On Fri, 2019-10-04 at 11:33 -0700, Jerry Snitselaar wrote:
On Fri Oct 04 19, James Bottomley wrote:
> On Fri, 2019-10-04 at 21:22 +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Thu, Oct 03, 2019 at 04:59:37PM -0700, James Bottomley wrote:
> > > I think the principle of using multiple RNG sources for strong
> > > keys is a sound one, so could I propose a compromise: We have
> > > a tpm subsystem random number generator that, when asked for
> > > <n> random bytes first extracts <n> bytes from the TPM RNG and
> > > places it into the kernel entropy pool and then asks for <n>
> > > random bytes from the kernel RNG? That way, it will always have
> > > the entropy to satisfy the request and in the worst case, where
> > > the kernel has picked up no other entropy sources at all it
> > > will be equivalent to what we have now (single entropy source)
> > > but usually it will be a much better mixed entropy source.
> >
> > I think we should rely the existing architecture where TPM is
> > contributing to the entropy pool as hwrng.
>
> That doesn't seem to work: when I trace what happens I see us
> inject 32 bytes of entropy at boot time, but never again. I think
> the problem is the kernel entropy pool is push not pull and we have
> no triggering event in the TPM to get us to push. I suppose we
> could set a timer to do this or perhaps there is a pull hook and we
> haven't wired it up correctly?
>
> James
>
Shouldn't hwrng_fillfn be pulling from it?
It should, but the problem seems to be it only polls the "current" hw
rng ... it doesn't seem to have a concept that there may be more than
one. What happens, according to a brief reading of the code, is when
multiple are registered, it determines what the "best" one is and then
only pulls from that. What I think it should be doing is filling from
all of them using the entropy quality to adjust how many bits we get.
James