Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/speculation: Fix incorrect MDS/TAA mitigation status

[Waiman Long]

On 11/15/19 3:21 PM, Boris Petkov wrote:
> On November 15, 2019 8:35:54 PM GMT+01:00, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> See the last sentence of the paragraph you replied to :)
> Proves even more that this should be documented in *all* places that talk about TAA cmdline options and we should not rely on references but write stuff out everywhere so that people can see it directly.
>
>> But serioulsy, yes we should mention the interaction in
>> kernel-parameters.txt as well. Something like:
>>
>> 	off        - Unconditionally disable MDS mitigation.
>> +		     On TAA affected machines, mds=off can be prevented
>> +		     by an active TAA mitigation as both vulnerabilities
>> +		     are mitigated with the same mechanism.
>>
>> and the other way round for TAA.
> Ack.
>
Sorry for late reply as I am out on Friday afternoon. On hindsight, I
should have added relevant description to kernel-parameters.txt as it is
the mostly read kernel document.

Acked-by: Waiman Long <longman@xxxxxxxxxx>

Thanks,
Longman