On Sat, Dec 21, 2019 at 02:13:25PM +0000, Marc Zyngier wrote:
On Fri, 20 Dec 2019 14:30:16 +0000
Andrew Murray <andrew.murray@xxxxxxx> wrote:
[somehow managed not to do a reply all, re-sending]
> From: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@xxxxxxx>
>
> Now that we can save/restore the full SPE controls, we can enable it
> if SPE is setup and ready to use in KVM. It's supported in KVM only if
> all the CPUs in the system supports SPE.
>
> However to support heterogenous systems, we need to move the check if
> host supports SPE and do a partial save/restore.
No. Let's just not go down that path. For now, KVM on heterogeneous
systems do not get SPE.
At present these patches only offer the SPE feature to VCPU's where the
sanitised AA64DFR0 register indicates that all CPUs have this support
(kvm_arm_support_spe_v1) at the time of setting the attribute
(KVM_SET_DEVICE_ATTR).
Therefore if a new CPU comes online without SPE support, and an
existing VCPU is scheduled onto it, then bad things happen - which I guess
must have been the intention behind this patch.
If SPE has been enabled on a guest and a CPU
comes up without SPE, this CPU should fail to boot (same as exposing a
feature to userspace).
I'm unclear as how to prevent this. We can set the FTR_STRICT flag on
the sanitised register - thus tainting the kernel if such a non-SPE CPU
comes online - thought that doesn't prevent KVM from blowing up. Though
I don't believe we can prevent a CPU coming up. At the moment this is
my preferred approach.
Looking at the vcpu_load and related code, I don't see a way of saying
'don't schedule this VCPU on this CPU' or bailing in any way.
One solution could be to allow scheduling onto non-SPE VCPUs but wrap the
SPE save/restore code in a macro (much like kvm_arm_spe_v1_ready) that
reads the non-sanitised feature register. Therefore we don't go bang, but
we also increase the size of any black-holes in SPE capturing. Though this
feels like something that will cause grief down the line.
Is there something else that can be done?