaf0635359..c1582fbd1150 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/serial/option.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/option.c
@@ -1343,6 +1343,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id option_ids[] = {
 	  .driver_info = RSVD(4) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(ZTE_VENDOR_ID, 0x0414, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(ZTE_VENDOR_ID, 0x0417, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff) },
+	{ USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(ZTE_VENDOR_ID, 0x0601, 0xff) },	/* GosunCn ZTE WeLink ME3630 (RNDIS mode) */
 	{ USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(ZTE_VENDOR_ID, 0x0602, 0xff) },	/* GosunCn ZTE WeLink ME3630 (MBIM mode) */
 	{ USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(ZTE_VENDOR_ID, 0x1008, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff),
 	  .driver_info = RSVD(4) },
diff --git a/drivers/usb/typec/tps6598x.c b/drivers/usb/typec/tps6598x.c
index c674abe3cf99..a38d1409f15b 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/typec/tps6598x.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/typec/tps6598x.c
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@
 #define TPS_STATUS_VCONN(s)		(!!((s) & BIT(7)))
 
 /* TPS_REG_SYSTEM_CONF bits */
-#define TPS_SYSCONF_PORTINFO(c)		((c) & 3)
+#define TPS_SYSCONF_PORTINFO(c)		((c) & 7)
 
 enum {
 	TPS_PORTINFO_SINK,
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ tps6598x_block_read(struct tps6598x *tps, u8 reg, void *val, size_t len)
 }
 
 static int tps6598x_block_write(struct tps6598x *tps, u8 reg,
-				void *val, size_t len)
+				const void *val, size_t len)
 {
 	u8 data[TPS_MAX_LEN + 1];
 
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ static inline int tps6598x_write64(struct tps6598x *tps, u8 reg, u64 val)
 static inline int
 tps6598x_write_4cc(struct tps6598x *tps, u8 reg, const char *val)
 {
-	return tps6598x_block_write(tps, reg, &val, sizeof(u32));
+	return tps6598x_block_write(tps, reg, val, 4);
 }
 
 static int tps6598x_read_partner_identity(struct tps6598x *tps)
diff --git a/fs/crypto/policy.c b/fs/crypto/policy.c
index d536889ac31b..4941fe8471ce 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/policy.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/policy.c
@@ -81,6 +81,8 @@ int fscrypt_ioctl_set_policy(struct file *filp, const void __user *arg)
 	if (ret == -ENODATA) {
 		if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
 			ret = -ENOTDIR;
+		else if (IS_DEADDIR(inode))
+			ret = -ENOENT;
 		else if (!inode->i_sb->s_cop->empty_dir(inode))
 			ret = -ENOTEMPTY;
 		else
diff --git a/fs/iomap.c b/fs/iomap.c
index 12654c2e78f8..da961fca3180 100644
--- a/fs/iomap.c
+++ b/fs/iomap.c
@@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ iomap_readpage_actor(struct inode *inode, loff_t pos, loff_t length, void *data,
 	if (iop)
 		atomic_inc(&iop->read_count);
 
-	if (!ctx->bio || !is_contig || bio_full(ctx->bio)) {
+	if (!ctx->bio || !is_contig || bio_full(ctx->bio, plen)) {
 		gfp_t gfp = mapping_gfp_constraint(page->mapping, GFP_KERNEL);
 		int nr_vecs = (length + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
 
diff --git a/fs/udf/inode.c b/fs/udf/inode.c
index e7276932e433..9bb18311a22f 100644
--- a/fs/udf/inode.c
+++ b/fs/udf/inode.c
@@ -470,13 +470,15 @@ static struct buffer_head *udf_getblk(struct inode *inode, udf_pblk_t block,
 	return NULL;
 }
 
-/* Extend the file by 'blocks' blocks, return the number of extents added */
+/* Extend the file with new blocks totaling 'new_block_bytes',
+ * return the number of extents added
+ */
 static int udf_do_extend_file(struct inode *inode,
 			      struct extent_position *last_pos,
 			      struct kernel_long_ad *last_ext,
-			      sector_t blocks)
+			      loff_t new_block_bytes)
 {
-	sector_t add;
+	uint32_t add;
 	int count = 0, fake = !(last_ext->extLength & UDF_EXTENT_LENGTH_MASK);
 	struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
 	struct kernel_lb_addr prealloc_loc = {};
@@ -486,7 +488,7 @@ static int udf_do_extend_file(struct inode *inode,
 
