Re: [RFC PATCH untested] vhost: block speculation of translated descriptors

[Jason Wang]

On 2019/9/9 äå10:45, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 09, 2019 at 03:19:55PM +0800, Jason Wang wrote:
> > On 2019/9/8 äå7:05, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> > > iovec addresses coming from vhost are assumed to be
> > > pre-validated, but in fact can be speculated to a value
> > > out of range.
> > >
> > > Userspace address are later validated with array_index_nospec so we can
> > > be sure kernel info does not leak through these addresses, but vhost
> > > must also not leak userspace info outside the allowed memory table to
> > > guests.
> > >
> > > Following the defence in depth principle, make sure
> > > the address is not validated out of node range.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > > ---
> > >    drivers/vhost/vhost.c | 4 +++-
> > >    1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/drivers/vhost/vhost.c b/drivers/vhost/vhost.c
> > > index 5dc174ac8cac..0ee375fb7145 100644
> > > --- a/drivers/vhost/vhost.c
> > > +++ b/drivers/vhost/vhost.c
> > > @@ -2072,7 +2072,9 @@ static int translate_desc(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq, u64 addr, u32 len,
> > >    		size = node->size - addr + node->start;
> > >    		_iov->iov_len = min((u64)len - s, size);
> > >    		_iov->iov_base = (void __user *)(unsigned long)
> > > -			(node->userspace_addr + addr - node->start);
> > > +			(node->userspace_addr +
> > > +			 array_index_nospec(addr - node->start,
> > > +					    node->size));
> > >    		s += size;
> > >    		addr += size;
> > >    		++ret;
> >
> > I've tried this on Kaby Lake smap off metadata acceleration off using
> > testpmd (virtio-user) + vhost_net. I don't see obvious performance
> > difference with TX PPS.
> >
> > Thanks
> Should I push this to Linus right now then? It's a security thing so
> maybe we better do it ASAP ... what's your opinion?


Yes, you can.

Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@xxxxxxxxxx>



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