Re: [PATCH RESEND] docs: update trusted-encrypted.rst

[James Bottomley]

On Tue, 2020-08-18 at 18:44 +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Sun, Aug 16, 2020 at 10:12:13AM -0700, James Bottomley wrote:
> > On Mon, 2020-08-17 at 00:57 +0800, Coly Li wrote:
> > > On 2020/8/17 00:36, James Bottomley wrote:
> > > > On Sun, 2020-08-16 at 12:06 -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
> > > > [...]
> > > > > A note in this file states this:
> > > > > 
> > > > > Note: When using a TPM 2.0 with a persistent key with handle
> > > > > 0x81000001, append 'keyhandle=0x81000001' to statements
> > > > > between quotes, such as "new 32 keyhandle=0x81000001".
> > > > > 
> > > > > Now if someone was (still) interested in TPM 1.2 
> > > > > adapt the  note to state that these keyhandle=... should be
> > > > > removed for the TPM 1.2 case.
> > > > 
> > > > Actually, I also have a plan to match what userspace does and
> > > > simply assume a keyhandle of 40000001 (generate an EC Storage
> > > > Primary Key on the fly) if it's not specified, which will make
> > > > the TPM1.2 and 2.0 versions of this the same.  Unfortunately
> > > > the necessary precursor patches are taking an age to get
> > > > upstream.
> > > 
> > > Hi James,
> > > 
> > > Do you have a plan to push such patches into upstream soon? If
> > > yes than I may wait for your patch and withdraw this one.
> > 
> > Well, as I said above it depends on not yet upstream precursor
> > patches.  They have been pending for about a year, so I've no real
> > idea of the timeline.
> > 
> > James
> 
> As far as I remember there was not much left in the previous version
> to do. Some time has passed when it was discussed but I recall it was
> mainly about documenting the key format.

Actually, no, unfortunately it's not in that update.  Generating an on-
the-fly primary would involve the cryptographic security patch (same
mechanism as used to generate the null primary).  I was thinking I'd
extract just that piece and use it in a follow on.  So both the rework
of the key format and this extra patch that's not yet even broken out
of the TPM security series are required precursors.

James