 	/* The previous extent is fake and we should not extend by anything
 	 * - there's nothing to do... */
-	if (!blocks && fake)
+	if (!new_block_bytes && fake)
 		return 0;
 
 	iinfo = UDF_I(inode);
@@ -517,13 +519,12 @@ static int udf_do_extend_file(struct inode *inode,
 	/* Can we merge with the previous extent? */
 	if ((last_ext->extLength & UDF_EXTENT_FLAG_MASK) ==
 					EXT_NOT_RECORDED_NOT_ALLOCATED) {
-		add = ((1 << 30) - sb->s_blocksize -
-			(last_ext->extLength & UDF_EXTENT_LENGTH_MASK)) >>
-			sb->s_blocksize_bits;
-		if (add > blocks)
-			add = blocks;
-		blocks -= add;
-		last_ext->extLength += add << sb->s_blocksize_bits;
+		add = (1 << 30) - sb->s_blocksize -
+			(last_ext->extLength & UDF_EXTENT_LENGTH_MASK);
+		if (add > new_block_bytes)
+			add = new_block_bytes;
+		new_block_bytes -= add;
+		last_ext->extLength += add;
 	}
 
 	if (fake) {
@@ -544,28 +545,27 @@ static int udf_do_extend_file(struct inode *inode,
 	}
 
 	/* Managed to do everything necessary? */
-	if (!blocks)
+	if (!new_block_bytes)
 		goto out;
 
 	/* All further extents will be NOT_RECORDED_NOT_ALLOCATED */
 	last_ext->extLocation.logicalBlockNum = 0;
 	last_ext->extLocation.partitionReferenceNum = 0;
-	add = (1 << (30-sb->s_blocksize_bits)) - 1;
-	last_ext->extLength = EXT_NOT_RECORDED_NOT_ALLOCATED |
-				(add << sb->s_blocksize_bits);
+	add = (1 << 30) - sb->s_blocksize;
+	last_ext->extLength = EXT_NOT_RECORDED_NOT_ALLOCATED | add;
 
 	/* Create enough extents to cover the whole hole */
-	while (blocks > add) {
-		blocks -= add;
+	while (new_block_bytes > add) {
+		new_block_bytes -= add;
 		err = udf_add_aext(inode, last_pos, &last_ext->extLocation,
 				   last_ext->extLength, 1);
 		if (err)
 			return err;
 		count++;
 	}
-	if (blocks) {
+	if (new_block_bytes) {
 		last_ext->extLength = EXT_NOT_RECORDED_NOT_ALLOCATED |
-			(blocks << sb->s_blocksize_bits);
+			new_block_bytes;
 		err = udf_add_aext(inode, last_pos, &last_ext->extLocation,
 				   last_ext->extLength, 1);
 		if (err)
@@ -596,6 +596,24 @@ static int udf_do_extend_file(struct inode *inode,
 	return count;
 }
 
+/* Extend the final block of the file to final_block_len bytes */
+static void udf_do_extend_final_block(struct inode *inode,
+				      struct extent_position *last_pos,
+				      struct kernel_long_ad *last_ext,
+				      uint32_t final_block_len)
+{
+	struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
+	uint32_t added_bytes;
+
+	added_bytes = final_block_len -
+		      (last_ext->extLength & (sb->s_blocksize - 1));
+	last_ext->extLength += added_bytes;
+	UDF_I(inode)->i_lenExtents += added_bytes;
+
+	udf_write_aext(inode, last_pos, &last_ext->extLocation,
+			last_ext->extLength, 1);
+}
+
 static int udf_extend_file(struct inode *inode, loff_t newsize)
 {
 
@@ -605,10 +623,12 @@ static int udf_extend_file(struct inode *inode, loff_t newsize)
 	int8_t etype;
 	struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
 	sector_t first_block = newsize >> sb->s_blocksize_bits, offset;
+	unsigned long partial_final_block;
 	int adsize;
 	struct udf_inode_info *iinfo = UDF_I(inode);
 	struct kernel_long_ad extent;
-	int err;
+	int err = 0;
+	int within_final_block;
 
 	if (iinfo->i_alloc_type == ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_SHORT)
 		adsize = sizeof(struct short_ad);
@@ -618,18 +638,8 @@ static int udf_extend_file(struct inode *inode, loff_t newsize)
 		BUG();
 
 	etype = inode_bmap(inode, first_block, &epos, &eloc, &elen, &offset);
+	within_final_block = (etype != -1);
 
