[PATCH 4.14 54/91] userfaultfd: require CAP_SYS_PTRACE for UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_FORK

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>

[ Upstream commit 3c1c24d91ffd536de0a64688a9df7f49e58fadbc ]

A while ago Andy noticed
(http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CALCETrWY+5ynDct7eU_nDUqx=okQvjm=Y5wJvA4ahBja=CQXGw@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx)
that UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_FORK used by an unprivileged user may have
security implications.

As the first step of the solution the following patch limits the availably
of UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_FORK only for those having CAP_SYS_PTRACE.

The usage of CAP_SYS_PTRACE ensures compatibility with CRIU.

Yet, if there are other users of non-cooperative userfaultfd that run
without CAP_SYS_PTRACE, they would be broken :(

Current implementation of UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_FORK modifies the file
descriptor table from the read() implementation of uffd, which may have
security implications for unprivileged use of the userfaultfd.

Limit availability of UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_FORK only for callers that have
CAP_SYS_PTRACE.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1572967777-8812-2-git-send-email-rppt@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Daniel Colascione <dancol@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Lokesh Gidra <lokeshgidra@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Nick Kralevich <nnk@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Nosh Minwalla <nosh@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <ovzxemul@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Tim Murray <timmurray@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
 fs/userfaultfd.c | 18 +++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/userfaultfd.c b/fs/userfaultfd.c
index a609d480606d..e2b2196fd942 100644
--- a/fs/userfaultfd.c
+++ b/fs/userfaultfd.c
@@ -1807,13 +1807,12 @@ static int userfaultfd_api(struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx,
 	if (copy_from_user(&uffdio_api, buf, sizeof(uffdio_api)))
 		goto out;
 	features = uffdio_api.features;
-	if (uffdio_api.api != UFFD_API || (features & ~UFFD_API_FEATURES)) {
-		memset(&uffdio_api, 0, sizeof(uffdio_api));
-		if (copy_to_user(buf, &uffdio_api, sizeof(uffdio_api)))
-			goto out;
-		ret = -EINVAL;
-		goto out;
-	}
+	ret = -EINVAL;
+	if (uffdio_api.api != UFFD_API || (features & ~UFFD_API_FEATURES))
+		goto err_out;
+	ret = -EPERM;
+	if ((features & UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_FORK) && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+		goto err_out;
 	/* report all available features and ioctls to userland */
 	uffdio_api.features = UFFD_API_FEATURES;
 	uffdio_api.ioctls = UFFD_API_IOCTLS;
@@ -1826,6 +1825,11 @@ static int userfaultfd_api(struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx,
 	ret = 0;
 out:
 	return ret;
+err_out:
+	memset(&uffdio_api, 0, sizeof(uffdio_api));
+	if (copy_to_user(buf, &uffdio_api, sizeof(uffdio_api)))
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+	goto out;
 }
 
 static long userfaultfd_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned cmd,
-- 
2.20.1