Re: [PATCH v7 01/18] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV SEND_START command

From: Venu Busireddy
Date: Mon May 04 2020 - 19:11:25 EST

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On 2020-05-04 22:36:37 +0000, Ashish Kalra wrote:
> On Mon, May 04, 2020 at 04:07:17PM -0500, Venu Busireddy wrote:
> > On 2020-04-30 08:40:34 +0000, Ashish Kalra wrote:
> > > From: Brijesh Singh <Brijesh.Singh@xxxxxxx>
> > >
> > > The command is used to create an outgoing SEV guest encryption context.
> > >
> > > Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > > Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > > Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@xxxxxxxxx>
> > > Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > > Cc: "Radim KrÄmÃÅ" <rkrcmar@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > > Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > > Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
> > > Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
> > > Cc: x86@xxxxxxxxxx
> > > Cc: kvm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > > Cc: linux-kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > > Reviewed-by: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > > Reviewed-by: Venu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > > Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
> > > Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@xxxxxxx>
> > > ---
> > > .../virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst | 27 ++++
> > > arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 125 ++++++++++++++++++
> > > include/linux/psp-sev.h | 8 +-
> > > include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 12 ++
> > > 4 files changed, 168 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
> > > index c3129b9ba5cb..4fd34fc5c7a7 100644
> > > --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
> > > +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
> > > @@ -263,6 +263,33 @@ Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
> > > __u32 trans_len;
> > > };
> > >
> > > +10. KVM_SEV_SEND_START
> > > +----------------------
> > > +
> > > +The KVM_SEV_SEND_START command can be used by the hypervisor to create an
> > > +outgoing guest encryption context.
> > > +
> > > +Parameters (in): struct kvm_sev_send_start
> > > +
> > > +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
> > > +
> > > +::
> > > + struct kvm_sev_send_start {
> > > + __u32 policy; /* guest policy */
> > > +
> > > + __u64 pdh_cert_uaddr; /* platform Diffie-Hellman certificate */
> > > + __u32 pdh_cert_len;
> > > +
> > > + __u64 plat_certs_uadr; /* platform certificate chain */
> >
> > Can this be changed as mentioned in the previous review
> > (https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flore.kernel.org%2Fkvm%2F20200402062726.GA647295%40vbusired-dt%2F&data=02%7C01%7CAshish.Kalra%40amd.com%7C5ea8d5ae78814a01618908d7f06f7667%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637242233846313842&sdata=qfxRdCY3A1Tox%2FMI%2FQLmUcvIxbfL%2BwoR2fzfQa1FVkA%3D&reserved=0)?
> >
> > > + __u32 plat_certs_len;
> > > +
> > > + __u64 amd_certs_uaddr; /* AMD certificate */
> > > + __u32 amd_cert_len;
> >
> > Can this be changed as mentioned in the previous review
> > (https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flore.kernel.org%2Fkvm%2F20200402062726.GA647295%40vbusired-dt%2F&data=02%7C01%7CAshish.Kalra%40amd.com%7C5ea8d5ae78814a01618908d7f06f7667%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637242233846323835&sdata=SMYG1m%2BT2KwNQ4Jed%2BJhsK6TQ7EYTKT16moEoZMTf7c%3D&reserved=0)?
> >
> > > +
> > > + __u64 session_uaddr; /* Guest session information */
> > > + __u32 session_len;
> > > + };
> > > +
> > > References
> > > ==========
> > >
> > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> > > index cf912b4aaba8..5a15b43b4349 100644
> > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> > > @@ -913,6 +913,128 @@ static int sev_launch_secret(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
> > > return ret;
> > > }
> > >
> > > +/* Userspace wants to query session length. */
> > > +static int
> > > +__sev_send_start_query_session_length(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp,
> > > + struct kvm_sev_send_start *params)
> > > +{
> > > + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
> > > + struct sev_data_send_start *data;
> > > + int ret;
> > > +
> > > + data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
> > > + if (data == NULL)
> > > + return -ENOMEM;
> > > +
> > > + data->handle = sev->handle;
> > > + ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_START, data, &argp->error);
> > > +
> > > + params->session_len = data->session_len;
> > > + if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, params,
> > > + sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_start)))
> > > + ret = -EFAULT;
> > > +
> > > + kfree(data);
> > > + return ret;
> > > +}
> > > +
> > > +static int sev_send_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
> > > +{
> > > + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
> > > + struct sev_data_send_start *data;
> > > + struct kvm_sev_send_start params;
> > > + void *amd_certs, *session_data;
> > > + void *pdh_cert, *plat_certs;
> > > + int ret;
> > > +
> > > + if (!sev_guest(kvm))
> > > + return -ENOTTY;
> > > +
> > > + if (copy_from_user(&params, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data,
> > > + sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_start)))
> > > + return -EFAULT;
> > > +
> > > + /* if session_len is zero, userspace wants to query the session length */
> > > + if (!params.session_len)
> > > + return __sev_send_start_query_session_length(kvm, argp,
> > > + &params);
> > > +
> > > + /* some sanity checks */
> > > + if (!params.pdh_cert_uaddr || !params.pdh_cert_len ||
> > > + !params.session_uaddr || params.session_len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)
> > > + return -EINVAL;
> > > +
> > > + /* allocate the memory to hold the session data blob */
> > > + session_data = kmalloc(params.session_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
> > > + if (!session_data)
> > > + return -ENOMEM;
> > > +
> > > + /* copy the certificate blobs from userspace */
> > > + pdh_cert = psp_copy_user_blob(params.pdh_cert_uaddr,
> > > + params.pdh_cert_len);
> > > + if (IS_ERR(pdh_cert)) {
> > > + ret = PTR_ERR(pdh_cert);
> > > + goto e_free_session;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + plat_certs = psp_copy_user_blob(params.plat_certs_uaddr,
> > > + params.plat_certs_len);
> > > + if (IS_ERR(plat_certs)) {
> > > + ret = PTR_ERR(plat_certs);
> > > + goto e_free_pdh;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + amd_certs = psp_copy_user_blob(params.amd_certs_uaddr,
> > > + params.amd_certs_len);
> > > + if (IS_ERR(amd_certs)) {
> > > + ret = PTR_ERR(amd_certs);
> > > + goto e_free_plat_cert;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
> > > + if (data == NULL) {
> > > + ret = -ENOMEM;
> > > + goto e_free_amd_cert;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + /* populate the FW SEND_START field with system physical address */
> > > + data->pdh_cert_address = __psp_pa(pdh_cert);
> > > + data->pdh_cert_len = params.pdh_cert_len;
> > > + data->plat_certs_address = __psp_pa(plat_certs);
> > > + data->plat_certs_len = params.plat_certs_len;
> > > + data->amd_certs_address = __psp_pa(amd_certs);
> > > + data->amd_certs_len = params.amd_certs_len;
> > > + data->session_address = __psp_pa(session_data);
> > > + data->session_len = params.session_len;
> > > + data->handle = sev->handle;
> > > +
> >
> > Can the following code be changed as acknowledged in
> > https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flore.kernel.org%2Fkvm%2Ff715bf99-0158-4d5f-77f3-b27743db3c59%40amd.com%2F&data=02%7C01%7CAshish.Kalra%40amd.com%7C5ea8d5ae78814a01618908d7f06f7667%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637242233846323835&sdata=5hbjsP%2Btxt2rdv2PtIc%2BV8cAwKUNsRdtiRglDupYXzs%3D&reserved=0?
> >
>
> I believe that this has been already addressed as discussed :
>
> Ah, so the main issue is we should not be going to e_free on error. If
> session_len is less than the expected len then FW will return an error.
> In the case of an error we can skip copying the session_data into
> userspace buffer but we still need to pass the session_len and policy
> back to the userspace.
>
> So this patch is still returning session_len and policy back to user
> in case of error : ( as the code below shows )
>
> if (!ret && copy_to_user((void
> __user*)(uintptr_t)params.session_uaddr,...

