Re: [RFC PATCH v1 1/5] fs: Add support for an O_MAYEXEC flag on sys_open()

[MickaÃl SalaÃn]

On 05/08/2019 01:55, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Wed, Dec 12, 2018 at 6:43 AM Jan Kara <jack@xxxxxxx> wrote:
>>
>> On Wed 12-12-18 09:17:08, MickaÃl SalaÃn wrote:
>>> When the O_MAYEXEC flag is passed, sys_open() may be subject to
>>> additional restrictions depending on a security policy implemented by an
>>> LSM through the inode_permission hook.
>>>
>>> The underlying idea is to be able to restrict scripts interpretation
>>> according to a policy defined by the system administrator.  For this to
>>> be possible, script interpreters must use the O_MAYEXEC flag
>>> appropriately.  To be fully effective, these interpreters also need to
>>> handle the other ways to execute code (for which the kernel can't help):
>>> command line parameters (e.g., option -e for Perl), module loading
>>> (e.g., option -m for Python), stdin, file sourcing, environment
>>> variables, configuration files...  According to the threat model, it may
>>> be acceptable to allow some script interpreters (e.g. Bash) to interpret
>>> commands from stdin, may it be a TTY or a pipe, because it may not be
>>> enough to (directly) perform syscalls.
>>>
>>> A simple security policy implementation is available in a following
>>> patch for Yama.
>>>
>>> This is an updated subset of the patch initially written by Vincent
>>> Strubel for CLIP OS:
>>> https://github.com/clipos-archive/src_platform_clip-patches/blob/f5cb330d6b684752e403b4e41b39f7004d88e561/1901_open_mayexec.patch
>>> This patch has been used for more than 10 years with customized script
>>> interpreters.  Some examples can be found here:
>>> https://github.com/clipos-archive/clipos4_portage-overlay/search?q=O_MAYEXEC
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: MickaÃl SalaÃn <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
>>> Signed-off-by: Thibaut Sautereau <thibaut.sautereau@xxxxxxxxxxx>
>>> Signed-off-by: Vincent Strubel <vincent.strubel@xxxxxxxxxxx>
>>> Reviewed-by: Philippe TrÃbuchet <philippe.trebuchet@xxxxxxxxxxx>
>>> Cc: Al Viro <viro@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>>> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
>>> Cc: MickaÃl SalaÃn <mickael.salaun@xxxxxxxxxxx>
>>
>> ...
>>
>>> diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
>>> index 0285ce7dbd51..75479b79a58f 100644
>>> --- a/fs/open.c
>>> +++ b/fs/open.c
>>> @@ -974,6 +974,10 @@ static inline int build_open_flags(int flags, umode_t mode, struct open_flags *o
>>>       if (flags & O_APPEND)
>>>               acc_mode |= MAY_APPEND;
>>>
>>> +     /* Check execution permissions on open. */
>>> +     if (flags & O_MAYEXEC)
>>> +             acc_mode |= MAY_OPENEXEC;
>>> +
>>>       op->acc_mode = acc_mode;
>>>
>>>       op->intent = flags & O_PATH ? 0 : LOOKUP_OPEN;
>>
>> I don't feel experienced enough in security to tell whether we want this
>> functionality or not. But if we do this, shouldn't we also set FMODE_EXEC
>> on the resulting struct file? That way also security_file_open() can be
>> used to arbitrate such executable opens and in particular
>> fanotify permission event FAN_OPEN_EXEC will get properly generated which I
>> guess is desirable (support for it is sitting in my tree waiting for the
>> merge window) - adding some audit people involved in FAN_OPEN_EXEC to
>> CC. Just an idea...
>>
> 
> I would really like to land this patch.  I'm fiddling with making
> bpffs handle permissions intelligently, and the lack of a way to say
> "hey, I want to open this bpf program so that I can run it" is
> annoying.

Are you OK with this series? What about Aleksa's work on openat2(), and
Sean's work on SGX/noexec? Is it time to send a new patch series (with a
dedicated LSM instead of Yama)?