Re: [PATCH =v2 3/3] tpm: selftest: cleanup after unseal with wrong auth/policy test
From: James Bottomley
Date: Thu Dec 12 2019 - 15:54:50 EST
On Thu, 2019-12-12 at 12:49 -0800, Tadeusz Struk wrote:
> On 12/12/19 11:51 AM, James Bottomley wrote:
> > TPM2_Clear reprovisions the SPS ... that would make all currently
> > exported TPM keys go invalid. I know these tests should be
> > connected to a vTPM, so doing this should be safe, but if this
> > accidentally got executed on your laptop all TPM relying functions
> > would be disrupted, which doesn't seem to be the best thing to hard
> > wire into a test.
> That is true, but it will need to be executed as root, and root
> should know what she/he is doing ;)
Not in the modern kernel resource manager world: anyone who is in the
tpm group can access the tpmrm device and we haven't added a dangerous
command filter like we promised we would, so unless they have actually
set lockout or platform authorization, they'll find they can execute it
> > What about doing a TPM2_DictionaryAttackLockReset instead, which is
> > the least invasive route to fixing the problem ... provided you
> > know what the lockout authorization is.
> I can change tpm2_clear to tpm2_dictionarylockout -c if we want to
> make it foolproof. In this case we can assume that the lockout auth
> is empty.
Well, if it isn't TPM2_Clear would refuse to execute as well since that
requires either lockout auth or platform + physical presence.