-	/* File has extent covering the new size (could happen when extending
-	 * inside a block)? */
-	if (etype != -1)
-		return 0;
-	if (newsize & (sb->s_blocksize - 1))
-		offset++;
-	/* Extended file just to the boundary of the last file block? */
-	if (offset == 0)
-		return 0;
-
-	/* Truncate is extending the file by 'offset' blocks */
 	if ((!epos.bh && epos.offset == udf_file_entry_alloc_offset(inode)) ||
 	    (epos.bh && epos.offset == sizeof(struct allocExtDesc))) {
 		/* File has no extents at all or has empty last
@@ -643,7 +653,22 @@ static int udf_extend_file(struct inode *inode, loff_t newsize)
 				      &extent.extLength, 0);
 		extent.extLength |= etype << 30;
 	}
-	err = udf_do_extend_file(inode, &epos, &extent, offset);
+
+	partial_final_block = newsize & (sb->s_blocksize - 1);
+
+	/* File has extent covering the new size (could happen when extending
+	 * inside a block)?
+	 */
+	if (within_final_block) {
+		/* Extending file within the last file block */
+		udf_do_extend_final_block(inode, &epos, &extent,
+					  partial_final_block);
+	} else {
+		loff_t add = ((loff_t)offset << sb->s_blocksize_bits) |
+			     partial_final_block;
+		err = udf_do_extend_file(inode, &epos, &extent, add);
+	}
+
 	if (err < 0)
 		goto out;
 	err = 0;
@@ -745,6 +770,7 @@ static sector_t inode_getblk(struct inode *inode, sector_t block,
 	/* Are we beyond EOF? */
 	if (etype == -1) {
 		int ret;
+		loff_t hole_len;
 		isBeyondEOF = true;
 		if (count) {
 			if (c)
@@ -760,7 +786,8 @@ static sector_t inode_getblk(struct inode *inode, sector_t block,
 			startnum = (offset > 0);
 		}
 		/* Create extents for the hole between EOF and offset */
-		ret = udf_do_extend_file(inode, &prev_epos, laarr, offset);
+		hole_len = (loff_t)offset << inode->i_blkbits;
+		ret = udf_do_extend_file(inode, &prev_epos, laarr, hole_len);
 		if (ret < 0) {
 			*err = ret;
 			newblock = 0;
diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_aops.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_aops.c
index 8da5e6637771..11f703d4a605 100644
--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_aops.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_aops.c
@@ -782,7 +782,7 @@ xfs_add_to_ioend(
 		atomic_inc(&iop->write_count);
 
 	if (!merged) {
-		if (bio_full(wpc->ioend->io_bio))
+		if (bio_full(wpc->ioend->io_bio, len))
 			xfs_chain_bio(wpc->ioend, wbc, bdev, sector);
 		bio_add_page(wpc->ioend->io_bio, page, len, poff);
 	}
diff --git a/include/linux/bio.h b/include/linux/bio.h
index f87abaa898f0..e36b8fc1b1c3 100644
--- a/include/linux/bio.h
+++ b/include/linux/bio.h
@@ -102,9 +102,23 @@ static inline void *bio_data(struct bio *bio)
 	return NULL;
 }
 
-static inline bool bio_full(struct bio *bio)
+/**
+ * bio_full - check if the bio is full
+ * @bio:	bio to check
+ * @len:	length of one segment to be added
+ *
+ * Return true if @bio is full and one segment with @len bytes can't be
+ * added to the bio, otherwise return false
+ */
+static inline bool bio_full(struct bio *bio, unsigned len)
 {
-	return bio->bi_vcnt >= bio->bi_max_vecs;
+	if (bio->bi_vcnt >= bio->bi_max_vecs)
+		return true;
+
+	if (bio->bi_iter.bi_size > UINT_MAX - len)
+		return true;
+
+	return false;
 }
 
 static inline bool bio_next_segment(const struct bio *bio,
diff --git a/include/linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h b/include/linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h
index 77ac9c7b9483..762f793e92f6 100644
--- a/include/linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h
@@ -62,9 +62,18 @@ enum {
 
