Re: [PATCH v2 05/12] arm64: Basic Branch Target Identification support

[Dave Martin]

On Fri, Oct 18, 2019 at 12:05:52PM +0100, Mark Rutland wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 11, 2019 at 05:42:00PM +0100, Dave Martin wrote:
> > On Fri, Oct 11, 2019 at 05:01:13PM +0100, Dave Martin wrote:
> > > On Fri, Oct 11, 2019 at 04:44:45PM +0100, Dave Martin wrote:
> > > > On Fri, Oct 11, 2019 at 04:40:43PM +0100, Mark Rutland wrote:
> > > > > On Fri, Oct 11, 2019 at 04:32:26PM +0100, Dave Martin wrote:

[...]

> > > > > > Either way, I feel we should do this: any function in a PROT_BTI page
> > > > > > should have a suitable landing pad.  There's no reason I can see why
> > > > > > a protection given to any other callback function should be omitted
> > > > > > for a signal handler.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > Note, if the signal handler isn't in a PROT_BTI page then overriding
> > > > > > BTYPE here will not trigger a Branch Target exception.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > I'm happy to drop a brief comment into the code also, once we're
> > > > > > agreed on what the code should be doing.
> > > > > 
> > > > > So long as there's a comment as to why, I have no strong feelings here.
> > > > > :)
> > > > 
> > > > OK, I think it's worth a brief comment in the code either way, so I'll
> > > > add something.
> > > 
> > > Hmm, come to think of it we do need special logic for a particular case
> > > here:
> > > 
> > > If we are delivering a SIGILL here and the SIGILL handler was registered
> > > with SA_NODEFER then we will get into a spin, repeatedly delivering
> > > the BTI-triggered SIGILL to the same (bad) entry point.
> > > 
> > > Without SA_NODEFER, the SIGILL becomes fatal, which is the desired
> > > behaviour, but we'll need to catch this recursion explicitly.
> > > 
> > > 
> > > It's similar to the special force_sigsegv() case in
> > > linux/kernel/signal.c...
> > > 
> > > Thoughts?
> > 
> > On second thought, maybe we don't need to do anything special.
> > 
> > A SIGSEGV handler registered with (SA_NODEFER & ~SA_RESETHAND) and that
> > dereferences a duff address would spin similarly.
> > 
> > This SIGILL case doesn't really seem different.  Either way it's a
> > livelock of the user task that doesn't compromise the kernel.  There
> > are plenty of ways for such a livelock to happen.
> 
> That sounds reasonable to me.

OK, I guess we can park this discussion for now.

Cheers
---Dave