On Wed, 2020-05-13 at 12:18 -0700, Scott Branden wrote:Huh? I said existing functionality is NOT broken by this patch series.
On 2020-05-13 12:03 p.m., Mimi Zohar wrote:There are also environments where the kernel is trusted and limits the
On Wed, 2020-05-13 at 11:53 -0700, Scott Branden wrote:Even if the kernel successfully verified the firmware file signature it
would just be wasting its time. The kernel in these use cases is not always
trusted. The device needs to authenticate the firmware image itself.
firmware being provided to the device to one which they signed.
Sure the device doesn't need the kernel measuring the firmware, butThe device firmware is being downloaded piecemeal from somewhere andIt doesn't need to be measured for current driver needs.
won't be measured?
hardened environments do measure firmware.
If someone has such need the infrastructure could be added to the kernelWow! ÂYou're saying that your patch set takes precedence over the
at a later date. Existing functionality is not broken in any way by
this patch series.
existing expectations and can break them.
Mimi