Re: [patch 0/6] posix-cpu-timers: Fallout fixes and permission tightening

[Frederic Weisbecker]

On Thu, Sep 05, 2019 at 04:57:10PM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> On Thu, 5 Sep 2019, Frederic Weisbecker wrote:
> > On Thu, Sep 05, 2019 at 02:03:39PM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> > > Sysbot triggered an issue in the posix timer rework which was trivial to
> > > fix, but after running another test case I discovered that the rework broke
> > > the permission checks subtly. That's also a straightforward fix.
> > > 
> > > Though when staring at it I discovered that the permission checks for
> > > process clocks and process timers are completely bonkers. The only
> > > requirement is that the target PID is a group leader. Which means that any
> > > process can read the clocks and attach timers to any other process without
> > > priviledge restrictions.
> > > 
> > > That's just wrong because the clocks and timers can be used to observe
> > > behaviour and both reading the clocks and arming timers adds overhead and
> > > influences runtime performance of the target process.
> > 
> > Yeah I stumbled upon that by the past and found out the explanation behind
> > in old history: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.git/commit/kernel/posix-cpu-timers.c?id=a78331f2168ef1e67b53a0f8218c70a19f0b2a4c
> > 
> > "This makes no constraint on who can see whose per-process clocks.  This
> > information is already available for the VIRT and PROF (i.e.  utime and stime)
> > information via /proc.  I am open to suggestions on if/how security
> > constraints on who can see whose clocks should be imposed."
> > 
> > I'm all for mitigating that, let's just hope that won't break some ABIs.
> 
> Well, reading clocks is one part of the issue. Arming timers on any process
> is a different story.

Exactly!

> 
> Also /proc/$PID access can be restricted nowadays. So that posic clock
> stuff should at least have exactly the same restrictions.

Yeah definetly.

> 
> Thanks,
> 
> 	tglx
>