 /*
  * A single VMCI device has an upper limit of 128MB on the amount of
- * memory that can be used for queue pairs.
+ * memory that can be used for queue pairs. Since each queue pair
+ * consists of at least two pages, the memory limit also dictates the
+ * number of queue pairs a guest can create.
  */
 #define VMCI_MAX_GUEST_QP_MEMORY (128 * 1024 * 1024)
+#define VMCI_MAX_GUEST_QP_COUNT  (VMCI_MAX_GUEST_QP_MEMORY / PAGE_SIZE / 2)
+
+/*
+ * There can be at most PAGE_SIZE doorbells since there is one doorbell
+ * per byte in the doorbell bitmap page.
+ */
+#define VMCI_MAX_GUEST_DOORBELL_COUNT PAGE_SIZE
 
 /*
  * Queues with pre-mapped data pages must be small, so that we don't pin
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/usb/audio.h b/include/uapi/linux/usb/audio.h
index ddc5396800aa..76b7c3f6cd0d 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/usb/audio.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/usb/audio.h
@@ -450,6 +450,43 @@ static inline __u8 *uac_processing_unit_specific(struct uac_processing_unit_desc
 	}
 }
 
+/*
+ * Extension Unit (XU) has almost compatible layout with Processing Unit, but
+ * on UAC2, it has a different bmControls size (bControlSize); it's 1 byte for
+ * XU while 2 bytes for PU.  The last iExtension field is a one-byte index as
+ * well as iProcessing field of PU.
+ */
+static inline __u8 uac_extension_unit_bControlSize(struct uac_processing_unit_descriptor *desc,
+						   int protocol)
+{
+	switch (protocol) {
+	case UAC_VERSION_1:
+		return desc->baSourceID[desc->bNrInPins + 4];
+	case UAC_VERSION_2:
+		return 1; /* in UAC2, this value is constant */
+	case UAC_VERSION_3:
+		return 4; /* in UAC3, this value is constant */
+	default:
+		return 1;
+	}
+}
+
+static inline __u8 uac_extension_unit_iExtension(struct uac_processing_unit_descriptor *desc,
+						 int protocol)
+{
+	__u8 control_size = uac_extension_unit_bControlSize(desc, protocol);
+
+	switch (protocol) {
+	case UAC_VERSION_1:
+	case UAC_VERSION_2:
+	default:
+		return *(uac_processing_unit_bmControls(desc, protocol)
+			 + control_size);
+	case UAC_VERSION_3:
+		return 0; /* UAC3 does not have this field */
+	}
+}
+
 /* 4.5.2 Class-Specific AS Interface Descriptor */
 struct uac1_as_header_descriptor {
 	__u8  bLength;			/* in bytes: 7 */
diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c
index 6f3a35949cdd..f24a757f8239 100644
--- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c
+++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c
@@ -3255,6 +3255,7 @@ static void alc256_init(struct hda_codec *codec)
 	alc_update_coefex_idx(codec, 0x57, 0x04, 0x0007, 0x4); /* Hight power */
 	alc_update_coefex_idx(codec, 0x53, 0x02, 0x8000, 1 << 15); /* Clear bit */
 	alc_update_coefex_idx(codec, 0x53, 0x02, 0x8000, 0 << 15);
+	alc_update_coef_idx(codec, 0x36, 1 << 13, 1 << 5); /* Switch pcbeep path to Line in path*/
 }
 
 static void alc256_shutup(struct hda_codec *codec)
@@ -7825,7 +7826,6 @@ static int patch_alc269(struct hda_codec *codec)
 		spec->shutup = alc256_shutup;
 		spec->init_hook = alc256_init;
 		spec->gen.mixer_nid = 0; /* ALC256 does not have any loopback mixer path */
-		alc_update_coef_idx(codec, 0x36, 1 << 13, 1 << 5); /* Switch pcbeep path to Line in path*/
 		break;
 	case 0x10ec0257:
 		spec->codec_variant = ALC269_TYPE_ALC257;
diff --git a/sound/usb/mixer.c b/sound/usb/mixer.c
index c703f8534b07..7498b5191b68 100644
--- a/sound/usb/mixer.c
+++ b/sound/usb/mixer.c
@@ -2303,7 +2303,7 @@ static struct procunit_info extunits[] = {
  */
 static int build_audio_procunit(struct mixer_build *state, int unitid,
 				void *raw_desc, struct procunit_info *list,
-				char *name)
+				bool extension_unit)
 {
 	struct uac_processing_unit_descriptor *desc = raw_desc;
 	int num_ins;
@@ -2320,6 +2320,8 @@ static int build_audio_procunit(struct mixer_build *state, int unitid,
 	static struct procunit_info default_info = {
 		0, NULL, default_value_info
 	};
+	const char *name = extension_unit ?
+		"Extension Unit" : "Processing Unit";
 
