Re: [PATCH RFC 1/2] mm: Extract SLAB_QUARANTINE from KASAN
From: Pavel Machek
Date: Sun Aug 16 2020 - 16:17:11 EST
On Sat 2020-08-15 19:54:55, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
> On Thu, Aug 13, 2020 at 06:19:21PM +0300, Alexander Popov wrote:
> > +config SLAB_QUARANTINE
> > + bool "Enable slab freelist quarantine"
> > + depends on !KASAN && (SLAB || SLUB)
> > + help
> > + Enable slab freelist quarantine to break heap spraying technique
> > + used for exploiting use-after-free vulnerabilities in the kernel
> > + code. If this feature is enabled, freed allocations are stored
> > + in the quarantine and can't be instantly reallocated and
> > + overwritten by the exploit performing heap spraying.
> > + This feature is a part of KASAN functionality.
>
> After this patch, it isn't part of KASAN any more ;-)
>
> The way this is written is a bit too low level. Let's write it in terms
> that people who don't know the guts of the slab allocator or security
> terminology can understand:
>
> Delay reuse of freed slab objects. This makes some security
> exploits harder to execute. It reduces performance slightly
> as objects will be cache cold by the time they are reallocated,
> and it costs a small amount of memory.
Written this way, it invites questions:
Does it introduce any new deadlocks in near out-of-memory situations?
Best regards,
Pavel
--
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
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