[PATCH 4.19 32/92] Documentation: Document arm64 kpti control

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@xxxxxxx>

commit de19055564c8f8f9d366f8db3395836da0b2176c upstream.

For a while Arm64 has been capable of force enabling
or disabling the kpti mitigations. Lets make sure the
documentation reflects that.

Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@xxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@xxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@xxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt |    6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -1946,6 +1946,12 @@
 			Built with CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK_DEFAULT_OFF=y,
 			the default is off.
 
+	kpti=		[ARM64] Control page table isolation of user
+			and kernel address spaces.
+			Default: enabled on cores which need mitigation.
+			0: force disabled
+			1: force enabled
+
 	kvm.ignore_msrs=[KVM] Ignore guest accesses to unhandled MSRs.
 			Default is 0 (don't ignore, but inject #GP)