 	if (desc->bLength < 13) {
 		usb_audio_err(state->chip, "invalid %s descriptor (id %d)\n", name, unitid);
@@ -2433,7 +2435,10 @@ static int build_audio_procunit(struct mixer_build *state, int unitid,
 		} else if (info->name) {
 			strlcpy(kctl->id.name, info->name, sizeof(kctl->id.name));
 		} else {
-			nameid = uac_processing_unit_iProcessing(desc, state->mixer->protocol);
+			if (extension_unit)
+				nameid = uac_extension_unit_iExtension(desc, state->mixer->protocol);
+			else
+				nameid = uac_processing_unit_iProcessing(desc, state->mixer->protocol);
 			len = 0;
 			if (nameid)
 				len = snd_usb_copy_string_desc(state->chip,
@@ -2466,10 +2471,10 @@ static int parse_audio_processing_unit(struct mixer_build *state, int unitid,
 	case UAC_VERSION_2:
 	default:
 		return build_audio_procunit(state, unitid, raw_desc,
-				procunits, "Processing Unit");
+					    procunits, false);
 	case UAC_VERSION_3:
 		return build_audio_procunit(state, unitid, raw_desc,
-				uac3_procunits, "Processing Unit");
+					    uac3_procunits, false);
 	}
 }
 
@@ -2480,8 +2485,7 @@ static int parse_audio_extension_unit(struct mixer_build *state, int unitid,
 	 * Note that we parse extension units with processing unit descriptors.
 	 * That's ok as the layout is the same.
 	 */
-	return build_audio_procunit(state, unitid, raw_desc,
-				    extunits, "Extension Unit");
+	return build_audio_procunit(state, unitid, raw_desc, extunits, true);
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/tools/perf/Documentation/intel-pt.txt b/tools/perf/Documentation/intel-pt.txt
index 115eaacc455f..60d99e5e7921 100644
--- a/tools/perf/Documentation/intel-pt.txt
+++ b/tools/perf/Documentation/intel-pt.txt
@@ -88,16 +88,16 @@ smaller.
 
 To represent software control flow, "branches" samples are produced.  By default
 a branch sample is synthesized for every single branch.  To get an idea what
-data is available you can use the 'perf script' tool with no parameters, which
-will list all the samples.
+data is available you can use the 'perf script' tool with all itrace sampling
+options, which will list all the samples.
 
 	perf record -e intel_pt//u ls
-	perf script
+	perf script --itrace=ibxwpe
 
 An interesting field that is not printed by default is 'flags' which can be
 displayed as follows:
 
-	perf script -Fcomm,tid,pid,time,cpu,event,trace,ip,sym,dso,addr,symoff,flags
+	perf script --itrace=ibxwpe -F+flags
 
 The flags are "bcrosyiABEx" which stand for branch, call, return, conditional,
 system, asynchronous, interrupt, transaction abort, trace begin, trace end, and
@@ -713,7 +713,7 @@ Having no option is the same as
 
 which, in turn, is the same as
 
-	--itrace=ibxwpe
+	--itrace=cepwx
 
 The letters are:
 
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/auxtrace.c b/tools/perf/util/auxtrace.c
index 66e82bd0683e..cfdbf65f1e02 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/auxtrace.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/auxtrace.c
@@ -1001,7 +1001,8 @@ int itrace_parse_synth_opts(const struct option *opt, const char *str,
 	}
 
 	if (!str) {
-		itrace_synth_opts__set_default(synth_opts, false);
+		itrace_synth_opts__set_default(synth_opts,
+					       synth_opts->default_no_sample);
 		return 0;
 	}
 
