[PATCH V35 03/29] security: Add a static lockdown policy LSM
From: Matthew Garrett
Date: Mon Jul 15 2019 - 16:00:07 EST
While existing LSMs can be extended to handle lockdown policy,
distributions generally want to be able to apply a straightforward
static policy. This patch adds a simple LSM that can be configured to
reject either integrity or all lockdown queries, and can be configured
at runtime (through securityfs), boot time (via a kernel parameter) or
build time (via a kconfig option). Based on initial code by David
Howells.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
.../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 9 +
include/linux/security.h | 3 +
security/Kconfig | 11 +-
security/Makefile | 2 +
security/lockdown/Kconfig | 47 +++++
security/lockdown/Makefile | 1 +
security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 172 ++++++++++++++++++
7 files changed, 240 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 security/lockdown/Kconfig
create mode 100644 security/lockdown/Makefile
create mode 100644 security/lockdown/lockdown.c
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 099c5a4be95b..95acd46fd891 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2248,6 +2248,15 @@
lockd.nlm_udpport=M [NFS] Assign UDP port.
Format: <integer>
+ lockdown= [SECURITY]
+ { integrity | confidentiality }
+ Enable the kernel lockdown feature. If set to
+ integrity, kernel features that allow userland to
+ modify the running kernel are disabled. If set to
+ confidentiality, kernel features that allow userland
+ to extract confidential information from the kernel
+ are also disabled.
+
locktorture.nreaders_stress= [KNL]
Set the number of locking read-acquisition kthreads.
Defaults to being automatically set based on the
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index c2b1204e8e26..54a0532ec12f 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -97,6 +97,9 @@ enum lsm_event {
* potentially a moving target. It is easy to misuse this information
* in a way that could break userspace. Please be careful not to do
* so.
+ *
+ * If you add to this, remember to extend lockdown_reasons in
+ * security/lockdown/lockdown.c.
*/
enum lockdown_reason {
LOCKDOWN_NONE,
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 06a30851511a..967e86fc415a 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -237,6 +237,7 @@ source "security/apparmor/Kconfig"
source "security/loadpin/Kconfig"
source "security/yama/Kconfig"
source "security/safesetid/Kconfig"
+source "security/lockdown/Kconfig"
source "security/integrity/Kconfig"
@@ -276,11 +277,11 @@ endchoice
config LSM
string "Ordered list of enabled LSMs"
- default "yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
- default "yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
- default "yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
- default "yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
- default "yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor"
+ default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
+ default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
+ default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
+ default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
+ default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor"
help
A comma-separated list of LSMs, in initialization order.
Any LSMs left off this list will be ignored. This can be
diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
index c598b904938f..be1dd9d2cb2f 100644
--- a/security/Makefile
+++ b/security/Makefile
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor
subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama
subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN) += loadpin
subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID) += safesetid
+subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) += lockdown
# always enable default capabilities
obj-y += commoncap.o
@@ -27,6 +28,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor/
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama/
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN) += loadpin/
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID) += safesetid/
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) += lockdown/
obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) += device_cgroup.o
# Object integrity file lists
diff --git a/security/lockdown/Kconfig b/security/lockdown/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..7374ba76d8eb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/lockdown/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+config SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM
+ bool "Basic module for enforcing kernel lockdown"
+ depends on SECURITY
+ help
+ Build support for an LSM that enforces a coarse kernel lockdown
+ behaviour.
+
+config SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM_EARLY
+ bool "Enable lockdown LSM early in init"
+ depends on SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM
+ help
+ Enable the lockdown LSM early in boot. This is necessary in order
+ to ensure that lockdown enforcement can be carried out on kernel
+ boot parameters that are otherwise parsed before the security
+ subsystem is fully initialised. If enabled, lockdown will
+ unconditionally be called before any other LSMs.
+
+choice
+ prompt "Kernel default lockdown mode"
+ default LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_NONE
+ depends on SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM
+ help
+ The kernel can be configured to default to differing levels of
+ lockdown.
+
+config LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_NONE
+ bool "None"
+ help
+ No lockdown functionality is enabled by default. Lockdown may be
+ enabled via the kernel commandline or /sys/kernel/security/lockdown.
+
+config LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_INTEGRITY
+ bool "Integrity"
+ help
+ The kernel runs in integrity mode by default. Features that allow
+ the kernel to be modified at runtime are disabled.
