Re: [PATCH v5 2/2] powerpc: Add support to initialize ima policy rules

From: Nayna
Date: Thu Sep 05 2019 - 08:32:12 EST




On 09/02/2019 07:52 AM, Michael Ellerman wrote:
Hi Nayna,

Hi Michael,


Some more comments below.

Nayna Jain <nayna@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes:
POWER secure boot relies on the kernel IMA security subsystem to
perform the OS kernel image signature verification.
Again this is just a design choice we've made, it's not specified
anywhere or anything like that. And it only applies to bare metal secure
boot, at least so far. AIUI.

Yes. I will make it consistent to use "PowerNV".

Since each secure
boot mode has different IMA policy requirements, dynamic definition of
the policy rules based on the runtime secure boot mode of the system is
required. On systems that support secure boot, but have it disabled,
only measurement policy rules of the kernel image and modules are
defined.
It's probably worth mentioning that we intend to use this in our
Linux-based boot loader, which uses kexec, and that's one of the reasons
why we're particularly interested in defining the rules for kexec?

Yes. Agreed. I will update patch description to add this.


This patch defines the arch-specific implementation to retrieve the
secure boot mode of the system and accordingly configures the IMA policy
rules.

This patch provides arch-specific IMA policies if PPC_SECURE_BOOT
config is enabled.

Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 2 ++
arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile | 2 +-
arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/ima.h | 3 +-
4 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
index c902a39124dc..42109682b727 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
@@ -917,6 +917,8 @@ config PPC_SECURE_BOOT
bool
default n
depends on PPC64
+ depends on IMA
+ depends on IMA_ARCH_POLICY
help
Linux on POWER with firmware secure boot enabled needs to define
security policies to extend secure boot to the OS.This config
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile
index d310ebb4e526..520b1c814197 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ endif
obj-$(CONFIG_EPAPR_PARAVIRT) += epapr_paravirt.o epapr_hcalls.o
obj-$(CONFIG_KVM_GUEST) += kvm.o kvm_emul.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT) += secboot.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT) += secboot.o ima_arch.o
# Disable GCOV, KCOV & sanitizers in odd or sensitive code
GCOV_PROFILE_prom_init.o := n
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ac90fac83338
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation
+ * Author: Nayna Jain <nayna@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
+ *
+ * ima_arch.c
+ * - initialize ima policies for PowerPC Secure Boot
+ */
+
+#include <linux/ima.h>
+#include <asm/secboot.h>
+
+bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void)
+{
+ return get_powerpc_secureboot();
+}
+
+/*
+ * File signature verification is not needed, include only measurements
+ */
+static const char *const default_arch_rules[] = {
+ "measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK",
+ "measure func=MODULE_CHECK",
+ NULL
+};
The rules above seem fairly self explanatory.

+
+/* Both file signature verification and measurements are needed */
+static const char *const sb_arch_rules[] = {
+ "measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK template=ima-modsig",
+ "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig",
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG)
+ "measure func=MODULE_CHECK",
+#else
+ "measure func=MODULE_CHECK template=ima-modsig",
+ "appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig",
+#endif
But these ones are not so obvious, at least to me who knows very little
about IMA.

Can you add a one line comment to each of the ones in here saying what
it does and why we want it?

Sure.


+ NULL
+};
+
+/*
+ * On PowerPC, file measurements are to be added to the IMA measurement list
+ * irrespective of the secure boot state of the system.
Why? Just because we think it's useful? Would be good to provide some
further justification.

Sure. I will clarify this in the next version.

Thanks & Regards,
ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ - Nayna