This fix addresses only one part of the problem. I am referring to the
other suggestion about avoiding copying the entire kvm_sev_send_start
structure back to the user. As I was mentioning in the discussion,
the only fields that changed are the policy and session_len fields. So,
why copy back the entire structure? Why not just those two fields?

>
> Thanks,
> Ashish
>
> > > + ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_START, data, &argp->error);
> > > +
> > > + if (!ret && copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.session_uaddr,
> > > + session_data, params.session_len)) {
> > > + ret = -EFAULT;
> > > + goto e_free;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + params.policy = data->policy;
> > > + params.session_len = data->session_len;
> > > + if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, &params,
> > > + sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_start)))
> > > + ret = -EFAULT;
> > > +
> > > +e_free:
> > > + kfree(data);
> > > +e_free_amd_cert:
> > > + kfree(amd_certs);
> > > +e_free_plat_cert:
> > > + kfree(plat_certs);
> > > +e_free_pdh:
> > > + kfree(pdh_cert);
> > > +e_free_session:
> > > + kfree(session_data);
> > > + return ret;
> > > +}
> > > +
> > > int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
> > > {
> > > struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;
> > > @@ -957,6 +1079,9 @@ int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
> > > case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_SECRET:
> > > r = sev_launch_secret(kvm, &sev_cmd);
> > > break;
> > > + case KVM_SEV_SEND_START:
> > > + r = sev_send_start(kvm, &sev_cmd);
> > > + break;
> > > default:
> > > r = -EINVAL;
> > > goto out;
> > > diff --git a/include/linux/psp-sev.h b/include/linux/psp-sev.h
> > > index 5167bf2bfc75..9f63b9d48b63 100644
> > > --- a/include/linux/psp-sev.h
> > > +++ b/include/linux/psp-sev.h
> > > @@ -323,11 +323,11 @@ struct sev_data_send_start {
> > > u64 pdh_cert_address; /* In */
> > > u32 pdh_cert_len; /* In */
> > > u32 reserved1;
> > > - u64 plat_cert_address; /* In */
> > > - u32 plat_cert_len; /* In */
> > > + u64 plat_certs_address; /* In */
> > > + u32 plat_certs_len; /* In */
> > > u32 reserved2;
> > > - u64 amd_cert_address; /* In */
> > > - u32 amd_cert_len; /* In */
> > > + u64 amd_certs_address; /* In */
> > > + u32 amd_certs_len; /* In */
> > > u32 reserved3;
> > > u64 session_address; /* In */
> > > u32 session_len; /* In/Out */
> > > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
> > > index 428c7dde6b4b..8827d43e2684 100644
> > > --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
> > > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
> > > @@ -1598,6 +1598,18 @@ struct kvm_sev_dbg {
> > > __u32 len;
> > > };
> > >
> > > +struct kvm_sev_send_start {
> > > + __u32 policy;
> > > + __u64 pdh_cert_uaddr;
> > > + __u32 pdh_cert_len;
> > > + __u64 plat_certs_uaddr;
> > > + __u32 plat_certs_len;
> > > + __u64 amd_certs_uaddr;
> > > + __u32 amd_certs_len;
> > > + __u64 session_uaddr;
> > > + __u32 session_len;
> > > +};
> > > +
> > > #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_ENABLE_IOMMU (1 << 0)
> > > #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_PCI_2_3 (1 << 1)
> > > #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_MASK_INTX (1 << 2)
> > > --
> > > 2.17.1
> > >

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In reply to: Ashish Kalra: "Re: [PATCH v7 01/18] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV SEND_START command"
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