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/header.c b/tools/perf/util/header.c
index 847ae51a524b..fb0aa661644b 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/header.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/header.c
@@ -3602,6 +3602,7 @@ int perf_event__synthesize_features(struct perf_tool *tool,
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	ff.size = sz - sz_hdr;
+	ff.ph = &session->header;
 
 	for_each_set_bit(feat, header->adds_features, HEADER_FEAT_BITS) {
 		if (!feat_ops[feat].synthesize) {
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/intel-pt.c b/tools/perf/util/intel-pt.c
index d6f1b2a03f9b..f7dd4657535d 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/intel-pt.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/intel-pt.c
@@ -2579,7 +2579,8 @@ int intel_pt_process_auxtrace_info(union perf_event *event,
 	} else {
 		itrace_synth_opts__set_default(&pt->synth_opts,
 				session->itrace_synth_opts->default_no_sample);
-		if (use_browser != -1) {
+		if (!session->itrace_synth_opts->default_no_sample &&
+		    !session->itrace_synth_opts->inject) {
 			pt->synth_opts.branches = false;
 			pt->synth_opts.callchain = true;
 		}
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/pmu.c b/tools/perf/util/pmu.c
index e0429f4ef335..faa8eb231e1b 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/pmu.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/pmu.c
@@ -709,9 +709,7 @@ static void pmu_add_cpu_aliases(struct list_head *head, struct perf_pmu *pmu)
 {
 	int i;
 	struct pmu_events_map *map;
-	struct pmu_event *pe;
 	const char *name = pmu->name;
-	const char *pname;
 
 	map = perf_pmu__find_map(pmu);
 	if (!map)
@@ -722,28 +720,26 @@ static void pmu_add_cpu_aliases(struct list_head *head, struct perf_pmu *pmu)
 	 */
 	i = 0;
 	while (1) {
+		const char *cpu_name = is_arm_pmu_core(name) ? name : "cpu";
+		struct pmu_event *pe = &map->table[i++];
+		const char *pname = pe->pmu ? pe->pmu : cpu_name;
 
-		pe = &map->table[i++];
 		if (!pe->name) {
 			if (pe->metric_group || pe->metric_name)
 				continue;
 			break;
 		}
 
-		if (!is_arm_pmu_core(name)) {
-			pname = pe->pmu ? pe->pmu : "cpu";
-
-			/*
-			 * uncore alias may be from different PMU
-			 * with common prefix
-			 */
-			if (pmu_is_uncore(name) &&
-			    !strncmp(pname, name, strlen(pname)))
-				goto new_alias;
+		/*
+		 * uncore alias may be from different PMU
+		 * with common prefix
+		 */
+		if (pmu_is_uncore(name) &&
+		    !strncmp(pname, name, strlen(pname)))
+			goto new_alias;
 
-			if (strcmp(pname, name))
-				continue;
-		}
+		if (strcmp(pname, name))
+			continue;
 
 new_alias:
 		/* need type casts to override 'const' */
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/thread-stack.c b/tools/perf/util/thread-stack.c
index 4ba9e866b076..60c9d955c4d7 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/thread-stack.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/thread-stack.c
@@ -616,6 +616,23 @@ static int thread_stack__bottom(struct thread_stack *ts,
 				     true, false);
 }
 
+static int thread_stack__pop_ks(struct thread *thread, struct thread_stack *ts,
+				struct perf_sample *sample, u64 ref)
+{
+	u64 tm = sample->time;
+	int err;
+
+	/* Return to userspace, so pop all kernel addresses */
+	while (thread_stack__in_kernel(ts)) {
+		err = thread_stack__call_return(thread, ts, --ts->cnt,
+						tm, ref, true);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int thread_stack__no_call_return(struct thread *thread,
 					struct thread_stack *ts,
 					struct perf_sample *sample,
@@ -896,7 +913,18 @@ int thread_stack__process(struct thread *thread, struct comm *comm,
 			ts->rstate = X86_RETPOLINE_DETECTED;
 
 	} else if (sample->flags & PERF_IP_FLAG_RETURN) {
-		if (!sample->ip || !sample->addr)
+		if (!sample->addr) {
+			u32 return_from_kernel = PERF_IP_FLAG_SYSCALLRET |
+						 PERF_IP_FLAG_INTERRUPT;
+
+			if (!(sample->flags & return_from_kernel))
+				return 0;
+
+			/* Pop kernel stack */
+			return thread_stack__pop_ks(thread, ts, sample, ref);
+		}
+
+		if (!sample->ip)
 			return 0;
 
 		/* x86 retpoline 'return' doesn't match the stack */