Re: [PATCH] ARM: hw_breakpoint: Handle inexact watchpoint addresses

From: Matthias Kaehlcke
Date: Mon Oct 21 2019 - 14:47:07 EST


On Sat, Oct 19, 2019 at 11:12:26AM -0700, Douglas Anderson wrote:
> This is commit fdfeff0f9e3d ("arm64: hw_breakpoint: Handle inexact
> watchpoint addresses") but ported to arm32, which has the same
> problem.
>
> This problem was found by Android CTS tests, notably the
> "watchpoint_imprecise" test [1]. I tested locally against a copycat
> (simplified) version of the test though.
>
> [1] https://android.googlesource.com/platform/bionic/+/master/tests/sys_ptrace_test.cpp
>
> Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
>
> arch/arm/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c | 96 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
> 1 file changed, 70 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c b/arch/arm/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c
> index b0c195e3a06d..d394878409db 100644
> --- a/arch/arm/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c
> +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c
> @@ -680,26 +680,62 @@ static void disable_single_step(struct perf_event *bp)
> arch_install_hw_breakpoint(bp);
> }
>
> +/*
> + * Arm32 hardware does not always report a watchpoint hit address that matches
> + * one of the watchpoints set. It can also report an address "near" the
> + * watchpoint if a single instruction access both watched and unwatched
> + * addresses. There is no straight-forward way, short of disassembling the
> + * offending instruction, to map that address back to the watchpoint. This
> + * function computes the distance of the memory access from the watchpoint as a
> + * heuristic for the likelyhood that a given access triggered the watchpoint.
> + *
> + * See this same function in the arm64 platform code, which has the same
> + * problem.
> + *
> + * The function returns the distance of the address from the bytes watched by
> + * the watchpoint. In case of an exact match, it returns 0.
> + */
> +static u32 get_distance_from_watchpoint(unsigned long addr, u32 val,
> + struct arch_hw_breakpoint_ctrl *ctrl)
> +{
> + u32 wp_low, wp_high;
> + u32 lens, lene;
> +
> + lens = __ffs(ctrl->len);

Doesn't this always end up with 'lens == 0'? IIUC ctrl->len can have
the values ARM_BREAKPOINT_LEN_{1,2,4,8}:

#define ARM_BREAKPOINT_LEN_1 0x1
#define ARM_BREAKPOINT_LEN_2 0x3
#define ARM_BREAKPOINT_LEN_4 0xf
#define ARM_BREAKPOINT_LEN_8 0xff

> + lene = __fls(ctrl->len);
> +
> + wp_low = val + lens;
> + wp_high = val + lene;

First I thought these values are off by one, but in difference to
ffs() from glibc the kernel functions start with index 0, instead
of using zero as 'no bit set'.

> + if (addr < wp_low)
> + return wp_low - addr;
> + else if (addr > wp_high)
> + return addr - wp_high;
> + else
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> static void watchpoint_handler(unsigned long addr, unsigned int fsr,
> struct pt_regs *regs)
> {
> - int i, access;
> - u32 val, ctrl_reg, alignment_mask;
> + int i, access, closest_match = 0;
> + u32 min_dist = -1, dist;
> + u32 val, ctrl_reg;
> struct perf_event *wp, **slots;
> struct arch_hw_breakpoint *info;
> struct arch_hw_breakpoint_ctrl ctrl;
>
> slots = this_cpu_ptr(wp_on_reg);
>
> + /*
> + * Find all watchpoints that match the reported address. If no exact
> + * match is found. Attribute the hit to the closest watchpoint.
> + */
> + rcu_read_lock();
> for (i = 0; i < core_num_wrps; ++i) {
> - rcu_read_lock();
> -
> wp = slots[i];
> -
> if (wp == NULL)
> - goto unlock;
> + continue;
>
> - info = counter_arch_bp(wp);
> /*
> * The DFAR is an unknown value on debug architectures prior
> * to 7.1. Since we only allow a single watchpoint on these
> @@ -708,33 +744,31 @@ static void watchpoint_handler(unsigned long addr, unsigned int fsr,
> */
> if (debug_arch < ARM_DEBUG_ARCH_V7_1) {
> BUG_ON(i > 0);
> + info = counter_arch_bp(wp);
> info->trigger = wp->attr.bp_addr;
> } else {
> - if (info->ctrl.len == ARM_BREAKPOINT_LEN_8)
> - alignment_mask = 0x7;
> - else
> - alignment_mask = 0x3;
> -
> - /* Check if the watchpoint value matches. */
> - val = read_wb_reg(ARM_BASE_WVR + i);
> - if (val != (addr & ~alignment_mask))
> - goto unlock;
> -
> - /* Possible match, check the byte address select. */
> - ctrl_reg = read_wb_reg(ARM_BASE_WCR + i);
> - decode_ctrl_reg(ctrl_reg, &ctrl);
> - if (!((1 << (addr & alignment_mask)) & ctrl.len))
> - goto unlock;
> -
> /* Check that the access type matches. */
> if (debug_exception_updates_fsr()) {
> access = (fsr & ARM_FSR_ACCESS_MASK) ?
> HW_BREAKPOINT_W : HW_BREAKPOINT_R;
> if (!(access & hw_breakpoint_type(wp)))
> - goto unlock;
> + continue;
> }
>
> + val = read_wb_reg(ARM_BASE_WVR + i);
> + ctrl_reg = read_wb_reg(ARM_BASE_WCR + i);
> + decode_ctrl_reg(ctrl_reg, &ctrl);
> + dist = get_distance_from_watchpoint(addr, val, &ctrl);
> + if (dist < min_dist) {
> + min_dist = dist;
> + closest_match = i;
> + }
> + /* Is this an exact match? */
> + if (dist != 0)
> + continue;
> +
> /* We have a winner. */
> + info = counter_arch_bp(wp);
> info->trigger = addr;

Unless we care about using the 'last' watchpoint in case multiple WPs have
the same address I think it would be clearer to change the above to:

if (dist == 0) {
/* We have a winner. */
info = counter_arch_bp(wp);
info->trigger = addr;
break;
}

> }
>
> @@ -748,10 +782,20 @@ static void watchpoint_handler(unsigned long addr, unsigned int fsr,
> */
> if (is_default_overflow_handler(wp))
> enable_single_step(wp, instruction_pointer(regs));
> + }
>
> -unlock:
> - rcu_read_unlock();
> + if (min_dist > 0 && min_dist != -1) {
> + /* No exact match found. */
> + wp = slots[closest_match];
> + info = counter_arch_bp(wp);
> + info->trigger = addr;
> + pr_debug("watchpoint fired: address = 0x%x\n", info->trigger);
> + perf_bp_event(wp, regs);
> + if (is_default_overflow_handler(wp))
> + enable_single_step(wp, instruction_pointer(regs));
> }
> +
> + rcu_read_unlock();
> }
>
> static void watchpoint_single_step_handler(unsigned long pc)
> --
> 2.23.0.866.gb869b98d4c-goog
>