Re: [PATCH] x86/speculation: Fix incorrect MDS/TAA mitigation status

[Thomas Gleixner]

On Thu, 14 Nov 2019, Waiman Long wrote:
> On 11/14/19 3:12 PM, Pawan Gupta wrote:
> > On Wed, Nov 13, 2019 at 02:33:50PM -0500, Waiman Long wrote:

Folks, please trim your replies ....

> >> +	/*
> >> +	 * Update MDS mitigation, if necessary, as the mds_user_clear is
> >> +	 * now enabled for TAA mitigation.
> >> +	 */
> >> +	if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF &&
> >> +	    boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS)) {
> >> +		mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
> >> +		mds_select_mitigation();
> > This will cause a confusing print in dmesg from previous and this call
> > to mds_select_mitigation().
> >
> > 	"MDS: Vulnerable"
> > 	"MDS: Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers"
>
> Yes, that is the side effect of this patch. It is the last message that
> is relevant. We saw this kind of messages all the time with early
> loading of microcode. A message showing a hardware vulnerability as
> vulnerable and then another message showing it as mitigated after the
> loading of microcode.
> >
> > Maybe delay MDS mitigation print till TAA is evaluated.
> 
> I will see what can be done about that. However, this is not a critical
> issue and I may not change it if there is no easy solution.

Right. There is nothing wrong with these two messages coming after each
other. They are both correct and due to the ordering they also make sense.

> > 	"MDS: Vulnerable"
> > 	"MDS: Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers"

CPU is vulnerable and then the next printk tells that mitigation is in
effect. So really nothing to worry about.

The important part is that the ordering of these messages is correct which
is the case and that the sysfs file corresponds with the last printk.

We really have more urgent problems than bikeshed painting these printks.

Thanks,

	tglx