Re: [PATCH v5 06/10] swiotlb: Zero out bounce buffer for untrusted device

From: Lu Baolu
Date: Thu Jul 25 2019 - 22:22:17 EST


Hi,

On 7/25/19 7:49 PM, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
index 43c88626a1f3..edc84a00b9f9 100644
--- a/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c
+++ b/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
#include <linux/set_memory.h>
+#include <linux/pci.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
#include <linux/debugfs.h>
#endif
@@ -562,6 +563,11 @@ phys_addr_t swiotlb_tbl_map_single(struct device *hwdev,
*/
for (i = 0; i < nslots; i++)
io_tlb_orig_addr[index+i] = orig_addr + (i << IO_TLB_SHIFT);
+
+ /* Zero out the bounce buffer if the consumer is untrusted. */
+ if (dev_is_untrusted(hwdev))
+ memset(phys_to_virt(tlb_addr), 0, alloc_size);

Hmm. Maybe we need to move the untrusted flag to struct device?
Directly poking into the pci_dev from swiotlb is a bit of a layering
violation.

Yes. We can consider this. But I tend to think that it's worth of a
separated series. That's a reason why I defined dev_is_untrusted(). This
helper keeps the caller same when moving the untrusted flag.


+
if (!(attrs & DMA_ATTR_SKIP_CPU_SYNC) &&
(dir == DMA_TO_DEVICE || dir == DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL))
swiotlb_bounce(orig_addr, tlb_addr, mapping_size, DMA_TO_DEVICE);

Also for the case where we bounce here we only need to zero the padding
(if there is any), so I think we could optimize this a bit.


Yes. There's duplication here.

Best regards,
Baolu