Re: [PATCH] MIPS: Prevent READ_IMPLIES_EXEC propagation

From: Thomas Bogendoerfer
Date: Thu Jul 16 2020 - 08:04:45 EST


On Tue, Jul 07, 2020 at 05:39:01PM +0800, Tiezhu Yang wrote:
> In the MIPS architecture, we should clear the security-relevant
> flag READ_IMPLIES_EXEC in the function SET_PERSONALITY2() of the
> file arch/mips/include/asm/elf.h.
>
> Otherwise, with this flag set, PROT_READ implies PROT_EXEC for
> mmap to make memory executable that is not safe, because this
> condition allows an attacker to simply jump to and execute bytes
> that are considered to be just data [1].
>
> In mm/mmap.c:
> unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
> unsigned long len, unsigned long prot,
> unsigned long flags, vm_flags_t vm_flags,
> unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long *populate,
> struct list_head *uf)
> {
> [...]
> if ((prot & PROT_READ) && (current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC))
> if (!(file && path_noexec(&file->f_path)))
> prot |= PROT_EXEC;
> [...]
> }
>
> By the way, x86 and ARM64 have done the similar thing.
>
> After commit 250c22777fe1 ("x86_64: move kernel"), in the file
> arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c:
> void set_personality_64bit(void)
> {
> [...]
> current->personality &= ~READ_IMPLIES_EXEC;
> }
>
> After commit 48f99c8ec0b2 ("arm64: Preventing READ_IMPLIES_EXEC
> propagation"), in the file arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h:
> #define SET_PERSONALITY(ex) \
> ({ \
> clear_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT); \
> current->personality &= ~READ_IMPLIES_EXEC; \
> })
>
> [1] https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/cert/2014/02/feeling-insecure-blame-your-parent.html
>
> Reported-by: Juxin Gao <gaojuxin@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> Co-developed-by: Juxin Gao <gaojuxin@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Juxin Gao <gaojuxin@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Tiezhu Yang <yangtiezhu@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> arch/mips/include/asm/elf.h | 1 +
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

applied to mips-next.

Thomas.

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