Re: [PATCH v3 2/3] kernel/ucounts: expose count of inotify watches in use

From: Albert Vaca Cintora
Date: Wed Oct 16 2019 - 14:47:38 EST


On Sat, Jun 1, 2019 at 8:20 PM Albert Vaca Cintora
<albertvaka@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On Sat, Jun 1, 2019 at 2:00 AM Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >
> > On Fri, 31 May 2019 21:50:15 +0200 Albert Vaca Cintora <albertvaka@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >
> > > Adds a readonly 'current_inotify_watches' entry to the user sysctl table.
> > > The handler for this entry is a custom function that ends up calling
> > > proc_dointvec. Said sysctl table already contains 'max_inotify_watches'
> > > and it gets mounted under /proc/sys/user/.
> > >
> > > Inotify watches are a finite resource, in a similar way to available file
> > > descriptors. The motivation for this patch is to be able to set up
> > > monitoring and alerting before an application starts failing because
> > > it runs out of inotify watches.
> > >
> > > ...
> > >
> > > --- a/kernel/ucount.c
> > > +++ b/kernel/ucount.c
> > > @@ -118,6 +118,26 @@ static void put_ucounts(struct ucounts *ucounts)
> > > kfree(ucounts);
> > > }
> > >
> > > +#ifdef CONFIG_INOTIFY_USER
> > > +int proc_read_inotify_watches(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
> > > + void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
> > > +{
> > > + struct ucounts *ucounts;
> > > + struct ctl_table fake_table;
> >
> > hmm.
> >
> > > + int count = -1;
> > > +
> > > + ucounts = get_ucounts(current_user_ns(), current_euid());
> > > + if (ucounts != NULL) {
> > > + count = atomic_read(&ucounts->ucount[UCOUNT_INOTIFY_WATCHES]);
> > > + put_ucounts(ucounts);
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + fake_table.data = &count;
> > > + fake_table.maxlen = sizeof(count);
> > > + return proc_dointvec(&fake_table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
> >
> > proc_dointvec
> > ->do_proc_dointvec
> > ->__do_proc_dointvec
> > ->proc_first_pos_non_zero_ignore
> > ->warn_sysctl_write
> > ->pr_warn_once(..., table->procname)
> >
> > and I think ->procname is uninitialized.
> >
> > That's from a cursory check. Perhaps other uninitialized members of
> > fake_table are accessed, dunno.
> >
> > we could do
> >
> > {
> > struct ctl_table fake_table = {
> > .data = &count,
> > .maxlen = sizeof(count),
> > };
> >
> > return proc_dointvec(&fake_table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
> > }
> >
> > or whatever. That will cause the pr_warn_once to print "(null)" but
> > that's OK I guess.
> >
> > Are there other places in the kernel which do this temp ctl_table
> > trick? If so, what do they do? If not, what is special about this
> > code?
> >
> >
>
> I copied this 'fake_table' trick from proc_do_entropy in
> drivers/char/random.c exactly as it is. It is also used in other
> places with slight variations.
>
> Note that, since we are creating a read-only proc file,
> proc_first_pos_non_zero_ignore is not called from __do_proc_dointvec,
> so the uninitialized ->procname is not accessed.
>

Friendly ping. I think the code is correct as it is for the reasons
explained above.

Best regards,
Albert