[PATCH 5.6 115/161] ovl: fix out of bounds access warning in ovl_check_fb_len()

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman
Date: Tue Jun 16 2020 - 11:59:43 EST


From: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@xxxxxxxxx>

commit 522f6e6cba6880a038e2bd88e10390b84cd3febd upstream.

syzbot reported out of bounds memory access from open_by_handle_at()
with a crafted file handle that looks like this:

{ .handle_bytes = 2, .handle_type = OVL_FILEID_V1 }

handle_bytes gets rounded down to 0 and we end up calling:
ovl_check_fh_len(fh, 0) => ovl_check_fb_len(fh + 3, -3)

But fh buffer is only 2 bytes long, so accessing struct ovl_fb at
fh + 3 is illegal.

Fixes: cbe7fba8edfc ("ovl: make sure that real fid is 32bit aligned in memory")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+61958888b1c60361a791@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Cc: <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> # v5.5
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@xxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

---
fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

--- a/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h
@@ -339,6 +339,9 @@ int ovl_check_fb_len(struct ovl_fb *fb,

static inline int ovl_check_fh_len(struct ovl_fh *fh, int fh_len)
{
+ if (fh_len < sizeof(struct ovl_fh))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
return ovl_check_fb_len(&fh->fb, fh_len - OVL_FH_WIRE_OFFSET);
}