Re: [PATCH 20/35] arm64: mte: Add in-kernel MTE helpers

[Andrey Konovalov]

On Thu, Aug 27, 2020 at 11:38 AM Catalin Marinas
<catalin.marinas@xxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On Fri, Aug 14, 2020 at 07:27:02PM +0200, Andrey Konovalov wrote:
> > diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mte.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mte.h
> > index 1c99fcadb58c..733be1cb5c95 100644
> > --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mte.h
> > +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mte.h
> > @@ -5,14 +5,19 @@
> >  #ifndef __ASM_MTE_H
> >  #define __ASM_MTE_H
> >
> > -#define MTE_GRANULE_SIZE     UL(16)
> > +#include <asm/mte_asm.h>
>
> So the reason for this move is to include it in asm/cache.h. Fine by
> me but...
>
> >  #define MTE_GRANULE_MASK     (~(MTE_GRANULE_SIZE - 1))
> >  #define MTE_TAG_SHIFT                56
> >  #define MTE_TAG_SIZE         4
> > +#define MTE_TAG_MASK         GENMASK((MTE_TAG_SHIFT + (MTE_TAG_SIZE - 1)), MTE_TAG_SHIFT)
> > +#define MTE_TAG_MAX          (MTE_TAG_MASK >> MTE_TAG_SHIFT)
>
> ... I'd rather move all these definitions in a file with a more
> meaningful name like mte-def.h. The _asm implies being meant for .S
> files inclusion which isn't the case.

Sounds good, I'll leave fixing this and other arm64-specific comments
to Vincenzo. I'll change KASAN code to use mte-def.h once I have
patches where this file is renamed.

>
> > diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c
> > index eb39504e390a..e2d708b4583d 100644
> > --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c
> > +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c
> > @@ -72,6 +74,47 @@ int memcmp_pages(struct page *page1, struct page *page2)
> >       return ret;
> >  }
> >
> > +u8 mte_get_mem_tag(void *addr)
> > +{
> > +     if (system_supports_mte())
> > +             addr = mte_assign_valid_ptr_tag(addr);
>
> The mte_assign_valid_ptr_tag() is slightly misleading. All it does is
> read the allocation tag from memory.
>
> I also think this should be inline asm, possibly using alternatives.
> It's just an LDG instruction (and it saves us from having to invent a
> better function name).
>
> > +
> > +     return 0xF0 | mte_get_ptr_tag(addr);
> > +}
> > +
> > +u8 mte_get_random_tag(void)
> > +{
> > +     u8 tag = 0xF;
> > +
> > +     if (system_supports_mte())
> > +             tag = mte_get_ptr_tag(mte_assign_random_ptr_tag(NULL));
>
> Another alternative inline asm with an IRG instruction.
>
> > +
> > +     return 0xF0 | tag;
> > +}
> > +
> > +void * __must_check mte_set_mem_tag_range(void *addr, size_t size, u8 tag)
> > +{
> > +     void *ptr = addr;
> > +
> > +     if ((!system_supports_mte()) || (size == 0))
> > +             return addr;
> > +
> > +     tag = 0xF0 | (tag & 0xF);
> > +     ptr = (void *)__tag_set(ptr, tag);
> > +     size = ALIGN(size, MTE_GRANULE_SIZE);
>
> I think aligning the size is dangerous. Can we instead turn it into a
> WARN_ON if not already aligned? At a quick look, the callers of
> kasan_{un,}poison_memory() already align the size.
>
> > +
> > +     mte_assign_mem_tag_range(ptr, size);
> > +
> > +     /*
> > +      * mte_assign_mem_tag_range() can be invoked in a multi-threaded
> > +      * context, ensure that tags are written in memory before the
> > +      * reference is used.
> > +      */
> > +     smp_wmb();
> > +
> > +     return ptr;
>
> I'm not sure I understand the barrier here. It ensures the relative
> ordering of memory (or tag) accesses on a CPU as observed by other CPUs.
> While the first access here is setting the tag, I can't see what other
> access on _this_ CPU it is ordered with.
>
> > +}
> > +
> >  static void update_sctlr_el1_tcf0(u64 tcf0)
> >  {
> >       /* ISB required for the kernel uaccess routines */
> > diff --git a/arch/arm64/lib/mte.S b/arch/arm64/lib/mte.S
> > index 03ca6d8b8670..8c743540e32c 100644
> > --- a/arch/arm64/lib/mte.S
> > +++ b/arch/arm64/lib/mte.S
> > @@ -149,3 +149,44 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(mte_restore_page_tags)
> >
> >       ret
> >  SYM_FUNC_END(mte_restore_page_tags)
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * Assign pointer tag based on the allocation tag
> > + *   x0 - source pointer
> > + * Returns:
> > + *   x0 - pointer with the correct tag to access memory
> > + */
> > +SYM_FUNC_START(mte_assign_valid_ptr_tag)
> > +     ldg     x0, [x0]
> > +     ret
> > +SYM_FUNC_END(mte_assign_valid_ptr_tag)
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * Assign random pointer tag
> > + *   x0 - source pointer
> > + * Returns:
> > + *   x0 - pointer with a random tag
> > + */
> > +SYM_FUNC_START(mte_assign_random_ptr_tag)
> > +     irg     x0, x0
> > +     ret
> > +SYM_FUNC_END(mte_assign_random_ptr_tag)
>
> As I said above, these two can be inline asm.
>
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * Assign allocation tags for a region of memory based on the pointer tag
> > + *   x0 - source pointer
> > + *   x1 - size
> > + *
> > + * Note: size is expected to be MTE_GRANULE_SIZE aligned
> > + */
> > +SYM_FUNC_START(mte_assign_mem_tag_range)
> > +     /* if (src == NULL) return; */
> > +     cbz     x0, 2f
> > +     /* if (size == 0) return; */
>
> You could skip the cbz here and just document that the size should be
> non-zero and aligned. The caller already takes care of this check.
>
> > +     cbz     x1, 2f
> > +1:   stg     x0, [x0]
> > +     add     x0, x0, #MTE_GRANULE_SIZE
> > +     sub     x1, x1, #MTE_GRANULE_SIZE
> > +     cbnz    x1, 1b
> > +2:   ret
> > +SYM_FUNC_END(mte_assign_mem_tag_range)
>
> --
> Catalin
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "kasan-dev" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to kasan-dev+unsubscribe@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.
> To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/kasan-dev/20200827093808.GB29264%40gaia.