Hello,
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.cIf CONFIG_MODULE_SIG is enabled but module signatures aren't enforced,
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..39401b67f19e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation
+ * Author: Nayna Jain
+ */
+
+#include <linux/ima.h>
+#include <asm/secure_boot.h>
+
+bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void)
+{
+ return is_powerpc_os_secureboot_enabled();
+}
+
+/* Defines IMA appraise rules for secureboot */
+static const char *const arch_rules[] = {
+ "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig",
+#if !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG)
+ "appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig",
+#endif
+ NULL
+};
+
+/*
+ * Returns the relevant IMA arch policies based on the system secureboot state.
+ */
+const char *const *arch_get_ima_policy(void)
+{
+ if (is_powerpc_os_secureboot_enabled())
+ return arch_rules;
+
+ return NULL;
+}
then IMA won't enforce module signature either. x86's
arch_get_ima_policy() calls set_module_sig_enforced(). Doesn't the
powerpc version need to do that as well?
On the flip side, if module signatures are enforced by the module
subsystem then IMA will verify the signature a second time since there's
no sharing of signature verification results between the module
subsystem and IMA (this was observed by Mimi).
IMHO this is a minor issue, since module loading isn't a hot path and
the duplicate work shouldn't impact anything. But it could be avoided by
having a NULL entry in arch_rules, which arch_get_ima_policy() would
dynamically update with the "appraise func=MODULE_CHECK" rule if
is_module_sig_enforced() is true.