Re: [PATCH bpf-next v1 00/13] MAC and Audit policy using eBPF (KRSI)

[Stephen Smalley]

On 1/14/20 9:48 PM, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 14, 2020 at 12:42:22PM -0500, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> > On 1/14/20 11:54 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> > > On 1/10/20 12:53 PM, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> > > > On Fri, Jan 10, 2020 at 04:27:58PM +0100, KP Singh wrote:
> > > > > On 09-Jan 14:47, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> > > > > > On 1/9/20 2:43 PM, KP Singh wrote:
> > > > > > > On 10-Jan 06:07, James Morris wrote:
> > > > > > > > On Thu, 9 Jan 2020, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > On 1/9/20 1:11 PM, James Morris wrote:
> > > > > > > > > > On Wed, 8 Jan 2020, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > The cover letter subject line and the
> > > > > > > > > > > Kconfig help text refer to it as a
> > > > > > > > > > > BPF-based "MAC and Audit policy". It
> > > > > > > > > > > has an enforce config option that
> > > > > > > > > > > enables the bpf programs to deny access,
> > > > > > > > > > > providing access control. IIRC,
> > > > > > > > > > > in
> > > > > > > > > > > the earlier discussion threads, the BPF
> > > > > > > > > > > maintainers suggested that Smack
> > > > > > > > > > > and
> > > > > > > > > > > other LSMs could be entirely
> > > > > > > > > > > re-implemented via it in the future, and
> > > > > > > > > > > that
> > > > > > > > > > > such an implementation would be more optimal.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > In this case, the eBPF code is similar to a
> > > > > > > > > > kernel module, rather than a
> > > > > > > > > > loadable policy file. It's a loadable
> > > > > > > > > > mechanism, rather than a policy, in
> > > > > > > > > > my view.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > I thought you frowned on dynamically loadable
> > > > > > > > > LSMs for both security and
> > > > > > > > > correctness reasons?
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Based on the feedback from the lists we've updated the design for v2.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > In v2, LSM hook callbacks are allocated dynamically using BPF
> > > > > > > trampolines, appended to a separate security_hook_heads and run
> > > > > > > only after the statically allocated hooks.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > The security_hook_heads for all the other LSMs (SELinux, AppArmor etc)
> > > > > > > still remains __lsm_ro_after_init and cannot be modified. We are still
> > > > > > > working on v2 (not ready for review yet) but the general idea can be
> > > > > > > seen here:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >       https://github.com/sinkap/linux-krsi/blob/patch/v1/trampoline_prototype/security/bpf/lsm.c
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Evaluating the security impact of this is the next
> > > > > > > > step. My understanding
> > > > > > > > is that eBPF via BTF is constrained to read only access to hook
> > > > > > > > parameters, and that its behavior would be entirely restrictive.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > I'd like to understand the security impact more
> > > > > > > > fully, though.  Can the
> > > > > > > > eBPF code make arbitrary writes to the kernel, or
> > > > > > > > read anything other than
> > > > > > > > the correctly bounded LSM hook parameters?
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > As mentioned, the BPF verifier does not allow writes to BTF types.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > And a traditional security module would necessarily fall
> > > > > > > > > under GPL; is the eBPF code required to be
> > > > > > > > > likewise? If not, KRSI is a
> > > > > > > > > gateway for proprietary LSMs...
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Right, we do not want this to be a GPL bypass.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > This is not intended to be a GPL bypass and the BPF verifier checks
> > > > > > > for license compatibility of the loaded program with GPL.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > IIUC, it checks that the program is GPL compatible if it
> > > > > > uses a function
> > > > > > marked GPL-only. But what specifically is marked GPL-only
> > > > > > that is required
> > > > > > for eBPF programs using KRSI?
> > > > >
> > > > > Good point! If no-one objects, I can add it to the BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM
> > > > > specific verification for the v2 of the patch-set which would require
> > > > > all BPF-LSM programs to be GPL.
> > > >
> > > > I don't think it's a good idea to enforce license on the program.
> > > > The kernel doesn't do it for modules.
> > > > For years all of BPF tracing progs were GPL because they have to use
> > > > GPL-ed helpers to do anything meaningful.
> > > > So for KRSI just make sure that all helpers are GPL-ed as well.
> > >
> > > IIUC, the example eBPF code included in this patch series showed a
> > > program that used a GPL-only helper for the purpose of reporting event
> > > output to userspace. But it could have just as easily omitted the use of
> > > that helper and still implemented its own arbitrary access control model
> > > on the LSM hooks to which it attached. It seems like the question is
> > > whether the kernel developers are ok with exposing the entire LSM hook
> > > interface and all the associated data structures to non-GPLd code,
> > > irrespective of what helpers it may or may not use.
> >
> > Also, to be clear, while kernel modules aren't necessarily GPL, prior to
> > this patch series, all Linux security modules were necessarily GPLd in order
> > to use the LSM interface.
>
> Because they use securityfs_create_file() GPL-ed api, right?
> but not because module license is enforced.

No, securityfs was a later addition and is not required by all LSMs 
either.  Originally LSMs had to register their hooks via 
register_security(), which was intentionally EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL() to 
avoid exposing the LSM interface to non-GPLd modules because there were 
significant concerns with doing so when LSM was first merged.  Then in 
20510f2f4e2dabb0ff6c13901807627ec9452f98 ("security: Convert LSM into a 
static interface"), the ability for loadable modules to use 
register_security() at all was removed, limiting its use to built-in 
modules.  In commit b1d9e6b0646d0e5ee5d9050bd236b6c65d66faef ("LSM: 
Switch to lists of hooks"), register_security() was replaced by 
security_add_hooks(), but this was likewise not exported for use by 
modules and could only be used by built-in code.  The bpf LSM is 
providing a shim that allows eBPF code to attach to these hooks that 
would otherwise not be exposed to non-GPLd code, so if the bpf LSM does 
not require the eBPF programs to also be GPLd, then that is a change 
from current practice.

> > So allowing non-GPL eBPF-based LSMs would be a
> > change.
>
> I don't see it this way. seccomp progs technically unlicensed. Yet they can
> disallow any syscall. Primitive KRSI progs like
> int bpf-prog(void*) { return REJECT; }
> would be able to do selectively disable a syscall with an overhead acceptable
> in production systems (unlike seccomp). I want this use case to be available to
> people. It's a bait, because to do real progs people would need to GPL them.
> Key helpers bpf_perf_event_output, bpf_ktime_get_ns, bpf_trace_printk are all
> GPL-ed. It may look that most networking helpers are not-GPL, but real life is
> different. To debug programs bpf_trace_printk() is necessary. To have
> communication with user space bpf_perf_event_output() is necssary. To measure
> anything or implement timestamps bpf_ktime_get_ns() is necessary. So today all
> meaninful bpf programs are GPL. Those that are not GPL probably exist, but
> they're toy programs. Hence I have zero concerns about GPL bypass coming from
> tracing, networking, and, in the future, KRSI progs too.

You have more confidence than I do about that.  I would anticipate 
developers of out-of-tree LSMs latching onto this bpf LSM and using it 
to avoid GPL.  I don't see that any of those helpers are truly needed to 
implement an access control model.