Re: [Bluez PATCH v3] bluetooth: secure bluetooth stack from bluedump attack

[Marcel Holtmann]

Hi Howard,

> Attack scenario:
> 1. A Chromebook (let's call this device A) is paired to a legitimate
>   Bluetooth classic device (e.g. a speaker) (let's call this device
>   B).
> 2. A malicious device (let's call this device C) pretends to be the
>   Bluetooth speaker by using the same BT address.
> 3. If device A is not currently connected to device B, device A will
>   be ready to accept connection from device B in the background
>   (technically, doing Page Scan).
> 4. Therefore, device C can initiate connection to device A
>   (because device A is doing Page Scan) and device A will accept the
>   connection because device A trusts device C's address which is the
>   same as device B's address.
> 5. Device C won't be able to communicate at any high level Bluetooth
>   profile with device A because device A enforces that device C is
>   encrypted with their common Link Key, which device C doesn't have.
>   But device C can initiate pairing with device A with just-works
>   model without requiring user interaction (there is only pairing
>   notification). After pairing, device A now trusts device C with a
>   new different link key, common between device A and C.
> 6. From now on, device A trusts device C, so device C can at anytime
>   connect to device A to do any kind of high-level hijacking, e.g.
>   speaker hijack or mouse/keyboard hijack.
> 
> Since we don't know whether the repairing is legitimate or not,
> leave the decision to user space if all the conditions below are met.
> - the pairing is initialized by peer
> - the authorization method is just-work
> - host already had the link key to the peer
> 
> Signed-off-by: Howard Chung <howardchung@xxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> 
> Changes in v3:
> - Change confirm_hint from 2 to 1
> - Fix coding style (declaration order)
> 
> Changes in v2:
> - Remove the HCI_PERMIT_JUST_WORK_REPAIR debugfs option
> - Fix the added code in classic
> - Add a similar fix for LE
> 
> net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 10 ++++++++++
> net/bluetooth/smp.c       | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
> index 2c833dae9366..e6982f4f51ea 100644
> --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
> +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
> @@ -4571,6 +4571,16 @@ static void hci_user_confirm_request_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev,
> 			goto confirm;
> 		}
> 
> +		/* If there already exists link key in local host, leave the
> +		 * decision to user space since the remote device could be
> +		 * legitimate or malicious.
> +		 */
> +		if (hci_find_link_key(hdev, &ev->bdaddr)) {
> +			bt_dev_warn(hdev, "Local host already has link key");
> +			confirm_hint = 1;
> +			goto confirm;
> +		}
> +
> 		BT_DBG("Auto-accept of user confirmation with %ums delay",
> 		       hdev->auto_accept_delay);
> 
> diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
> index 2cba6e07c02b..1483ceea3bab 100644
> --- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
> +++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
> @@ -2139,6 +2139,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
> 	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
> 	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
> 	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
> +	struct smp_ltk *key;
> 	u8 *pkax, *pkbx, *na, *nb;
> 	u32 passkey;
> 	int err;
> @@ -2192,6 +2193,23 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
> 		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
> 			     smp->prnd);
> 		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
> +
> +		key = hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
> +				   hcon->role);
> +
> +		/* If there already exists link key in local host, leave the
> +		 * decision to user space since the remote device could be
> +		 * legitimate or malicious.
> +		 */
> +		if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS && key) {
> +			err = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
> +							hcon->type,
> +							hcon->dst_type, passkey,
> +							1);
> +			if (err)
> +				return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
> +			set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
> +		}
> 	}

while this looks good, I like to optimize this to only look up the LTK when needed.

	/* comment here */
	if (smp->method != JUST_WORKS)
		goto mackey_and_ltk;


	/* and command here */
	if (hci_find_ltk()) {
		mgmt_user_confirm_request()
		..
	}

And my preference that we also get an Ack from Johan or Luiz that double checked that this is fine.

Regards

Marcel