Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver

[Jarkko Sakkinen]

On Thu, Jun 25, 2020 at 08:53:34PM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 01:08:33AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> 
> > Subject: Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver
> 					 ^
> 					 Add

I'll change it to "Add SGX enclave driver".

> 
> > Intel Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) is a set of CPU instructions that
> > can be used by applications to set aside private regions of code and
> > data. The code outside the SGX hosted software entity is disallowed to
> > access the memory inside the enclave enforced by the CPU. We call these
> > entities as enclaves.
> 
> s/as //
> 
> > This commit implements a driver that provides an ioctl API to construct
> 
> s/This commit implements/Implement/
> 
> > and run enclaves. Enclaves are constructed from pages residing in
> > reserved physical memory areas. The contents of these pages can only be
> > accessed when they are mapped as part of an enclave, by a hardware
> > thread running inside the enclave.
> > 
> > The starting state of an enclave consists of a fixed measured set of
> > pages that are copied to the EPC during the construction process by
> > using ENCLS leaf functions and Software Enclave Control Structure (SECS)
> > that defines the enclave properties.
> > 
> > Enclave are constructed by using ENCLS leaf functions ECREATE, EADD and
> 
> Enclaves
> 
> > EINIT. ECREATE initializes SECS, EADD copies pages from system memory to
> > the EPC and EINIT check a given signed measurement and moves the enclave
> 
> 		   checks
> 
> > into a state ready for execution.
> > 
> > An initialized enclave can only be accessed through special Thread Control
> > Structure (TCS) pages by using ENCLU (ring-3 only) leaf EENTER.  This leaf
> > function converts a thread into enclave mode and continues the execution in
> > the offset defined by the TCS provided to EENTER. An enclave is exited
> > through syscall, exception, interrupts or by explicitly calling another
> > ENCLU leaf EEXIT.
> > 
> > The permissions, which enclave page is added will set the limit for maximum
> > permissions that can be set for mmap() and mprotect().
> 
> I can't parse that sentence.

Neither can I.

> > This will
> > effectively allow to build different security schemes between producers and
> > consumers of enclaves. Later on we can increase granularity with LSM hooks
> > for page addition (i.e. for producers) and mapping of the enclave (i.e. for
> > consumers)

I rephrased the whole paragraph:

"
The mmap() permissions are capped by the contained enclave page
permissions. The mapped areas must also be opaque, i.e. each page address
must contain a page. This logic is implemented in sgx_encl_may_map().
"

> Other than that, nice explanation. I like that in a commit message.
> 
> Thx.

Thank you.

> 
> -- 
> Regards/Gruss,
>     Boris.
> 
> https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette

/Jarkko