+
+config LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_CONFIDENTIALITY
+ bool "Confidentiality"
+ help
+ The kernel runs in confidentiality mode by default. Features that
+ allow the kernel to be modified at runtime or that permit userland
+ code to read confidential material held inside the kernel are
+ disabled.
+
+endchoice
+
diff --git a/security/lockdown/Makefile b/security/lockdown/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e3634b9017e7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/lockdown/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) += lockdown.o
diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d30c4d254b5f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Lock down the kernel
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+
+static enum lockdown_reason kernel_locked_down;
+
+static char *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = {
+ [LOCKDOWN_NONE] = "none",
+ [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity",
+ [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality",
+};
+
+static enum lockdown_reason lockdown_levels[] = {LOCKDOWN_NONE,
+ LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX,
+ LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX};
+
+/*
+ * Put the kernel into lock-down mode.
+ */
+static int lock_kernel_down(const char *where, enum lockdown_reason level)
+{
+ if (kernel_locked_down >= level)
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ kernel_locked_down = level;
+ pr_notice("Kernel is locked down from %s; see man kernel_lockdown.7\n",
+ where);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int __init lockdown_param(char *level)
+{
+ if (!level)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (strcmp(level, "integrity") == 0)
+ lock_kernel_down("command line", LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX);
+ else if (strcmp(level, "confidentiality") == 0)
+ lock_kernel_down("command line", LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX);
+ else
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+early_param("lockdown", lockdown_param);
+
+/**
+ * lockdown_is_locked_down - Find out if the kernel is locked down
+ * @what: Tag to use in notice generated if lockdown is in effect
+ */
+static int lockdown_is_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what)
+{
+ if (kernel_locked_down >= what) {
+ if (lockdown_reasons[what])
+ pr_notice("Lockdown: %s is restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7\n",
+ lockdown_reasons[what]);
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct security_hook_list lockdown_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(locked_down, lockdown_is_locked_down),
+};
+
+static int __init lockdown_lsm_init(void)
+{
+#if defined(CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_INTEGRITY)
+ lock_kernel_down("Kernel configuration", LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX);
+#elif defined(CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_CONFIDENTIALITY)
+ lock_kernel_down("Kernel configuration", LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX);
+#endif
+ security_add_hooks(lockdown_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(lockdown_hooks),
+ "lockdown");
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static ssize_t lockdown_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t count,
+ loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char temp[80];
+ int i, offset = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(lockdown_levels); i++) {
+ enum lockdown_reason level = lockdown_levels[i];
+
+ if (lockdown_reasons[level]) {
+ const char *label = lockdown_reasons[level];
+
+ if (kernel_locked_down == level)
+ offset += sprintf(temp+offset, "[%s] ", label);
+ else
+ offset += sprintf(temp+offset, "%s ", label);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Convert the last space to a newline if needed. */
+ if (offset > 0)
+ temp[offset-1] = '\n';
+
+ return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, temp, strlen(temp));
+}
+
+static ssize_t lockdown_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t n, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char *state;
+ int i, len, err = -EINVAL;
+
+ state = memdup_user_nul(buf, n);
+ if (IS_ERR(state))
+ return PTR_ERR(state);
+
+ len = strlen(state);
+ if (len && state[len-1] == '\n') {
+ state[len-1] = '\0';
+ len--;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(lockdown_levels); i++) {
+ enum lockdown_reason level = lockdown_levels[i];
+ const char *label = lockdown_reasons[level];
+
+ if (label && !strcmp(state, label))
+ err = lock_kernel_down("securityfs", level);
+ }
+
+ kfree(state);
+ return err ? err : n;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations lockdown_ops = {
+ .read = lockdown_read,
+ .write = lockdown_write,
+};
+
+static int __init lockdown_secfs_init(void)
+{
+ struct dentry *dentry;
+
+ dentry = securityfs_create_file("lockdown", 0600, NULL, NULL,
+ &lockdown_ops);
+ if (IS_ERR(dentry))
+ return PTR_ERR(dentry);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+core_initcall(lockdown_secfs_init);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM_EARLY
+DEFINE_EARLY_LSM(lockdown) = {
+#else
+DEFINE_LSM(lockdown) = {
+#endif
+ .name = "lockdown",
+ .init = lockdown_lsm_init,
+};
--
2.22.0.510.g264f2c817a-goog