Re: [PATCH 2/2] KVM: VMX: Extend VMX's #AC handding

[Sean Christopherson]

On Sat, Feb 01, 2020 at 01:47:10AM +0800, Xiaoyao Li wrote:
> On 1/31/2020 11:37 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> >
> >>On Jan 30, 2020, at 11:22 PM, Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >>
> >> On 1/31/2020 1:16 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:

...

> >>>Can we get a credible description of how this would work? I suggest: Intel
> >>>adds and documents a new CPUID bit or core capability bit that means
> >>>âsplit lock detection is forced onâ.  If this bit is set, the MSR bit
> >>>controlling split lock detection is still writable, but split lock
> >>>detection is on regardless of the value.  Operating systems are expected
> >>>to set the bit to 1 to indicate to a hypervisor, if present, that they
> >>>understand that split lock detection is on.  This would be an SDM-only
> >>>change, but it would also be a commitment to certain behavior for future
> >>>CPUs that donât implement split locks.
> >>
> >>It sounds a PV solution for virtualization that it doesn't need to be
> >>defined in Intel-SDM but in KVM document.
> >>
> >>As you suggested, we can define new bit in KVM_CPUID_FEATURES (0x40000001)
> >>as KVM_FEATURE_SLD_FORCED and reuse MSR_TEST_CTL or use a new virtualized
> >>MSR for guest to tell hypervisor it understand split lock detection is
> >>forced on.
> >
> >Of course KVM can do this. But this missed the point. Intel added a new CPU
> >feature, complete with an enumeration mechanism, that cannot be correctly
> >used if a hypervisor is present.
> 
> Why it cannot be correctly used if a hypervisor is present? Because it needs
> to disable split lock detection when running a vcpu for guest as this patch
> wants to do?

Because SMT.  Unless vCPUs are pinned 1:1 with pCPUs, and the guest is
given an accurate topology, disabling/enabling split-lock #AC may (or may
not) also disable/enable split-lock #AC on a random vCPU in the guest.

> >As it stands, without specific hypervisor and guest support of a non-Intel
> >interface, it is *impossible* to give architecturally correct behavior to a
> >guest. If KVM implements your suggestion, *Windows* guests will still
> >malfunction on Linux.
> 
> Actually, KVM don't need to implement my suggestion. It can just virtualize
> and expose this feature (MSR_IA32_CORE_CAPABILITIES and MSR_TEST_CTRL) to
> guest, (but it may have some requirement that HT is disabled and host is
> sld_off) then guest can use it architecturally.

This is essentially what I proposed a while back.  KVM would allow enabling
split-lock #AC in the guest if and only if SMT is disabled or the enable bit
is per-thread, *or* the host is in "warn" mode (can live with split-lock #AC
being randomly disabled/enabled) and userspace has communicated to KVM that
it is pinning vCPUs.