Re: [PATCH v12 00/18] Enable FSGSBASE instructions
From: Jarkko Sakkinen
Date: Fri May 15 2020 - 05:24:22 EST
On Mon, 2020-05-11 at 00:52 -0400, Sasha Levin wrote:
> Benefits:
> Currently a user process that wishes to read or write the FS/GS base must
> make a system call. But recent X86 processors have added new instructions
> for use in 64-bit mode that allow direct access to the FS and GS segment
> base addresses. The operating system controls whether applications can
> use these instructions with a %cr4 control bit.
>
> In addition to benefits to applications, performance improvements to the
> OS context switch code are possible by making use of these instructions. A
> third party reported out promising performance numbers out of their
> initial benchmarking of the previous version of this patch series [9].
>
> Enablement check:
> The kernel provides information about the enabled state of FSGSBASE to
> applications using the ELF_AUX vector. If the HWCAP2_FSGSBASE bit is set in
> the AUX vector, the kernel has FSGSBASE instructions enabled and
> applications can use them.
>
> Kernel changes:
> Major changes made in the kernel are in context switch, paranoid path, and
> ptrace. In a context switch, a task's FS/GS base will be secured regardless
> of its selector. In the paranoid path, GS base is unconditionally
> overwritten to the kernel GS base on entry and the original GS base is
> restored on exit. Ptrace includes divergence of FS/GS index and base
> values.
>
> Security:
> For mitigating the Spectre v1 SWAPGS issue, LFENCE instructions were added
> on most kernel entries. Those patches are dependent on previous behaviors
> that users couldn't load a kernel address into the GS base. These patches
> change that assumption since the user can load any address into GS base.
> The changes to the kernel entry path in this patch series take account of
> the SWAPGS issue.
>
> Changes from v11:
>
> - Rebase to v5.7-rc5, fix 32bit compilation error.
>
>
> Andi Kleen (2):
> x86/fsgsbase/64: Add intrinsics for FSGSBASE instructions
> x86/elf: Enumerate kernel FSGSBASE capability in AT_HWCAP2
>
> Andy Lutomirski (4):
> x86/cpu: Add 'unsafe_fsgsbase' to enable CR4.FSGSBASE
> x86/entry/64: Clean up paranoid exit
> x86/fsgsbase/64: Use FSGSBASE in switch_to() if available
> x86/fsgsbase/64: Enable FSGSBASE on 64bit by default and add a chicken
> bit
>
> Chang S. Bae (9):
> x86/ptrace: Prevent ptrace from clearing the FS/GS selector
> selftests/x86/fsgsbase: Test GS selector on ptracer-induced GS base
> write
> x86/entry/64: Switch CR3 before SWAPGS in paranoid entry
> x86/entry/64: Introduce the FIND_PERCPU_BASE macro
> x86/entry/64: Handle FSGSBASE enabled paranoid entry/exit
> x86/entry/64: Document GSBASE handling in the paranoid path
> x86/fsgsbase/64: Enable FSGSBASE instructions in helper functions
> x86/fsgsbase/64: Use FSGSBASE instructions on thread copy and ptrace
> selftests/x86/fsgsbase: Test ptracer-induced GS base write with
> FSGSBASE
>
> Sasha Levin (1):
> x86/fsgsbase/64: move save_fsgs to header file
>
> Thomas Gleixner (1):
> Documentation/x86/64: Add documentation for GS/FS addressing mode
>
> Tony Luck (1):
> x86/speculation/swapgs: Check FSGSBASE in enabling SWAPGS mitigation
>
> .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 2 +
> Documentation/x86/entry_64.rst | 9 +
> Documentation/x86/x86_64/fsgs.rst | 199 ++++++++++++++++++
> Documentation/x86/x86_64/index.rst | 1 +
> arch/x86/entry/calling.h | 40 ++++
> arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 131 +++++++++---
> arch/x86/include/asm/fsgsbase.h | 45 +++-
> arch/x86/include/asm/inst.h | 15 ++
> arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/hwcap2.h | 3 +
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 6 +-
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 22 ++
> arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 9 +-
> arch/x86/kernel/process.h | 72 +++++++
> arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 142 +++++++------
> arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c | 17 +-
> tools/testing/selftests/x86/fsgsbase.c | 24 ++-
> 16 files changed, 608 insertions(+), 129 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/x86_64/fsgs.rst
>
Can you put me to the CC-loop for this patches. Some SGX-enabled
frameworks such as Graphene use out-of-tree changes to achieve this.
That's where the interest to possibly test this comes from.
Thanks.
[*] https://github.com/oscarlab/graphene
/Jarkko