Re: [PATCH 5/5] virtio: Add bounce DMA ops

From: Lu Baolu
Date: Wed Apr 29 2020 - 03:01:22 EST


On 2020/4/29 14:50, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
On Wed, Apr 29, 2020 at 01:42:13PM +0800, Lu Baolu wrote:
On 2020/4/29 12:57, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
On Wed, Apr 29, 2020 at 10:22:32AM +0800, Lu Baolu wrote:
On 2020/4/29 4:41, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
On Tue, Apr 28, 2020 at 11:19:52PM +0530, Srivatsa Vaddagiri wrote:
* Michael S. Tsirkin<mst@xxxxxxxxxx> [2020-04-28 12:17:57]:

Okay, but how is all this virtio specific? For example, why not allow
separate swiotlbs for any type of device?
For example, this might make sense if a given device is from a
different, less trusted vendor.
Is swiotlb commonly used for multiple devices that may be on different trust
boundaries (and not behind a hardware iommu)?
Even a hardware iommu does not imply a 100% security from malicious
hardware. First lots of people use iommu=pt for performance reasons.
Second even without pt, unmaps are often batched, and sub-page buffers
might be used for DMA, so we are not 100% protected at all times.

For untrusted devices, IOMMU is forced on even iommu=pt is used;
I think you are talking about untrusted*drivers* like with VFIO.
No. I am talking about untrusted devices like thunderbolt peripherals.
We always trust drivers hosted in kernel and the DMA APIs are designed
for them, right?

Please refer to this series.

https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/9/6/39

Best regards,
baolu
Oh, thanks for that! I didn't realize Linux is doing this.

So it seems that with modern Linux, all one needs
to do on x86 is mark the device as untrusted.
It's already possible to do this with ACPI and with OF - would that be
sufficient for achieving what this patchset is trying to do?

Yes.


Adding more ways to mark a device as untrusted, and adding
support for more platforms to use bounce buffers
sounds like a reasonable thing to do.


Agreed.

Best regards,
baolu